Activity Of Mind Research Articles

Précis: The Mind-Body Politic

The Mind-Body Politic is a study in the new discipline of political philosophy of mind, that aims to develop an embodied and enactive theory of social institutions, building on our 2009 study of the mind-body relation and mental causation, Embodied Minds in Action. In this sequel, we distinguish between (i) destructive, deforming social institutions–characteristic of contemporary neoliberal nation-states, and (ii) constructive, enabling social institutions, and defend what we call the mindshaping thesis and the enactive-transformative principle. The upshot is an activist, transformative philosophical theory.

The Impact of a Model of Nonmaterial Consciousness on the Concept of Mind in Action

The author considers the impact of new understandings about the nature of consciousness. These challenge materialist assumptions of science in favor of a deep ecological perspective and a focus on spirit and spirituality in psychotherapy. The author argues that transactional analysis theory and practice offer sufficient scope in adapting to these changing perspectives, and particular consideration is given to the concepts of autonomy and life positions. A new integration of body, mind, and spirit is proposed within an ecological paradigm. This is considered as part of the evolving theory of future-oriented consciousness.

Gerda Walther and the Possibility of Telepathy as an Act of Personal Social Mind

The phenomenologist Gerda Walther posits the possibility of a new social act, which she terms telepathy. It is marked by an intimate in-terpersonal union in which ego and alter ego become capable of sharing in the identical lived experience, though distant from one another. Here, there is no fusion or collective identi􀏔ication; rather, in-dividuals, though they live the experience and mind of the other, never lose or transcend their own individuation. Unlike the act of empathy, there is no analogical transfer. This article defends the possibility of a restricted sense telepathy. The author argues that four conditions must be ful􀏔illed for telepathy to occur: recognition of a social drive; a partially willed act of mind that results in the assump-tion of a certain stance, but it also comes upon us as an experience; constitution of subjects as persons marked by a “fundamental es-sence”; and I-splitting.

Two theories of action - Edelman's Neuronal group Selection and the Poetics of Paul Valéry

Motivated by two imperatives as they are framed in Code Biology – mechanism and actualization - we have turned to other attempts of modeling life at work. Here, we present two theories devoted to minds in action – one explains neuronal function, and the other dissects poetic crafting. Neuronal networks activation and poetic composition, respectively, are seen as the selection of specific connective patterns of either neurons or words, in action. Gerald Edelman, as a scientist, has generalized the Darwinian ideas of variation and selection to the cellular level in his “Sciences of Recognition”, a broader theoretical framework that includes the “Theory of Neuronal Group Selection” (TGNS) analyzed here. Paul Valéry, as a poet, has reconciled inspiration and technique in what he has called “works of the mind”, the creative processes mediated by sensing and making sense, in the “Poetic Theory” we present here he advances the mechanisms of artistic composition. We have identified the main ideas conveyed in these two theories, i.e., variation and selection, integration and differentiation, ambiguity and degeneracy, binding and blending, stasis and semiosis, by pairing and comparing textual fragments from the authors. We show that TGNS and the Theory of Poetic Action reconcile Sciences and Arts by recognizing that Natural Selection is a mechanism implied by formative acts in both scenarios and discuss to which extent Natural Convention - the main contribution of Code Biology – is integrated by the two thinkers.

Minds in action: Evidence that linguistic diversity helps children build a theory of mind

AbstractReports suggest that the development of a child's understanding of the mind (ToM) is enhanced in bilingual children. This is usually ascribed to different features of executive functioning (EF), though there is not a lot of empirical support for that position. Instead, published studies suggest an association between linguistic processes such as sociolinguistic sensitivity, metalinguistic awareness, language proficiency, and bilinguals’ ToM development. Coupled with evidence that bilinguals rely more on person-intention cues and show enhanced abilities to repair breakdowns in communication compared to monolinguals, this paper presents the argument that navigating sociolinguistic environments with agents differing in linguistic knowledge helps bilingual children develop an enhanced ToM. Additionally, this review includes relevant literature on deaf children and cultural variations and ToM, which are indicative of other situations in which contextual variants, especially those that are linguistically mediated, have an impact on the development of ToM that is independent of EF.

Hegel's Later Theory of Cognition: An Additive or Transformative Model?

AbstractThis article investigates Hegel's later theory of perception and cognition, identifying and analysing its general assumptions about the relation among the mind's activities. These often unremarked upon assumptions, I claim, continue to underwrite recent interpretive controversies. I demonstrate how a correct understanding of such assumptions points us toward an alternative interpretation of Hegel's model of the mind. I argue that this new model changes how we understand (a) Hegel's later notion of ‘non-conceptual content’ and (b) his distinction between human and animal minds—two areas that constitute the fault line dividing interpretations of late Hegel. To isolate the relevant assumptions, I use Matthew Boyle's influential conceptual distinction between ‘additive’ and ‘transformative’ models of rationality. I demonstrate that Hegel himself addresses the basic issues characterizing this distinction and clarify how approaching his work in these terms presents considerable interpretative and conceptual advantages, including allowing us to defend the position that Hegel adopts a ‘transformative’ framework of mind. To support this argument, this paper closely analyses Hegel's treatment of sensation (Empfindung), which has not yet been systematically addressed by scholars. I show how sensation can be best understood as part of Hegel's later ‘transformative’ framework for cognition. I also show how this framework can be extended to other parts of Hegel's theory.

Mentes Positivas en Acción: A Randomized Feasibility Study of a Promotor-Delivered Cognitive Behavioral Stress Management Program for Low-Income Spanish-Speaking Latinos.

Purpose: Although psychological distress is common among Latinos in the United States, they underutilize mental health services. We describe a community-based program to manage stress and reduce depressive symptoms among low-income Spanish-speaking Latinos.Methods: Mentes Positivas en Acción (MPA) (Positive Minds in Action) is an 8-week group program, delivered by trained promotores in community settings and evaluated through a randomized feasibility study. Participants were randomly assigned to an immediate MPA treatment group or a delayed-intervention control group. Outcomes assessed at baseline and 8 weeks included stress (Perceived Stress Scale [PSS]) and depressive symptoms (PHQ-9); higher scores indicate worse health. Repeated-measures analysis of variance examined group×time interaction effects for group differences in change from baseline to 8 weeks. The control group offered the program after the 8-week assessment, completed an additional assessment at the end of the program (16 weeks); t-tests assessed within-group changes.Results: Most participants were female, born in Mexico, and spoke only Spanish. Group×time interaction effects were significant for both outcomes. Mean PSS scores improved in the treatment group but not the control group (−0.80 vs. +0.10; p<0.014). Mean PHQ-9 scores improved more in the treatment group than the control group (−5.7 vs. −0.3; p<0.011). Within-group analyses of the control group found significant improvements in stress (−0.8; p<0.000) and depressive symptoms (−3.9; p<0.002).Conclusions: This study provides preliminary evidence of the effectiveness of a community-based promotor-delivered program to manage stress and reduce depressive symptoms among vulnerable underserved Latinos in the United States.

The Fictional Minds of Modernism: Narrative Cognition from Henry James to Christopher Isherwood ed. by Ricardo Miguel-Alfonso

Reviewed by: The Fictional Minds of Modernism: Narrative Cognition from Henry James to Christopher Isherwood ed. by Ricardo Miguel-Alfonso Luke Mueller MIGUEL-ALFONSO, RICARDO, ed. The Fictional Minds of Modernism: Narrative Cognition from Henry James to Christopher Isherwood. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. 236 pp. $99.00 hardcover; $79.20 e-book. The story of the modernist novel usually involves an “inward turn”: against the nineteenth-century realists’ highly wrought social worlds, against their moral dilemmas and ostensibly objective descriptions, modernism (as the story goes) dramatizes private minds whose contacts with the world are perspectival, partial, and tenuous. It’s true that modernist novels are deeply concerned with the mind, but the inward turn offers a picture of mental experience that looks simplistic in the context of recent work in cognitive studies. This work examines how minds are always already in the world, and it has been the subject of seminal works such as Alan Palmer’s Fictional Minds (2004), Lisa Zunshine’s Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (2006), and David Herman’s collection The Emergence of Mind: Representations of Consciousness in Narrative Discourse in English (2011). Ricardo Miguel-Alfonso brings this broader picture of mind squarely into the realm of modernist narrative in The Fictional Minds of Modernism: Narrative Cognition from Henry James to Christopher Isherwood, a collection of essays that thoughtfully challenges the “inward turn.” Miguel-Alfonso begins The Fictional Minds of Modernism by arguing that modernist narrative (exemplified by Gertrude Stein’s work) is fundamentally about the “continuity between mind and world” (12). Narrative is both an act of mind, giving sequence and structure to phenomena, and also an act of mind made available to other minds. In other words, narrative is fundamentally public. But Miguel-Alfonso acknowledges this publicness is problematic, contending that modernist narratives engage in “relentless questioning of the relationship between mind, language, and reality” (9). The book’s contributors take up this relentless questioning, seeking a more nuanced picture of mind that is not simplistically bifurcated into “internal” and “external” aspects. In the second essay, Jukka Mikkonen warns against too quickly accepting fictional minds as means for learning “about the workings of the mind” (18). Mikkonen recognizes the propensity of readers to ascribe realistic qualities of mind to fictional characters, but he argues that fictional minds must also obey the demands of narrative necessity. Narrative minds have both mimetic and poetic aspects, and these poetic aspects make trouble for those who would claim modernist literature can faithfully represent minds. In Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, for example, Clarissa Dalloway’s ability to understand others borders on extraordinary, and the portrayal of the shell-shocked Septimus Warren Smith is haunted by the fact that Woolf may not be “a real expert of schizophrenia” (21). In other words, there is a difference between narrative minds feeling real and being real. While Mikkonen is sympathetic to those who would [End Page 192] claim “that literary narratives could widen our ‘mental universe’ or ‘the cognitive horizon of human awareness,’” he concludes that such claims “are not proportional to their supporting evidence—no matter how evidence is understood—and at times look even like dogmas” (25). While Mikkonen’s skepticism is warranted, it is somewhat tempered by two following essays that argue that normal presentations of mind are always already conceptual and linguistic—making poesis a crucial part of investigations of mental experience. Marco Caracciolo argues that metaphors for mind break down barriers between inner and outer life because they express what is “internal” in terms of “concrete things that we can directly perceive” (34). Caracciolo explores metaphors of mind in three novels: Kate Chopin’s The Awakening, Federigo Tozzi’s Con gli occhi chiusi (Eyes Shut), and in Mrs. Dalloway. He shows how mind is conceptualized in terms of sensory activities (perceiving, seeing, having illusions, etc.), in terms of space (Tozzi’s protagonist feels his mind is a “large hall” [42]), and in relation to physical things and processes (Tozzi’s narrator reports of the protagonist, “A familiar ache dashed his brain like a cold jet that never let him get anything done” [42]). Caracciolo believes that these metaphorical “mind styles...

The concept of &lt;i&gt;fitra&lt;/i&gt; in Epistemology

The aim of the given article is to show that the concept of “fitra” known as congenital but not deliberate faith comes as the basics for Epistemology (the science of cognition). It does not contradict the concepts of Existentialism and Cognitive Psychology but complements them. The article reveals that the concept of faith is not just a part of a logical conclusions structure but it is the act of mind which displays the will to live and to seek the purpose of life. That’s why faith is a necessary component of cognition. The author argues that Hegel’s Dialectical Pyramid is based on an erroneous exclusion of mental analysis from the epistemology. Existential Philosophy and Cognitive Psychology advanced the idea of coming back to the concept that sees the purpose of life as a human’s main purpose. Ibn Sina’s teaching about intuition surpassed European science and became relevant again. The concept of “fitra” in its rational interpretation is the bridge connecting different sciences and Theology. Author discusses the appearance of phenomenon of faith in epistemology and analyses the transformation of hypothetical faith into a religious one, as well as correlation between faith and religion.

Any God Will Do by Virginia Konchan

Reviewed by: Any God Will Do by Virginia Konchan Sarah Giragosian (bio) Virginia Konchan. Any God Will Do. Carnegie Mellon Virginia Konchan is the author of the poetry collection The End of Spectacle (Carnegie Mellon University Press, 2018); a collection of short stories entitled Anatomical Gift (Noctuary Press, 2017); and three chapbooks, Empire of Dirt (above/ground press, 2019), The New Alphabets (Anstruther, 2019) and Vox Populi (Finishing Line, 2015). She is also the coeditor (with Sarah Giragosian) of Marbles on the Floor: How to Assemble a Book of Poems (U of Akron P, 2022). Her most recent poetry collection, Any God Will Do (Carnegie Mellon UP, 2020), is perhaps most remarkable for its expansive use of the lyric, the ways in which it embraces various idioms, registers, and tones, and mediates between varied texts and voices. Any God Will Do showcases the deft discursive shifts of a poet interested in productively blurring so-called high and low culture, poetic difficulty, and accessibility. These investigations into lyric subjectivity are more concerned with the disruptive values of poetry, like aporia, ellipsis, and rupture, than with transcendence, revelation, and epiphany. Often whimsical and idiosyncratic, her poems model the swift vagaries and divagations of the mind in action as they swing from one register to another. They shape meaning out of an eclectic range of subjects: from the spiritually and psychically enervating forces of capitalism to the loneliness of living in an American imperial state to the violence of living through the environmental crisis. In the opening poem, "A Star is Born," the poet writes, "Don't mess with a woman / from Texas. No, I'm not / from Texas, but I was raised / by wolves. In saying that, though, / am I appropriating the experience / of those literally raised by wolves, / as I was only using it as a metaphor for neglect?" Here she exploits a rhetoric of self-consciousness, as she finds humor in the slippages (and limitations) of metaphor. The poem flirts with the corrosive effects of neoliberalism—with its emphasis on hyper-individualism and competition—on the self: "There is no way to describe / the sublimity of music / entering a room suffering / under a gag rule for years. / If I can learn to do that, / my God, I will have won." Unafraid to implicate her speakers, Konchan gravitates toward flawed, riveting subjectivities that oscillate between loneliness and moodiness, cheekiness and [End Page 187] candor. In their full-tilt tonal movement, they are at once playful and political, as in "Epithalamium," a poem that seeks to "decolonize" both marriage and language, each with its own complex and entangled relations to power: "I ask you to help me move / the cadaver: you demure. / I ask you to help me conjugate / French verbs: you aver." In "Empire," as in many poems throughout the collection, she inquires into the relationship between power and language. While the empire in question is never identified forthright, it is redolent of an American empire allied with media-speak and technocapitalism that has instrumentalized language and made it impotent. She writes, "We make inroads in discourse, / interventions and the like, / while in neighboring countries / body parts are auctioned / and punishment meted out / according to fallible law." She then turns to a lyric canon, including the works of T.S. Eliot, William Carlos Williams, Adrienne Rich, William Wordsworth, and Emily Dickinson, even as she tests the aesthetic theories of these poets. For example, in the same poem, signposting William's famous dictum "No ideas but in things," Konchan writes, "So much depends upon / the right words in the right order, / not just spoken in mutiny, / but also propinquity. / This vodka, for example, / is made of bison grass / and can be applied to wounds. / Draw closer. I have distilled / the literal. You can touch it—/the idea within the thing, metaphor." In this revision of Williams's dictum, Konchan's speaker posits that metaphor is a functional and generative in the human consciousness, even while accounting for the slipperiness and subterfuge of metaphor, which can be both divisive (given its potentially essentializing logic) and beneficial, even healing, as in the vodka that can be applied to wounds. With impressive agility, Konchan revisits...

Scenes: Four Way Books: An interview with Martha Rhodes

ScenesFour Way Books: An interview with Martha Rhodes Martha Rhodes Four Way Books www.fourwaybooks.com Could you briefly describe your press’s history? Four Way Books is in its twenty-eighth year of publishing poetry and short fiction collections by emerging and established writers. We operate out of lower Manhattan with a small, efficient staff that works together in close coordination, all positions filled by long term, highly committed personnel. We serve readers and writers — mostly, but not exclusively adults, from all walks of life, all corners of the country. Our titles have been honored with awards such as the Pulitzer Prize in Poetry, The Lenore Marshall, The Norma Farber First Book Award, The Thom Gunn Award for Gay Poetry, The Great Lakes New Writers Award for Poetry, to mention just a few awards over the year. Our titles have also been on the NYT top 10 list for poetry. Stellar reviews in the NYT, Publishers Weekly, Library Journal and many literary reviews have both been encouraging and thrilling for staff and author and have succeeded in giving our titles more reach. Because we matter to readers, FWB has been profiled by the Best American Poetry, the NYT, and the LA Review of Books and Writers for Change (excerpted here) “New York has seen plenty of ruin over the last two decades, from the ash of 9/11 [FWB office is just blocks from Ground Zero] to the wreckage of Hurricane Sandy. But for over 20 years, FWB has also been building something of its own, a city within a city, something cognizant of — but impervious to — that ruin… [A] thriving small press, publishing some of the most interesting, aesthetically diverse poetry and fiction in the country.” “A sanctuary.” Click for larger view View full resolution How would you characterize the work you publish? Narrative, lyric, quiet, domestic, political, linear, jagged, spare, expansive — we don’t fit into any niche; we aren’t groupies of any trends. We publish what makes us think, breaks our hearts, makes us laugh — engages us, worries us, concerns us, speaks to us. Well-crafted writing by writers who expertly manage their content. We publish work by yetto-be known and popular, buzzy, award-winning authors (as well as under-the radar tours de force) whose work is massively resonant in contemporary American life. Some of our authors dig where they stand, others throw the shovel farther away. All are deeply engaged with the world, the complexities that characterize their inner and exterior landscapes depicted through expert management of craft through the decisions they make in the use of language, syntax, form, structure, and so forth. How the author manages content is the key factor for us when we think about accepting a book and then as we go on to make editing suggestions to a given author. We are also attuned — actually I would say that we are especially attuned — to hearing the speaker’s mind in action, to being able to hear/experience the gears cranking as the speaker discovers thoughts and feelings, the moment(s) of discovery and surprise activate our own discoveries and senses of surprise as we read and so we don’t want to feel that the content was pre-digested before it even got to the page. We want to feel its aliveness and be thrilled by that, no matter how somber or devastating those moments on the pages might be. Who is your audience, and in what ways are you trying to reach them? We hope to be a great leg up to our authors, emerging and established, connecting them with longtime literary folks and those who are newly discovering contemporary writers. We seek niche readers by subject matter (health communities for a doctor poet, etc), expanding the lit audience! We have strong cohorts of African American and Asian American, Latinx, and queer authors. We publish authors in their 20s–80s and climbing. Writers and readers alike hail from diverse, often underserved demographics. We offer readers the best new American writing across genres, across aesthetic divides, with many ways to learn of and appreciate the work. We hope to find reading and presenting opportunities for...

Locke's Science of Knowledge by Matthew Priselac

Reviewed by: Locke's Science of Knowledge by Matthew Priselac Martha Brandt Bolton Matthew Priselac. Locke's Science of Knowledge. New York: Routledge, 2017. Pp. 240. Cloth, $140.00. This interesting and challenging book addresses the apparent gap between the empiricist account of the origin of ideas and the theory of knowledge in the Essay concerning Human Understanding. Matthew Priselac makes an impressive argument that they are complementary parts of a coherent program. It consists of a naturalistic interpretation on which the Essay's main aim is to provide the kind of understanding of the mind, knowledge, and probability afforded by modern methods of natural scientific inquiry. On this view, the Essay advances a hypothesis intended to explain the epistemic phenomena of everyday life, that is, what we take ourselves to know rather than hold as probable. It describes a process by which the mind generates experience from nothing but simple ideas received by sense or reflection, operating on them to form various kinds of compound ideas, and culminating in sensory and reflective experience. Completed by Locke's definitions of knowledge and probability, the hypothesis is confirmed by its explanatory adequacy: its ability to show that we know instances of the four main types of propositions commonly counted as exemplars of knowledge (propositions that express identity, a relation among things, co-existence of things in the same subject, and real existence), and to explain why we regard them as such. The project is explanatory, not justificatory. It is purely epistemic in that claims of speculative metaphysics are excluded. The hypothesis of the origin and taxonomy of ideas is said to be grounded on introspection, observation, and, importantly, as the author has it, Locke's analysis of the sorts of ideas that contribute to the mind's activity of constructing experience that can be intelligibly understood. Completed by the definition of knowledge, its severest test is posed by Locke's account of sensory cognition of the existence of things outside us. Understanding how that fits the definition of knowledge is a well-known interpretative crux. To my knowledge, no previously published interpretation is fully consistent with the structure and strictly internal theory of warrant it implies, but Priselac urges a credible account that fully comports with the definition. The most central points of this interpretation are these. The notion of "genetic structure" (5–6) adds the following to the familiar doctrine that compound ideas of modes, substances, and relations are formed by the mind's uniting two or more simpler ideas by means of certain relations. Because the mind is always conscious of its current operations, the relations are [End Page 405] known by reflection. Therefore, each compound idea exhibits its simple constituents and the relations by which, and order in which, its more complex constituents have been formed. The simple idea of power is important because it or one of its simple modes enters the genetic structure of all ideas of qualities. The structure of ideas of substances is not taken from the chapter on ideas of substances or the account of their archetypes (Essay, 2.23.1–6; 30.5; 12.6). Rather, it is based on what, as Priselac has it, Locke takes our thoughts about substances to be, that is, things that are existentially self-subsistent, unified, have various qualities, and interact with ourselves and each other—nothing more. Accordingly, ideas of substances are "confused," "obscure," and "inadequate," for reasons having to do with nothing but their genesis within the mind. According to Locke, knowledge is perception of the agreement of two ideas that are joined by the mind; probability is the presumed, but not perceived, agreement between ideas so joined. Priselac contends that, for Locke, two ideas agree just in case one contains the other. Three points are offered in support of this claim: it makes sense of the project—because ideas are either simple or have genetic structure, the idea-containment model applies to all four types of knowledge recognized by Locke; genetic structure is explicitly mentioned in connection with "trifling propositions" (i.e. propositions that do not increase our knowledge [Essay, 4.8.4]); and the containment model comports with the foundational role given...

Theory of Mind in Action: Use of Mental State Understanding in Social Interactions

Theory of Mind in Action: Use of Mental State Understanding in Social Interactions

An expert’s mind in action: Assessing attentional focus, workload and performance in a dynamic, naturalistic environment

ABSTRACT The aims of this study were to (1) to explore attentional strategies in expert judo players and (2) investigate how attentional focus affects performance effectiveness and perceptions of workload in expert judo players during real competitions. Fourteen expert male judo players participated in the study. A simulated recall method was used following participants’ competition to explore contents of attention qualitatively. The data analysis process for the qualitative portion of the study was an iterative process between inductive and deductive analyses. Quantitative analyses of performance outcomes and workload were then associated with the qualitative findings. Qualitative results revealed that the focus of attention was dynamic and complex, with technical aspects of the movements as the highest identified focus. Quantitative analyses revealed that reporting a lower quantity of attentional cues and higher percentage of focus on opponent resulted in higher performance effectiveness and less perceptions of workload. This study indicates that cognitive control and automaticity may work in a synergistic manner for successful skill execution in expert performance.

Resultados de un programa de estimulación lingüística y cognitiva dirigido a adultos mayores y su impacto en la calidad de vida

Introducción. Las habilidades lingüísticas y cognitivas cambian en los adultos mayores afectando su calidad de vida. Los programas de estimulación cognitiva están dirigidos a fortalecer dichas habilidades y mitigar las consecuencias.Objetivo. Presentar la metodología y los resultados de una de las cohortes del programa de promoción de habilidades comunicativas, lingüísticas y cognitivas Mentes en Acción, dirigido a adultos mayores y desarrollado de forma interdisciplinaria en el Programa Docente Asistencial Centro de la Comunicación Humana de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia.Materiales y métodos. Se analizaron y compararon los resultados de 92 participantes antes y después de las 8 semanas que contempla el programa. Se evaluaron diferentes habilidades cognitivas y lingüísticas, así como el impacto en la calidad de vida.Resultados. Se evidenciaron mejorías significativas en la mayoría de los dominios evaluados (comunicación, atención, memoria, habilidades de planificación y razonamiento) y en algunas de las variables relacionadas con la calidad de vida tales como dolor, salud general, rol emocional, función social y salud mental.Conclusiones. El estudio se constituye como un primer paso en la generación de evidencia a favor del programa Mentes en Acción; sin embargo, se discuten las limitaciones y perspectivas del mismo.

Psychological Functions of Advertising Communication, and Their Relevance to The Subconscious Mind in Influencing the Purchasing Response

The subconscious mind is the most popular scientific trend, especially in the field of advertising, for it is the essence of all creativity and its direct and strong influence over advertising to the mind of consumers and purchasing decisions. All imagination and creativity stems from the subconscious mind. Thus, imagination and surrealism are the components of creativity and a method of programming the subconscious. All of the mentioned terms represent integrated rings that are inseparable from the entity that is the “subconscious mind”, it is the source and the recipient of the impact and programming. If the programming is properly implemented via imagination and surrealism along with other catalytic methods such as repetition, suggestion, pictures and emotion. All these methods will in turn attract the attention and form the mental image of the advertising messages in the mind of the consumers. Problem: The research problem can be summarized in the following questions: Are there any rules for the programming of the subconscious? Is the subconscious associated with the psychological functions and psychological stages experienced by the consumer in advertising? Do psychological functions and stages of psychological impact play a role in influencing the purchasing response? Objectives: to study the psychological functions and psychological impact stages of advertising communication, to ensure the success of any advertising campaign and to achieve a higher purchasing response through the knowledge and study of the extent of the subconscious connection to the stages of psychological impact of advertising communication. Results: The conscious mind represents 10% of the mind's activities, while the subconscious represents the other 90%. The subconscious mind can be programmed through rules and methods that relies upon imagination and repetition. The subconscious broke through imagination and surrealism in art until it reached advertising and the unbridled the advertising fantasia in all the styles that are associated with it. All the creative innovations in advertising stems from the subconscious mind. The subconscious mind is linked to the stages of psychic influence of the advertising communication that the consumer undergoes. The methods of the subconscious influence on the mind of the consumer reinforce the transition of the stages from one stage to the other with greater success. Both the subconscious mind and the stages of psychological effect are in conformity with the same goal, which is achieving the targeted purchasing response.

The developing mind in action: measuring manual dynamics in childhood

ABSTRACTDevelopmental theory has long emphasized the importance of linking perception, cognition, and action. Techniques designed to record the spatial and temporal characteristics of hand movements (i.e., manual dynamics) present new opportunities to study the nature of these links across development by providing a window into how perceptual, cognitive, and motoric processes interact and unfold over time. Although manual dynamics are commonly used to explore a range of topics with adults, including language processing, numerical cognition, social perception, and cognitive control, comparatively little research has used hand-tracking techniques to explore these topics with children. The current article aims to bring attention to this methodological gap and discuss how and why developmental researchers might want to address it. The article introduces two hand-tracking techniques, contrasts how the techniques have been used with adults relative to children, and explores how manual dynamics might fit into the broader landscape of research in child development.

Mind in Action: Experience and Embodied Cognition in Pragmatism, written by Pentti Määthttänen

Mind in Action: Experience and Embodied Cognition in Pragmatism, written by Pentti Määthttänen

Books: A Layman's Guide to Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis: Not a Wasted Word.

Eric Berne First published in the US as The Mind In Action in 1947; first published in the UK by Andre Deutsch, 1969. Penguin Books Ltd, 1971, PB, 432pp, 978-0140032710 As I read this book for the third or fourth time I think, ‘I wish we had geniuses like this in medicine now.’ Perhaps we do. But they certainly don’t write books like this. Eric Berne had only been a doctor for 12 years when this masterpiece was published. He was just 37, the same age I am now. Why is this a masterpiece? Start by taking a look at the contents page: it is breathtakingly simple ( ‘Chapter Five: Neuroses; Chapter Six: Psychoses …’ ), but each subsection makes you want to turn to the page right away and start reading: ‘Why people act and feel the way they do’ , ‘Getting along with people’ , and, one of my favourites, ‘What is intuition?’ Berne writes so candidly …

Searle, Merleau-Ponty, Rizzolatti – three perspectives on Intentionality and action in sport

Actions in sport are intentional in character. They are directed at and are about something. This understanding of intentional action is common in continental as well as analytic philosophy. In sport philosophy, intentionality has received relatively little attention, but has more recently come on the agenda. In addition to what we can call ‘action intentionality,’ studied by philosophers like Searle, the phenomenological approach forwarded by Merleau-Ponty has opened up for a concept of ‘motor intentionality,’ which means a basic bodily attention and relatedness to the surrounding world. This conception is very relevant for the study of bodily actions as we find them in sports. However, there may be even deeper layers. The identification of mirror neurons in the brain has opened up for a type of almost ‘muscular intentionality’ whereby a simple bodily movement like grasping a cup to drink seems to be intentionally controlled and orchestrated. My goal in this paper is to discuss the relation between different levels of intentionality, such as a) ‘action intentionality’ operating at a conscious cognitive level, as for instance, when a player shoots a goal in football, b) the ‘motor intentionality’ directing the bodily movements when kicking the ball, and c) the muscular ‘mirror neuron intentionality’ of the goal keeper which is in operation when the keeper is seeing how the kicker’s foot hits the ball. How are these different layers of intentionality related and how can they give a more nuanced and integrated picture of the body–mind in action in sports?