Acquisition Of Nuclear Weapons Research Articles

Assessing the Compatibility of Conventional Military Doctrines With the Changing Character of War: A Case of Indo-Pak Rivalry

Military doctrines integrate and encourage armed forces to pursue their strategic objectives while acting as an instrument to forestall conflicts by retaining credible deterrence. However, the acquisition of nuclear weapons and access to sophisticated technologies have significantly changed the character of warfare, adding layers to the complexity. This strategic shift has resulted in the diversification of sub-conventional warfare in the subcontinent, blurring the line between war and peace. In the case of Indo-Pak rivalry, non-contact warfare has gained currency, yet both states continue to prioritize conventional military doctrines when engaging each other in sub-conventional domain. Furthermore, this article argues that the compatibility of conventional military doctrines with the changing character of warfare is uncertain, and this is a topic of debate that merits through investigation and analysis.

CONCEPTUALISING THE ROLE OF INDIA IN NORTH KOREA`S DENUCLEARISATION

The US and its allies perceive North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons as a significant strategic challenge in the region. Diplomatic efforts have been made to persuade the Kim regime to abandon its nuclear programme, but they have failed. The DPRK considers nuclear weapons capability vital for deterrence against external threats and strategically crucial for national defence. India, a key US ally in containing China, has taken a stiffer stance towards Pyongyang's nuclear programme while enhancing its role in contributing to North Korea's denuclearisation. It represents itself as a staunch opponent of nuclear proliferation and the development of sophisticated weapons. This paper explores India's role in North Korea's perceived denuclearisation. It highlights that India has adopted a dual-standard approach to nuclear proliferation and sophisticated weapons and is also trying to create a technological nexus between Pakistan and North Korea, allegedly to achieve strategic ambitions in South Asia and assert pressure on Pakistan with the help of the US and its Western allies. Bibliography Entry Kakar, Sher Ali and Muhammad Adil Khan. 2023. "Conceptualising the Role of India in North Korea’s Denuclearisation." Margalla Papers 27 (1): 166-175.

The Impact of Iran's Nuclear Program on Iranian-American Relations (2010-2021)

Objectives: This paper explores the relationship between Iran and the U.S., focusing on Iran's nuclear program. It examines how successive U.S. administrations have addressed the issue and analyzes the responses of newly elected Presidents of the U.S. and Iran, as well as the Prime Minister of Israel, to the ongoing Iran Nuclear Deal negotiations using an analytical approach.
 Methods: The study employs an analytical methodology derived from the fields of political and social sciences, moving beyond traditional approaches in international relations.
 Results: The paper argues that Iran's development and acquisition of nuclear weapons, as a regional power, pose a direct threat to regional stability and may trigger a nuclear arms race. The interests of the U.S. and its allies in the region would also be endangered.
 Conclusions: The paper concludes that both Washington and Tehran should reach a mutually beneficial agreement to maintain regional power balance and prevent the potential for an arms race, especially with the seventh round of negotiations approaching. As Iran pursues destabilizing regional ambitions in the Middle East, posing a strategic threat to U.S. interests and allies, the U.S. should reassess its Middle East policy to ensure that Iran does not exploit sanctions relief and its remaining nuclear energy capacity to expand its revolutionary agenda throughout the region.

External Threats and Public Opinion: The East Asian Security Environment and Japanese Views on the Nuclear Option

AbstractThe Japanese public has been assumed to possess a deeply ingrained aversion toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We employ a survey experiment to ascertain whether this aversion is unconditional or may erode in the face of hypothetical deterioration in Japan's security situation, and in particular a hypothetical withdrawal of the US security-nuclear umbrella, increased North Korean nuclear weapons testing activities, and movement by South Korea toward the attainment of a nuclear arsenal. We find that the Japanese nuclear aversion may come under stress in the face of such developments. Additionally, we find that the elasticity of Japanese attitudes with respect to the nuclear option in the face of external security deterioration may be associated with an important individual-level demographic characteristic, namely, gender.

Analyzing the Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Risk Posed by a Mature Fusion Technology and Economy

Nuclear fusion is widely promoted as the ultimate environmentally friendly solution to the world’s energy demands. However, the medium/long-term nuclear weapons proliferation risks from a hypothetical fusion economy are rarely considered. Using risk assessment tools, this paper undertakes a trial scoping of proliferation hazards arising from fusion energy technologies, focused on the implications of a global ‘Mature Fusion Economy’ (MFE). In the medium term, an MFE could (1) facilitate construction of large, efficient, and reliable nuclear arsenals by producing tritium and the fissile materials Plutonium-239 and Uranium-233; and (2) erode the barriers constraining nuclear weapons acquisition by facilitating the spread of nuclear knowledge, technologies, and materials. Given the potential scale of a global MFE, management via monitoring of proliferation and diplomacy could become unworkable. Therefore, policy development must include independent and comprehensive expert and informed community assessment of such fusion-enhanced risks, transparent oversight by the nuclear disarmament community, and systematic analysis of the issues raised in this paper and their implications for fusion into the very long-term future.

Proliferation before Hiroshima: tracing the wartime diffusion of nuclear knowledge

ABSTRACT Relatively simplistic conceptions of early nuclear history can sometimes prevail even among nonproliferation scholars. The dominance of the nation-state in historic and contemporary conceptions of nuclear-weapons development carries with it a temptation to treat nuclear-weapons acquisition as essentially linear: first one state and then another, with the United States as the point of origin for all weapons-relevant nuclear knowledge and 1945 as the effective year of proliferation studies’ birth. This article argues against such a view. It draws on a wide range of archival material to illustrate the surprisingly wide diffusion of nuclear knowledge prior to the bombing of Hiroshima, highlighting, first, the reciprocal nature of the early Anglo-American nuclear relationship, including the extent to which the United States benefited from external information; second, how connections within the British Empire enabled the participation of personnel from Australia and New Zealand in various aspects of British and American nuclear work during the war; and, third, the privileged access of French personnel to British and Canadian nuclear knowledge. The overall argument is that the early history of nuclear proliferation is more complex than is generally thought and that greater acknowledgment of these complexities may have contemporary value.

Sanctions as a deterrent to nuclear testing

ABSTRACT This article considers the role of economic sanctions in deterring nuclear testing. It argues that sanctions have been relatively effective in discouraging the pursuit and acquisition of nuclear weapons but have a more mixed track record when it comes to preventing nuclear tests. The article explains why preventing further nuclear testing furthers US nonproliferation interests and discusses three different avenues for strengthening sanctions against nuclear testing: through the United Nations Security Council, unilaterally, or through coordination with like-minded partners. It argues for the importance of sanctions even in complicated cases where US allies are considering conducting nuclear tests.

Public Support for Nuclear Proliferation: Experimental Evidence from Brazil

Abstract How do mass publics in nonnuclear weapon states form their preferences over the acquisition of nuclear weapons? We field a survey experiment in Brazil, a possessor of uranium-enrichment capabilities with a long history of nuclear ambitions. Three sets of results support the view that members of the public approach nuclear proliferation strategically, that is, by taking into account how their home state interacts with enemies and allies alike. First, the external security environment is a major driver for individual-level preferences: when security is plentiful, only a small minority of the public in Brazil supports proliferation, but a deterioration of external conditions engenders a high minority in support for nuclear-weapon acquisition. Second, the mere extension by the United States of conventional security assurances suffices to dampen public support for an indigenous nuclear deterrent, restoring a majority view opposing proliferation. Third, conventional security assurances shape public sentiment on nuclear acquisition irrespective of whether they are credible or not. These results contribute to the effort currently unfolding in the scholarly community to make sense of how citizens outside the United States think about international security in a nuclear world.

نگاه به شرق و نظم نوین جهانی

Considering two facts, namely the Islamic Republic’s “Looking East” strategy and the establishment of a new world order following Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, as well as Ali Khamenei’s support and justification for it, the Islamic Republic ties its future to the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Due to its worldwide isolation, Russia includes the Islamic Republic in the Ukraine conflict. The Islamic Republic’s leaders believe that the East will triumph over the West in the new world order and that they must remain active in the victorious world. The reality, however, is that as the Islamic Republic’s ability to tackle society’s concerns diminishes, the distance between society and government expands; and as this gap widens, the Iranian regime moves closer to Russia and China and away from the West. Thus, in the event of widespread disturbances that could lead to military conflicts, the likelihood of future Russian military action in Iran will increase. Russia must ensure the survival of the anti-Western Islamic Republic. Problematic, though, is the fact that “Russia itself has become a loathed nation.” In the event of internal conflict in Iran, the likelihood of foreign intervention in the region will increase. The public revelation by Khamenei’s foreign policy adviser Kamal Kharazi of the Islamic Republic’s technological capacity to produce nuclear weapons makes more sense. The Islamic Republic has pursued the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a deterrent for more than two decades and has no intention of abandoning this objective. “When it comes to system defense, no other tool appears as potent and efficient as nuclear deterrence.”

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Islam: Applying the Šarīʿa in Saudi Arabia

Abstract This is a study of a legal treatise by ʿĀdil ʿAwaḍ, published by Umm al-Qurā University in Mecca, a scholarly attempt to deal with the legality and ethics of Weapons of Mass Destruction (wmd) from the perspective of the šarīʿa. Saudi Arabia offers a relevant real-world case study, given the continuing importance of Islam in its socio-political system and the indications that Riyadh is considering the acquisition of nuclear weapons. ʿAwaḍ addresses the moral and legal – and essentially religiously-based, although mingled with Realpolitik – considerations pertinent to acquiring and potentially using wmd, especially nuclear weapons, and he addresses issues such as deterrence, first-strike capability, the parameters of targeting, and proportionality. This study engages an actual player, rather than limiting the approach to a theoretical perspective and to positing how Muslims could or should think, and concludes that the findings in ʿAwaḍ’s treatise legitimize and contribute to the proliferation and use of wmd.

Hindu Nuclear Politics and the Logic of Realism

Two variants of Hindu political thought proved decisive in determining the timing and rational behind India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Despite the realist logic of deterrence that dominates the discourse around nuclear proliferation, both Gandhian and Hindu nationalist actors subverted the logic of realism in India’s armament—in opposite directions. Whereas Gandhian moral inspiration drove India to avoid armament when it was strategically advantageous from a realist perspective, Hindu nationalist impulses proved decisive in pushing India to arm under far less strategic circumstances. This essay examines the history of Hindu nuclear politics, and its implications for nuclear proliferation, the logic of realism, and the future of religio-political movements.

Corrigendum to Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea

Corrigendum to Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea

Протиріччя США та ЄС щодо іранської ядерної програми у період президентства Дональда Трампа: наслідки для євроатлантичної єдності

The article examines the relationship between the United States and the EU on issues related to the Iranian nuclear program and ways to solve it during the presidency of Donald Trump (2017 – 2021). It is analyzed to what extent the contradictions between the US administration of President Donald Trump and the EU countries over the nuclear agreement with Iran have shaken Euro-Atlantic solidarity. The difference between the approaches of the European Union and the United States toward Iran's nuclear program during the presidency of Trump is discussed. It is considered how both sides tried to overcome these contradictions and how they tried to find a common approach to solving the problem of Iran's nuclear program in the framework of Euro-Atlantic solidarity. It has been shown that the main source of concern for both the United States and the European Union is not Iran's nuclear program only but also Iran's aggressive policy in the Middle East, and Tehran's progress in developing a space rocket program. The influence of the US Middle East Allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula) on the formation of Washington's position on Iran's nuclear program and on cooperation with the European Union on this issue has been studied. It has been found that the Donald Trump administration finds more in common with its Middle Eastern allies in pursuing a policy toward Iran than with the EU. The consequences of radicalizing Iranian nuclear policy in connection with the assassinations of Iranian General Kasem Soleimani and nuclear physicist Mohsen Fakhrizade are considered. It was analyzed the prospects for Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons or the return of Tehran to the nuclear agreement with the world's leading powers, which was signed by Iran in 2015 and which significantly limited Iran's nuclear program and reduced the chances of producing an Iranian atomic bomb. A comparative analysis of the US-EU response to Iran's latest steps to increase uranium enrichment, which could potentially bring Tehran closer to nuclear weapons, has been conducted. The consequences of President Trump's policy towards Iran for Euro-Atlantic unity are analyzed. Possible prospects for the development of US-EU cooperation in resolving the problem of Iran's nuclear program after the end of Trump's term are considered.

Extended deterrence and the future of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty

Extended deterrence was a major pillar of the NPT at its origin. As the Soviet threat diminished and then disappeared, this was forgotten by most policy makers and observers. Recently, the role of extended deterrence in preventing nuclear proliferation has regained much of its salience. Two factors are responsible for that change: the growing threats from Russia, China and North Korea; and increasing allied doubts about the solidity of U.S. security commitments. While allied acquisition of nuclear weapons does not appear imminent, that danger could increase unless the United States reinforces its security commitments in word and deed. Failing that, the future of the NPT may be bleak.

Why Germany won’t build its own nuclear weapons and remains skeptical of a Eurodeterrent

ABSTRACT Aggressive Russian policies and the Trump administration’s transactional approach to alliances have put nuclear issues back on the agenda for European governments. Arguments for German acquisition of nuclear weapons have gained no traction among German decision makers, as this would require multiple costly and radical shifts of Berlin’s foreign and security policies. German-French convergence on the role of nuclear weapons in European security is a necessary – though not necessarily sufficient – precondition for a strengthened nuclear dimension to the EU’s security and defense policies. However, the different nuclear cultures in France and Germany, French aversion to nuclear consultations, and inter-European divisions on the role of nuclear weapons make it unlikely that Germany will support a Eurodeterrent anytime soon. In the short term, the German debate on NATO’s response to the end of the INF treaty and Berlin’s decision on new dual-capable aircraft to support NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements will be indicators of changing nuclear attitudes and policies.

Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea

How does the alliance between a client state and its nuclear ally influence support for proliferation in the client? Conventional wisdom suggests that when nuclear security guarantees are not credible, support for proliferation will be high, since a domestic nuclear capability offers an alternative source of deterrence. I introduce a new theory, which posits that highly credible security guarantees can backfire by causing some individuals to fear their ally might miscalculate—either by using nuclear weapons in an unnecessary preventative attack or by precipitous escalation of a crisis or conflict. Survey experiments conducted among representative samples of South Korean citizens in 2018 and 2019 support this theory, showing that increases in the credibility of the US nuclear security guarantee lead to increased support for nuclear proliferation among South Korean respondents.

Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia: An Analysis

The South Asian security environment is in a state of flux due to the rivalry of two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by both the states cannot be retracted; however, it is critically important to maintain a stable and credible deterrence at the lowest possible level. Pakistan has often proposed India to develop a “strategic restraint regime” to avert the possibility of a total war that could culminate in a nuclear war. To establish such a regime, there is a need to improve bilateral relations and increase cooperation in the nuclear domain. To avoid chances of nuclear use, India and Pakistan should reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons by spending less on nuclear weapons development. This paper tries to examine the challenges to strategic stability in South Asia from domestic, regional and global perspectives and also explores that how the interplay of these challenges is undermining the South Asian strategic stability. The role of major powers, especially the US, has also been analysed for a thorough understanding of an already fragile security situation in the region.

How long until midnight? Intelligence-policy relations and the United States response to the Israeli nuclear program, 1959–1985

ABSTRACTWhy did the United States fail to stop Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons? Existing research argues that patrons such as the U.S. should have an easy time halting proliferation by militarily and economically vulnerable clients. Nevertheless, Israel acquired nuclear weapons with relatively little American opposition. Utilizing extensive primary source research, we argue that problematic intelligence-policy relations hindered U.S. efforts to arrest Israeli proliferation as (1) policymakers often gave mixed guidance to the intelligence community, resulting in (2) limited information on Israeli efforts that reinforced policy ambiguity. The results carry implications for understanding the dynamics of nuclear proliferation and intelligence-policy relations.

US nuclear weapons and non-proliferation

According to a widespread conventional wisdom, there is a link between US nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation and, therefore, in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other states, the US government must first make changes to its own nuclear arsenal. This article challenges the notion that US nuclear posture has a significant bearing on the proliferation and non-proliferation behavior of other states. Contrary to the received wisdom in policy circles, this article maintains that state decisions on nuclear non-proliferation issues are driven by a range of other security, economic, and political factors and, once these considerations are taken into account, there is little if any remaining variance to be explained by US nuclear posture. Using a dataset on US nuclear arsenal size from 1945 to 2011, this article examines the relationship between the size of the US nuclear arsenal and a variety of nuclear non-proliferation outcomes. It finds that there is no evidence of a relationship between the size of the US arsenal and: the exploration, pursuit, or acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states; the provision of sensitive nuclear assistance to non-nuclear weapon states; and voting on non-proliferation issues in the United Nations Security Council. The results are robust to alternate conceptualizations and measurements of US nuclear weapons and in various subsamples of data. This article breaks new ground on an empirical research agenda on how the nuclear policies and postures of the major nuclear powers affect the spread of nuclear weapons and has important implications for nuclear security policy.

(Nuclear) Change of Plans: What Explains Nuclear Reversals?

ABSTRACTWhat explains a state’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons program? While instances of nuclear reversal figure prominently in international politics, evidence in the literature has been largely piecemeal. We offer a novel conceptualization of the proliferation process as nonlinear, potentially including instances of reversal, as well as pursuit of a nuclear program and acquisition of nuclear weapons. Employing this theoretical framework, we consider states’ cost-benefit calculations in each phase of the proliferation process, and we test our theory using a multistate model. Two counterintuitive findings emerge from this framework. First, nuclear latency increases the likelihood of pursuit and acquisition but also increases the likelihood of reversal by reducing the costs of restarting a program in the future. Second, the nonproliferation regime discourages states without a nuclear program from pursuing and acquiring nuclear weapons while at the same time making states with nuclear programs less likely to reverse course.