Hegel's Later Theory of Cognition: An Additive or Transformative Model?

Luca Corti

doi:10.1017/hgl.2021.13

Abstract

AbstractThis article investigates Hegel's later theory of perception and cognition, identifying and analysing its general assumptions about the relation among the mind's activities. These often unremarked upon assumptions, I claim, continue to underwrite recent interpretive controversies. I demonstrate how a correct understanding of such assumptions points us toward an alternative interpretation of Hegel's model of the mind. I argue that this new model changes how we understand (a) Hegel's later notion of ‘non-conceptual content’ and (b) his distinction between human and animal minds—two areas that constitute the fault line dividing interpretations of late Hegel. To isolate the relevant assumptions, I use Matthew Boyle's influential conceptual distinction between ‘additive’ and ‘transformative’ models of rationality. I demonstrate that Hegel himself addresses the basic issues characterizing this distinction and clarify how approaching his work in these terms presents considerable interpretative and conceptual advantages, including allowing us to defend the position that Hegel adopts a ‘transformative’ framework of mind. To support this argument, this paper closely analyses Hegel's treatment of sensation (Empfindung), which has not yet been systematically addressed by scholars. I show how sensation can be best understood as part of Hegel's later ‘transformative’ framework for cognition. I also show how this framework can be extended to other parts of Hegel's theory.

Highlights

Until recently, discussion of Hegel’s theoretical position on mind and cognition had been limited mostly to the thoughts outlined in his early writings and the Phenomenology, while his later ideas have remained largely off the radar.1 The past few years, have seen a growing appreciation of Hegel’s later views on these topics.2 Within this context, several controversies have arisen regarding how to interpret both the structure of Hegel’s argument as well as its core claims.Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 02 Nov 2021 at 10:02:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.In this article, I will investigate Hegel’s texts with the aim of making order of this controversy by systematizing the conceptual space for possible interpretations
I have drawn attention to the fact that the interpretive field can be divided into two fundamentally different camps whose dividing fault line is constituted by a basic assumption regarding the ‘separability’ of the mind’s activities
An ‘additive’ reading—one that accepts the separability and additivity of the various cognitive capacities addressed by Hegel—is exegetically inclined to understand Hegel’s text as a composite account of human cognition’s robustly independent powers

Summary

Introduction

Discussion of Hegel’s theoretical position on mind and cognition had been limited mostly to the thoughts outlined in his early writings and the Phenomenology, while his later ideas have remained largely off the radar. The past few years, have seen a growing appreciation of Hegel’s later views on these topics. Within this context, several controversies have arisen regarding how to interpret both the structure of Hegel’s argument as well as its core claims. For Boyle, ‘separability’ is the main issue setting apart the two models: whereas the additive theorist defends strong distinctions among discrete activities (or capacities, modules or faculties), arguing that ‘rationality’ does not affect the nature of other activities of the mind (which exist separately or in isolation from rational capacities), the transformative theorist rejects the notion of separability, arguing for the integration of the different activities and the impossibility of ‘separating’ them from each other without altering their nature.10 Understood in this sense, ‘separability’ is a central notion in Hegel’s later theory of mind and cognition. As I will show, divergences in how this part of Hegel’s theory gets interpreted stem in large part from different ways of reading the issue of ‘separability’

Hegel and the separability of the mind’s activities

The ‘additive’ interpretation of sensation

Difficulties of the additive approach

Abandoning the additive model: the ‘transformative’ interpretation

Conclusion