God and Time in Whitehead

Abstract

While it is generally agreed that conceives of in Process and Reality as a single nontemporal actual entity, several interpreters have suggested that there difficulties in that conception should be remedied by thinking of as a society of personally ordered actual occasions. This article focuses upon John Cobb's argument for societal view and suggests that that argument, as well as alternative proposal offered by William Christian, is based upon a confusion of Whitehead's two kinds of process (the process of becoming, or concrescence, and process of transition) and their relationship to time. The author seeks to demonstrate that Whitehead's system in Process and Reality not only allows a conception of as a single nontemporal everlasting actual entity but, in fact, demands it. Bowman L. Clarke is Professor of Philosophy and head of Department of Philosophy and Religion at University of Georgia. He is author of and Whitehead's Conception of Speculative Philosophy, Language and Natural Theology, and other publications. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 05:44:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 564 Bowman L. Clarke Most interpreters of agree that in Process and Reality is conceived by as a single nontemporal actual entity. A number of interpreters, however, have argued that this view involves difficulties can be remedied if we reconstruct along lines of a personally ordered society of actual occasions, or a nexus. Let us refer to this first view as entitative view and to second as societal view./l/ In this paper I want to examine these apparent difficulties posed by entitative view, seem to suggest that a societal view is more coherent, or consistent, with Whiteheadian metaphysics -primarily those difficulties posed by John Cobb in his A Christian Natural Theology. There may be reasons external to Whiteheadian metaphysics, such as religious, philosophical, or scientific reasons, to prefer a societal view,/2/ but I want to focus solely on those apparent problems internal to writings of seem to suggest that a societal view is preferable. And I shall use problems raised by Cobb as an occasion for investigating anew problem of relation of to in Process and Reality. Cobb's argument that a societal view is preferable to entitative view can conveniently be summarized in eight steps and a conclusion as follows: 1. From point of view of physical actual occasions temporally (185). This assertion is understood to mean that perish as soon as they have (187). This is taken to mean, Cobb writes, that the temporal extension happens at as an unit (186). Or again, Cobb writes, the occasion must be said to become at once (186), and this is taken to mean that occasions are into earlier and later portions (185-86). The second step concerns sequential ordering of physical time: 2. [P]hysical [is] derived from transition from one occasion to (185). is in this way, Cobb tells us, that Whitehead's reference to Locke's time is a perpetual perishing is to be understood. He writes, for example, For 'time' is physical time, and it is 'perpetual perishing' (187). Time, then, is a series, each member of is to be conceived as becoming all at once of a temporally atomic actual occasion is indivisible into earlier and later portions and which perishes as soon as it has become, and is then succeeded by another such atomic actual occasion, and so on. 3. Whitehead recognizes process in consequent nature of God (188). This, of course, is a rather important premise since it is taken by most interpreters of to be what distinguishes his view of from classical views. And it is generally taken to be his major contribution to theology. Cobb summarizes Whitehead's view this way: It is quite clear that description of as non-temporal does not This content downloaded from 157.55.39.144 on Wed, 07 Sep 2016 05:44:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms