Actors In International Affairs Research Articles

L'empreinte de l’avion militaire JSF / F-35 Lightning II aux Pays-Bas. Considérations géopolitiques et géo-économiques sur l'acquisition et la production d'armement

While the European Union aims at developing a common foreign policy and a common arms market, European states still collaborate poorly in the field of actual defence procurement. National firms (each furtively supported by its national government) often compete with each other as much as with American ones, European initiatives compete with Transatlantic ones. At the same time the relations between the European Defence and Security Policy (EDSP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) remain a much debated issue. While the positions of the larger member states (France, UK and Germany) are well known in this field, the views and practices of the smaller member states are hardly discussed in the literature. This paper explores the geopolitical and geo-economical dimensions of policy making regarding military technology and production in the Netherlands. A neutral country until German invasion and occupation (1940-45), the Netherlands is a founding member of the European Communities and NATO, and a close ally of the US and the UK. Around 2000 it was in absolute terms the sixth spender in the EU regarding both military Research & Development and Equipment Procurement. What are the geopolitical and geo-economical arguments of the Dutch government to procure a new generation of jet fighters and to participate in the Joint Strike Fighter programme to develop and produce the Lockheed Martin-F-35 Lightning II rather than to purchase the French Rafale or the Eurofighter? What does this mean for the further development of the EU as a territorial actor in international affairs?

War memories and Japan’s ‘normalization’ as an international actor: A critical analysis

The paradigmatic case in which an almost permanent impasse exists in coming to terms with a difficult war past and ‘normalizing’ its international relations is that of Japan. Although successive Japanese governments have apologized over the last few decades, these have been countered by periodic episodes within Japan revolving largely around history textbooks, the remembrance of war dead and the quest by nationalists to restore national pride in the past. Regional relations were especially strained during the premiership of Koizumi Juni’chirô and his immediate successor, Abe Shinzô. They improved under Fukuda Yasuo, a moderate on war memory issues, and remained steady under Asô Tarô. Japan’s latest prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio, appears determined to address Japan’s war past more openly and critically than previous LDP figures, no doubt with an eye to improving Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbours. But whatever line he pursues, contestation over war memories will remain an issue. They are driven by deep divisions within Japan at the same time that political leaders seek a more prominent identity for Japan as a ‘normal’ actor in international affairs. This article analyses key aspects of the politics of Japan’s war memories, using insights from collective memory studies and constructivist IR theory. We suggest that the quest for ‘normality’ has generated a set of tensions and contradictions over the issue of war memories, both domestically and internationally, for which there is no resolution in sight.

The state strategy in today's global economy: a reset position in the theory of international political economy

The main purpose of this article is to present a theoretical view on the current position of the state towards international economy but also its strategy based on economy and the indicators of economic power. This effort is based on the theory of international political economy and the rapidly changing policies and economic conditions of the international community. More precisely, the topics examined are the following: the interlink between economy and politics, the strategy that the state develops in order to ensure its security, the means used by the state for this strategy, such as the indicators of power, economy and technology. The study introduces the following work hypothesis: if there is a high degree of economic interdependence and a globalised economy in the international interstate system, then the strategy of the state (as the main actor in international affairs) is based on new data for the ensuring of its survival which refer to specific indicators of power like those of economy and technology.

Of Note: Bloggers as Actors in International Affairs?

Of Note Bloggers as Actors in International Affairs? Kevin Mazur (bio) In contrast to Washington, D.C., which serves as a nexus of international political and economic influence on the American policymaking process, the capitals of many Arab states are the sites of secretive policymaking with processes that are opaque even to most experts. The kind of information control exercised by the governments of most Middle Eastern states is at odds with the diffusion of power and avenues of influence that are emerging in the capitals of powerful nations and regional blocks. In countries like Syria, decisions about the state’s most important policies are made by a small elite consisting largely of blood relatives. News of these decisions filters down to the populace and to international actors primarily through the mechanism of state-controlled newspapers, which present and omit issues exactly as their governments see fit. Phone calls are monitored, many foreign newspapers are banned, and access to many websites is blocked. Such policies are aimed preserving the primacy and security of the state by limiting the ability of individuals to organize against it. This task is often accomplished in broad strokes; Facebook, YouTube, Google Maps, and Wikipedia are among a long list of websites that the government in Damascus has banned. But state control in Syria is often accomplished through decidedly low-tech methods. In Damascus, internet café owners receive photocopied instructions that describe a host of activities deemed illicit by the state; it is not uncommon for security service officers to stop by and enquire about any ‘suspicious activity’ on the part of café patrons. But any serious Syrian internet user can rattle off a long list of proxy server sites that allow him or her to circumvent government controls. While much of Syrian internet users’ maneuvering is aimed at writing on friends’ Facebook walls or downloading old episodes of “Buffy the Vampire Slayer,” these methods are also used to access and distribute oppositional political information more quickly and safely than was possible in an earlier age. Some degree of information control is a necessary condition for the maintenance of autocratic power, especially for a state like Syria that has an [End Page 99] ethnically distinct ruling group that is disliked by much of the population under its control. Yet while the internet and the patterns of communication that it has spawned continue to pose particular challenges for autocratic states, the internet has also limited the effectiveness of all states—autocratic or not—to control or shape the information disseminated about them. During its recent incursion into the Gaza Strip, for example, Israel hoped to minimize international fallout from the invasion by limiting the access of Western reporters to the territory. The Israeli government took a page from the media control tactics of its Arab neighbors, barring Western journalists from entering Gaza. This policy stood until an Israeli Supreme Court decision asserted the right of foreign journalists to access Gaza—over a week after the official end of hostilities. But the result of this infringement of access to information only mirrored the failures of Israel’s neighbors to contain inconvenient information. Bloggers in Gaza gained a new level of prominence during the invasion, becoming a source of detailed information that formal medial institutions were blocked from gathering themselves. The BBC, for example, turned to informal media (or “citizen journalism”) for its news on Gaza, distributing the footage of its former cameramen to millions of viewers throughout the world. Given the rising importance that public and international opinion have on a state’s ability to effectively wage wars, new media pose a challenge to the state’s pursuit of its interests by giving dissident voices new and effective tools with which to poke holes in official narratives. Paradoxically, perhaps, new media also pose problems for the creation of democratic institutions in those same societies—at least insofar as blogging and other forms of new media contain their own problems with transparency and fact-checking. Nevertheless, while the proliferation of internet technology looks unlikely to occasion a wholesale rearrangement of the state system, it is creating new opportunities for opposition in states whose leaders take great pains to suppress...

Why We Don’t Need a Fourth of July

2007 was a good year for discussing New Zealand’s independence. On 26 September 2007 New Zealand marked the centennial of the first Dominion Day in 1907, which was hailed at the time as New Zealand’s ‘Fourth of July’. On 25 November 2007 New Zealand reached the 60th anniversary of the adoption of the Statute of Westminster. There are, however, other dates to celebrate. The Statute of Westminster received assent on 11 December 1931 and, in the words of two Australian scholars, ‘independence given is not somehow inferior to independence taken’. New Zealand was separately represented for the first time at two international conferences in 1912 and by signing the League of Nations Covenant in 1919 became recognised as a separate actor in international affairs. In spite of this achievement of political and diplomatic independence many were reluctant to accept full sovereignty. The famous ’status formula’ of 1926, by which New Zealand accepted equality of status and free association with Britain and the other Dominions, was regarded as a ‘poisonous document’ by the Prime Minister of the day. After taking an independent line in the League of Nations and making a separate decision to go to war in 1939, New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser could say that Dominion status was ‘independence with something added’. But he dropped the title ‘Dominion’ in 1945; the country joined the United Nations as ‘New Zealand’. The Head of State was cited as 'Queen of New Zealand’ in 1953. In 1986 Parliament authorised its own existence and repealed the Statute of Westminster as part of New Zealand law. In place of a revolutionary moment and national declaration, what occurred was a peaceful, gradual process of constitutional evolution, rather subtle and satisfying.

The European Union a stepping stone to further integration or rather a Eurocentric fortress?

The European Union a stepping stone to further integration or rather a Eurocentric fortress? Still with the memory of the destructive national power of the Second World War, the main initiators of the European integration stirred this project with the objective of preventing further conflicts through economic integration. Closer economic ties, spilling over to more countries and more policy areas lead to the development of an ever closer union which has become a powerful actor in international affairs. This essay will explore the question to what extent the European Union can be characterized as Eurocentric regionalism, rather focused on internal integration and enforcing outside borders than on global understanding. In order to shed light on this question several policy areas will be analysed, such as the European aid and trade policy, as well as the agricultural policy as these are areas where the European Union is directly confronted with external politics and international interests.

American Hegemony or Global Governance? Competing Visions of International Security

Since the 1990s, the concepts of global and security governance have emerged as new frameworks for the analysis of international relations. The proponents of these approaches have argued that we are witnessing a transformation in global politics through the simultaneous dynamics of integration and fragmentation. The result of these two dynamics is a shift away from the state as the primary authority and actor in international affairs, thus challenging the state-centric theoretical perspectives that had developed during the Cold War. Although states retain a central role, the literature on global and security governance suggests that a growing number of international organizations and private actors, such as multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations, are taking on functions ranging from the making to the implementation of international policies (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Finkelstein 1995). Moreover, in addition to sectors such as those involving international finance, economics, and the environment (Young 2000; Hall and Biersteker 2002), the proponents of the governance concept find that the fragmentation of policymaking capabilities and authority among state and nonstate actors is also increasingly observed in the international security arena. In 1995, the Commission on Global Governance (1995:99) observed: The breakdown of the bipolar cold war system means that responses to security crises—both with preventive efforts and beyond them—have to come from a wider group of nations and organizations than before. The United Nations, particularly the Security Council, has the principal responsibility. But regional bodies and a wide range of civil society organization are now in a position to play useful roles. Nearly 10 years later, the concepts of global and security governance have increasingly become popular in the study of international security (Axworth 2001; Duffield 2001; Croft, Krahmann, and Howorth 2004). This popularity rests on the argument that subnational and transnational threats—such as …

Foreword

Foreword Negar Akhavi, Benjamin Hengst, and Maia Linask In this issue of the SAIS Review, we address two topics of undeniable significance in foreign affairs today: demographic shifts and their consequences, and the impact of religion as a global actor in international affairs. Demographic change might be likened to the progress of a glacier: slow moving, difficult to predict with much accuracy, but massive in its impact on its surroundings. From the standpoint of academics, policymakers, and practitioners in the international relations field, studying changes in population and designing appropriate policies are decidedly less glamorous than dealing with any number of burning, media-friendly crises. Yet as our authors' articles convincingly demonstrate, there are few social issues with more pressing relevance to both developing and industrialized countries, to relations between the two, and to the Earth in general. Pick a spot on the planet, and you are likely to find some population trend in progress, whether it is declining birthrates, skyrocketing young populations, or devastation from HIV/AIDS. The effects of such shifts can be felt locally, nationally, and even internationally. Stephen Schwenke leads off our examination of demography with an essay that begins with observations on the growth of mega cities in the developing world and moves to examine some of the moral issues that confront policymakers and practitioners working in international development. Central to his questioning are numbers—the data on populations and population trends that we all use to make decisions—and their appropriateness at different times. In terms of sheer immediacy, several countries are confronting population changes that may threaten their very foundations. Nicholas Eberstadt details the crisis facing Russia, which has been adversely affected by a collapsed birthrate and an abnormally high death rate. He shows how these demographic challenges could dramatically influence Russia's developmental pathway. Andrea den Boer and Valerie Hudson contribute to the emerging subfield of "security demographics" with their piece on gender ratios in Asia—particularly in China and India—and the impending security challenges posed by such imbalances. Sanam Vakil writes on demographic changes in Iran and explores in detail the pressures on the current regime brought on by a large surge in youth who are now coming of age with increasing social, economic and political demands. And addressing a subject that often comes to mind as one of the foremost demographic challenges today, Pramit Mitra explores the looming HIV/AIDS crisis in India, the national government's response, and ways in which the international community can not only help but also learn some lessons from the Indian experience. As populations grow older, governments on the other end of the development spectrum face increased fiscal strains arising from, among other [End Page vii] things, health care costs and pension payments. Frank Eich examines such fiscal challenges brought on by Europe's aging population, and finds that while these trends will indeed test the finances of many states, promising policies intended to address these concerns are already being implemented. Ken Henry's piece, which surveys population aging in Australia and examines government responses there, offers an interesting chance to compare policy options among wealthier nations. Population growth and decline, and the challenges these changes can present, are evident not only in various cities and nations but also within the boundaries of individual religions. Indeed, the role of religion in international affairs has made a resurgence, and rather than dismissing it as an altogether negative force, we have several articles that examine the often overlooked laudatory effects of religion as an actor in the international and development arenas. Reminiscent of the once praised Protestant ethic, Marcus Noland and Howard Pack combine demography and religion in an insightful investigation of the challenges posed by the "youth bulge" in their article on economic performance, Islam, and the Middle East, a region whose population could increase by 60 percent by 2020. Scott Thomas's essay explores methods by which faith-based foreign aid can be made more effective—specifically, by incorporating a "virtue-ethics" approach. Tim Shah contributes a nuanced piece on evangelical Christianity's spread in the developing world, arguing that the distinctive characteristics of this form of Christianity make it unlikely to bring...

Book Review: War and Power in the 21st century

Paul Hirst Oxford: Polity, 2001, vi + 170pp., 11.99 [pounds sterling] (paperback). This is a comparatively slight book that attempts the daunting task of predicting the major developments in war, armed conflict and international relations in the 21st century. In particular it explores the potential impact of changes in military technology; information and communications technology; economic and environmental conditions; demography; international relations and trade; and political regimes and systems of governance. Despite its brevity it seeks to provide some historical depth to its analysis by reviewing major changes in warfare since the 1500s, pointing out that the present revolution in military affairs is but one in a series of similar events over the past 400 years. Central to this analysis is the role of the state and of the international system of states. The author rejects the notion that we are witnessing the terminal decline of the nation-state--quite the contrary in fact, as he foresees the status of the state as the principal political actor in international affairs being enhanced by the imperatives of a globalized system based on economic liberalism. He also argues that the present concern with human rights was presaged by earlier campaigns to abolish the slave trade and establish rights of national self-determination. Similarly, he points out that globalization has its roots in the expansion of the international economy prior to World War One and should not be considered as a unique contemporary phenomenon. Overall, Hirst's prognosis is rather bleak, with future conflict being seen as inherent in the present global system of inequality of wealth and power, while the chances of conflict will increase if the global system of economic liberalism breaks down. This book might have been regarded as a good primer on its subject matter prior to 11 September 2001. Indeed, Hirst was prescient enough to remark that terrorist groups are highly likely to carry out major attacks using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the advanced countries, and that `one such action may lead to a campaign of extermination against such groups sanctioned by the major powers' (p. 98). This prediction has largely come true. Unfortunately, Hirst did not foresee that it would be highjacked aircraft full of aviation gasoline and suicide squads of prospective martyrs rather than WMD, as such, that would accomplish the outrage on such a scale. What 9/11 has revealed is the potentially catastrophic vulnerability of advanced societies to attacks on infrastructure and civilian targets utilizing non-military and opportunistic means of assault. …

UN Conferences and Constructivist Governance of the Environment

In this article I review history of global environmental conferences and draw political lessons about their broader role in constructing efforts at global environmental governance. I also examine future of global conference diplomacy for environment, in particular Rio+10 in Johannesburg in 2002 and prospects of reaching goals for sustainable development set at UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). Global conferences are oft-used policy instruments, thus deserving careful evaluation and assessment. Jacques Fomerand expresses justifiable skepticism that most global conferences are momentary media events that provide sound bite opportunities without lasting effects on policies or quality of environment. (1) Guilio Gallarotti, and Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, offer similar skeptical judgments about potential for effective state-based international governance. (2) Yet Fomerand also points out, as do I, that many conferences provide indirect effects that may be beneficial for inducing states to take more progressive steps toward governance and sustainable development. Governance and Constructivism Governance has recently become a popular catchphrase of international relations. Without prospects of hegemonic leadership, and in light of substantial growth of influence of international institutions and nonstate actors, international rule making has become domain of multiple overlapping actors and regimes, rather than clearcut leadership by one state or multilateral conformity with a small and homogeneous set of shared rules backed by enforcement mechanisms. Anne Marie Slaughter defines it as the formal and informal bundles of rules, roles and relationships that define and regulate social practices of states and nonstate actors in international affairs. (3) Sustainable development requires multilateral governance, because without well-defined rules and expectations most countries are incapable of unilaterally protecting themselves from transboundary and global environmental risks Constructivist scholars of international relations (IR) have been focusing on institutional, discursive, and intersubjective procedures by which international governance develops. John Ruggie writes that social constructivism rests on an irreducibly intersubjective dimension of human action ... constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life.... Constructivists hold view that building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place. (4) Constructivists look at mechanisms and consequences by which actors, particularly states, derive meaning from a complex world, and how they identify their interests and policies for issues that appear new and uncertain. It is now widely accepted by most IR scholars that governance increasingly occurs in a decentralized manner, through a loosely tied network of multiple actors, states, functional state agencies, and nonstate actors who interact frequently, sometimes at global conferences. (5) Governance of environment is no different. Constructivists focus on such distinctive processes as socialization, education, persuasion, discourse, and norm inculcation to understand ways in which international governance develops. Typically these are complex procedures involving multiple interacting actors that accrue over time and contribute to transformational shifts in perceptions of national identity, international agendas, and presumptive ways by which national interests are to be attained. UN conferences contribute to governance and sustainable development by establishing and reinforcing some of these constructivist themes in international relations. …

Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental Organizations

This paper provides a synopsis of current interpretations of the term “nongovernmental organization” (NGO). Although NGOs have become recognized actors in international affairs, particularly over the last decade, it has not yet been clearly defined what the term NGO encompasses. It is argued that two major tracks of NGO interpretations can be distinguished: the juridical approach, and the sociological perspective. In juridical studies, the emphasis is placed on the legal status of NGOs in the national context and their implications for international law. Sociological works, instead, are based on studies of societal actors, and try to capture the term while examining more specifically the composition and functions of NGOs in the transnational arena. Acknowledging both tracks, the paper concludes with a comprehensive definition of the term NGO.

The World Bank Inspection Panel: Lessons from the First Five Years

In 1993, the World Bank's board of directors responded to international environmental and human rights critics by creating a precedent-setting public accountability mechanism. Local-global civil society advocacy networks found allies in donor governments, and their message resonated with internal World Bank concerns about the need to improve the effective ness of its investments.1 Through the Inspection Panel, citizens of develop ing countries can now make direct grievances regarding the environmental and social costs of World Bank projects. Among multilateral organizations, the World Bank permits the greatest degree of citizen access. Composed of distinguished, non-World Bank development experts, the panel is a transna tional entity embedded within a multilateral institution. On balance, it has been a remarkably autonomous body, permitting people negatively affected by Bank projects to gain some degree of diplomatic standing, potential transnational public interest allies, media access, and even the possibility of some tangible concessions. In spite of its limits, the World Bank's Inspec tion Panel is one of its most tangible institution-wide policy changes in re sponse to almost two decades of environmental and human rights criticism. As World Bank president James Wolfensohn put it, the Inspection Panel is a bold experiment in transparency and accountability that has worked to the benefit of all concerned.2 The Inspection Panel's experience constitutes an important empirical test of the widely noted influence of nongovernmental actors in interna tional relations. Here is an institution that all parties agree was created in response to sustained advocacy campaigns by coalitions of nongovern mental organizations (NGOs) in the North with NGOs and grassroots groups in the South. By creating the panel, the World Bank board of direc tors recognized the legitimacy of the normative principle that international organizations should be publicly accountable, another powerful indicator of the influence of nongovernmental actors in international affairs. In the pro cess, transnational advocacy networks consistently used combinations of what Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink crisply frame as:

Private military force and challenges for the future

The article calls for greater clarity and analytical rigour in the debate over the role of private military actors in international affairs. It argues that the blanket term ‘mercenary’ is inappropriate and subsumes different types of private operation under one emotive, negative heading. The article goes on to outline the structures of five different types of privatised entities; independent military companies, proxy companies, security companies, ad hoc groupings and privatised states. It assesses their roles in international security and their chances of success. The article contends that in certain cases the use of privatised military actors can be beneficial, but also calls for greater regulation and control based on a balanced evaluation of both potential advantages and dangers of this rapidly growing sector.