Wittgenstein's Account Research Articles

"'P' dice P"

The paper is an interpretation of the critique of the Russellian theory of judgment, in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus [5.5422]. The author holds that the picture theory of language is the Wittgensteinian alternative to Russell’s theory of types, on which his theory of judgment is based. In other words, the idea that a picture cannot represent its own pictorial form, would avoid, with difficulties of its own, the vicious circle that Wittgenstein sees in the theory of types, namely to suppose that a description of the categorical structure of the world may establish the logical syntax of language. From this diagnosis, the author draws important consequences to illuminate the celebrated Wittgensteinian distinction between saying and showing, as well as the Wittgensteinian account of propositional attitudes.

Measurement as a Normative Practice

Recently, a number of prominent measurement specialists (e.g. Cliff, 1992; Schonemann, 1994) have pondered the lack of progress in the development of convincing solutions to the measurement problems of psychology, and have attempted to identify the factors responsible for this lack of progress. They suggest a number of possibilities, including a basic lack of talent in the ranks of the social sciences. It is argued here, however, that the philosophy of Wittgenstein provides an interesting alternative explanation. Specifically, despite their apparent differences, current approaches to the support of psychological measurement claims are unanimous in viewing measurement as chiefly an empirical matter. On Wittgenstein's account, however, this is a mischaracterization of measurement, for, as he argued in elaborate detail, measurement is a normative, rule-guided practice. Hence, empirically based argument is not relevant to the support of measurement claims. If this verdict is correct, it explains not only the failure of measurement theory in psychology, but the much discussed success of measurement in the physical sciences. In this paper, Wittgenstein's characterization of measurement, and its implications for psychology, are discussed.

The Nexus Misconceived

Certainly, the issues raised by Wittgenstein's account of measurement deserve serious debate. However, for such dialogue to produce a satisfying scholarly yield, an accurate depiction of his philosophy is required. Unfortunately, the commentaries of Jost and Gustafson (1998) and Chow (1998) carry on a dubious tradition in the social sciences of misunderstanding Wittgenstein's most essential insights. The most crippling of these is a failure to grasp Wittgenstein's remarks on the autonomy of the conceptual (rules) with respect to the empirical, and the implication of this autonomy for the treatment of conceptual and empirical issues in science.

Practices and Actions A Wittgensteinian Critique of Bourdieu and Giddens

This article criticizes Bourdieu's and Giddens's overintellectualizing accounts of human activity on the basis of Wittgenstein's insights into practical under standing. Part 1 describes these two theorists' conceptions of a homology between the organization of practices (spatial-temporal manifolds of action) and the governance of individual actions. Part 2 draws on Wittgenstein's discussions of linguistic definition and following a rule to criticize these conceptions for ascribing content to the practical understanding they claim governs action. Part 3 then suggests an alternative, Wittgensteinian account of the homology between practices and actions that avoids this pitfall.

Apperception and Spontaneity

Abstract The interest contemporary philosophy takes in Kant's notion of apperception is restricted to his criticism of the Cartesian Ego and to his refutation of scepticism, but there is a profound lack of concern for the notion itself and for the act of spontaneity in particular which is connected with the use of the word T. Starting from a comparison of Wittgenstein's account of this use with Kant's considerations it is argued that the latter aims at a theory of formal conditions of knowledge which includes the availability of the notion of the I. It is clarified what the determination of apperception as an ‘act of spontaniety’ amounts to (B: 132). Kant's scattered remarks on the ability of having the representation of the I, of using the word ‘I’, are considered in order to show that what he called ‘the logical I’ has something to do with the capacity of performing an act of judgment. It is argued that such an account is not to be found in contemporary discussions of ‘essential indexicals’, ‘first‐pers...

Apperception and spontaneity

The interest contemporary philosophy takes in Kant's notion of apperception is restricted to his criticism of the Cartesian Ego and to his refutation of scepticism, but there is a profound lack of concern for the notion itself and for the act of spontaneity in particular which is connected with the use of the word T. Starting from a comparison of Wittgenstein's account of this use with Kant's considerations it is argued that the latter aims at a theory of formal conditions of knowledge which includes the availability of the notion of the I. It is clarified what the determination of apperception as an ‘act of spontaniety’ amounts to (B: 132). Kant's scattered remarks on the ability of having the representation of the I, of using the word ‘I’, are considered in order to show that what he called ‘the logical I’ has something to do with the capacity of performing an act of judgment. It is argued that such an account is not to be found in contemporary discussions of ‘essential indexicals’, ‘first‐person view’ and mental self‐ascriptions.

Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: some lessons from Wittgenstein

This paper investigates the basis for making interpersonal comparisons of utility in everyday life. It argues that the position which many economists hold, namely that interpersonal comparisons of utility are highly problematic, impossible or even meaningless, is an implication of an underlying philosophy of mind, which locates utility, or enjoyment, in mental states which are private to individuals. The paper puts forward the suggestion that such mental states are of no significance to everyday life. In making this claim, I offer an account of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind as an alternative to the utilitarian view, the former stressing the importance of outward signs of enjoyment as opposed to inner states. By pursuing this path, a number of problems with the utilitarian position are revealed, and an account of how interpersonal comparisons of utility are made in everyday decision making is given.

Toward a Wittgensteinian Social Psychology of Human Development

It has been suggested that Wittgenstein's work on the philosophy of psychology contains the seeds of an anti-individualistic alternative to mentalism and behaviorism. Along these lines, I propose a social psychological reading of Wittgenstein based on Zettel§567 and related remarks. It is argued that Wittgenstein's views are social psychological because he claims that human behavior may be understood only in terms of the background of social practices and group norms, an assumption also shared by the social behaviorists Mead and Dewey. In particular, Wittgenstein emphasizes that psychological concepts, like all concepts, are systems of language-games supported by a complex variety of social practices, which he refers to as a form of life. According to Wittgenstein, people grow into the background assumptions of those around them through a process of socialization. On this view, human development is best understood as a progression through socio cultural sequences of increasingly complicated grammars. Some implications of Wittgenstein's account for contemporary developmental psychology are also discussed.

Fiction as "Grammatical" Investigation: A Wittgensteinian Account

Fiction as "Grammatical" Investigation: A Wittgensteinian Account

Meaning and Metaphilosophy

Jerry Katz's book touches on just about every area of philosophy, raising hard questions wherever it goes, and offering provocative answers to them. In this paper I would like to focus on just one of the issues he engages, but one I take to be central: namely, what is the relationship between Wittgenstein's account of meaning and his metaphilosophy? Katz supposes that Wittgenstein's treatment of meaning -including his identification of the meaning of an expression with its useis the basis of his metaphilosophy and of his accounts of logic, mathematics, the mind, and other matters. Thus he says

Democratic theory and individual autonomy

Abstract. Schumpeter argued that the norms of what he called the ‘classical’ theory were unrealisable within modern societies and offered what he believed to be a more realistic alternative. However, his critics accuse him of confusing ‘is’ with ‘ought’. This paper seeks to save him from this criticism. It shows that Schumpeter's attack on the classical model rested on a correct appraisal of the constraints on individual autonomous action within modern societies. Unlike the ‘competitive theory’ of Downs and others, Schumpeter's own alternative cannot be treated as a naive apologia for contemporary parliametary party democracy. He was well aware that such systems easily degenerate into oligopolies. Indeed he welcomed this development, viewing the party elections as means for moulding rather than responding to the people's will. Nevertheless, a series of procedural norms underlay his theory which are elucidated with reference to Wittgenstein's account of language.

The nature of all being: a study of Wittgenstein's modal atomism

In this comprehensive study of Wittgenstein's modal theorizing, Raymond Bradley offers a radical reinterpretation of Wittgenstein's early thought. He argues that the Tractatus presents a view of the world in which possibilities are given an important ontological status. Contrary to most interpreters, Bradley contends that Wittgenstein's ontology is central to his enterprise, and not simply a by-product of certain of his views on language. On Bradley's reading, the Tractatus offers a version of modal realism. He further demonstrates the unexpected existence of deep differences both in content and aims between the logical atomism of Wittgenstein and that of Russell. A unique feature of Bradley's argument here is his reliance on Wittgenstein's notebooks, which he believes offer indispensable guidance to the interpretation of difficult passages in the Tractatus. Bradley then goes on to argue that Wittgenstein's account of modality - and the related notion of possible worlds - is in fact superior to any of the currently popular theories in this area.

Wittgenstein's account of rule-following

Wittgenstein's account of rule-following

Wittgenstein on Logical Form and Kantian Geometry

That Wittgenstein in the Tractatus likens logic to geometry has been noticed; however, the extent and force of the analogy he develops between logical form and a broadly Kantian account of geometry has not been sufficiently appreciated. In this paper, I trace Wittgenstein's analogy in detail by looking closely at the relevant texts. I then suggest that we regard the fact that Wittgenstein develops his account of logical form by analogy with a Kantian account of geometry as evidence for the bold thesis that Wittgenstein belongs within a Kantian epistemological tradition. Finally, I supply two small pieces of the interpretive puzzle needed to support the larger thesis: first, evidence that Wittgenstein's concern with logical form involves a crucial epistemological component; second, a sketch of how Wittgenstein's account of logical and mathematical knowledge can be viewed as continuing a Kantian tradition.

A Fallacy in Ramsey

At the end of 'Facts and Propositions',1 Frank Ramsey argued in favour of Wittgenstein's thesis that universal (existential) quantifications were equivalent in meaning to the (probably infinite) conjunctions (disjunctions) of their instances, and against Russell's contention that they were true in virtue of sui generis general (or existential) facts.2 The positive argument is simple enough: if Wittgenstein's extension of the notion of truth-functional composition to cover quantification is accepted, then his semantic account of validity in propositional logic can be extended to cover such quantificational inferences as universal instantiation and existential generalization, whereas a semantic account like Russell's, in terms of sui generis facts, would leave the validity of these inferences unexplained. On the other side, however, the Russellian has an apparently telling objection to the Wittgensteinian account, and Ramsey answers this objection with an interesting but, I will argue, subtly circular argument. Russell's objection is that the conjunction of all its instances, even if it could be enunciated, does not exhaust the content of a universal quantification: the quantification cannot validly be inferred from the conjunction without an additional premiss to the effect that the conjunction is complete, that the names in the conjunct instances exhaust the domain over which the quantified variable ranges. In reply, Ramsey first canvasses the Wittgensteinian position, that the supposed added premiss is without meaning, but declines to defend it in detail, and contents himself with an ad hominem response. If the added premiss is tautologous, it adds nothing to the conjunction and can be omitted without affecting the validity of the inference, but, he claims, it can be shown, on the basis of assumptions acceptable to the (unnamed-he doesn't appear to have Russell in mind here) advancers of the objection, that it is a tautology. At this point there is a change of terminology. 'The objectors will claim that [the added premiss] is not a tautology, or in their terminology not a necessary proposition....' We who have read Kripke may find the identification of necessity with tautologousness, or in general with any sort of analyticity, dubious, but Ramsey felt comfortable enough with it to use in the remainder of the paragraph only the modal terminology. (His conclusion-that the added premiss is, if true, necessarily true, and, if false, necessarily false-is surprising enough for the objectors to be expected to retreat in confusion before it whatever their opinions on

Criticizing Forms of Life

It is frequently but mistakenly assumed that Ludwig Wittgenstein and/or Peter Winch in their remarks on the problems of understanding between ways of life are putting forward an 'impossibility' argument, claiming that a way of life cannot possibly be criticized from outside. They are understood as maintaining that the standards against which criticism is possible are internal to the way of life itself and are distinctive from those which are found in other ways of life, with the consequence that there are no common standards against which two different ways of life may be compared to the advantage of one of them. Lawrence M. Hinman1 seeks to identify something like the above view as 'the standard interpretation' of Wittgenstein's thought and wishes to attribute a primary responsibility for it to Peter Winch. He wishes to contest it both as an account of Wittgenstein's thought and as an argument. He thinks that, construed as an impossibility argument, it needs to be countered by a case for the possibility; the question to be asked is 'Can a form of life be wrong?' and the answer that needs to be given is in the affirmative. Hinman thinks that by conceding that 'to some extent forms of life differ from one another, presuppose somewhat different standards of meaning, and are constituted in part by rules which vary from one to another' (351), he has identified what is true and desirable in the standard interpretation and has to reject the idea that there is an 'absence of any such shared standards between different forms of life'. He wants to deny this because it has the 'disturbing' effect of inviting 'passivity and resignation rather than dialogue, disagreement and eventual creation of mutual understanding'. We do not understand either Wittgenstein or Winch as putting forward a general argument about the impossibility or otherwise of mutual understanding between ways of life2 any more than we read

Wittgenstein on sensation and ?seeing-as?

Although Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind has given rise to a vast body of critical literature, his discussion of sensation has so far received only piecemeal treatjnent. In fact, the focus of commentators has been so much on the private-language argument that it may appear as if Wittgenstein had little else to say relevant to the topic of sensation. Although I shaU of course pay heed to that argument, my main concern is to sketch an overview of Wittgenstein's approach to sensation. One special virtue I should like to claim for it is that it provides some important thematic continuity between the two parts of the Philosophi cal Investigations.2 Another feature is that it avoids imputing to Wittgenstein various traditional philosophical doctrines which some of his critics, as well as some of his followers, claim to find in the later writings. I have just suggested that Wittgenstein's account of sensation is significantly different from what may be found in traditional philoso phical theories. Nevertheless, some writers have viewed Wittgenstein as adopting a behavioristic analysis of mental phenomena; others have credited him with preserving private, inner mental process, and intro ducing 'criteria' to bridge the gap between mind and behavior. If what I have to say in the first part of this essay is correct, it follows that both of these interpretations are fundamentally in error, and that both errors have a common source.

Aesthetic Argument and Perceptual Persuasion

La influencia de Wittgenstein sobre la estética se siente, con particular fuerza, en relación con el argumento estético nos dice el Dr. Shusterman, quien engloba la contribución wittgensteiniana en este campo en tres temas principales. Al primero lo llama la ‘radical indetermnación de los conceptos estéticos’. Los conceptos que usamos en la crítica y reflexión sobre el arte pueden ser de dos clases; artísticos: los que definen el género (sinfonía, pintura épica), estilo o periodo (gótico, quattrocento), o el concepto mismo de ‘arte’; y estéticos: los adjetivos que califican nuestra experiencia como ‘vívido’, ‘delicado’ o el concepto de ‘belleza’. La argumentación que formulamos al evaluar una obra usando conceptos ‘artísticos’ es deductiva; el ejemplo es la tragedia en Aristóteles, donde la definición de lo que es una tragedia lleva implícita la definición de la norma con la cual juzgar si una tragedia es buena o no. Al usar conceptos ‘estéticos’ en nuestra evaluación de una obra también tendemos a hacer un argumento deductivo, pues requerimos, por ejemplo, de la definición de lo grotesco, para saber si una obra cae o no dentro de esa clasificación. La crítica de Wittgenstein parte de que estas dos familias de conceptos se refieren a conceptos indeterminados, que no tienen límites definibles, ni podemos esperar que los tengan. Los conceptos estéticos dependen, y éste es el segundo tema, de la ‘pluralidad lógica del discurso estético’, donde Wittgenstein nos pide que consideremos las palabras como herramientas cuyo uso es múltiple. El sentido de la palabra ‘bello’ depende de la función que desempeñe en un juego de lenguaje dado, así como del contexto histórico y social en el que se dé. Esto nos lleva al tercer tema, el de la ‘historicidad del arte y la apreciación estética’, pues el uso que se le da a las palabras en una época es distinto al que tuvo en el pasado o tendrá en el futuro. Esta indeterminación de los conceptos estéticos desacredita la validez de los argumentos estéticos deductivos e inductivos. Para Wittgenstein, el argumento estético que desarrolla un crítico tiene la función, al no apoyarse en definiciones preestablecidas, de describir la obra de tal manera que los demás la vean como él. La percepción es la prueba final. El argumento estético, que Wisdom llama retórico y Shusterman dialéctico, busca convencer, y en esto radica su éxito. Esta forma de razonar en el arte, distinta a la deducción e inducción lógica, no es exclusiva de éste, pues se usa en el lenguaje legal en una corte y en la misma filosofía (la de Wittgenstein se proponía convencer); teoría como las de Newton y Freud se aceptan, no tanto por su respaldo lógico, sino por la atracción de ver el mundo desde su perspectiva. Pero aceptar las sugerencias de Wittgenstein no implica rechazar los argumentos estéticos deductivos e inductivos como necesariamente falsos (como hace Casey), sino al contrario, y de acuerdo con la pluralidad wittgensteiniana, afirmar que la falta de principios y la multiplicidad de puntos de vista en la crítica de nuestros días exige una interpretación abierta à la Wittgenstein no implica que en otra situación histórica (p.ej. en la Grecia de Aristóteles) no se haya podido evaluar acertadamente una obra de arte mediante argumentos deductivos. De igual forma, ciertos argumentos inductivos (p.ej. afirmar que, a pesar del consenso, Dante es un mal poeta tiene que ser falso) debe tener validez, pues de lo contrario toda nuestra concepción de la cultura se vería cuestionada. Por esto, Shusterman concluye, ser fieles a lo que enseñó Wittgenstein requiere no cegarse a que la pluralidad de las funciones del lenguaje estético es aun mayor que lo que a veces estamos dispuestos a aceptar, y que nuestra posición abierta es sólo una entre varias. [Luis Argudín]

Some Remarks on Wittgenstein's Account of Religious Belief

Pupils' notes of some lectures on religious belief which Wittgenstein gave in 1938 have recently been published, and what I have to say is set against the background of these lectures. My title may suggest that there is a distinctive and precise account of religious belief which can be extracted from them and stated clearly for consideration. But I do not think that this is so. It is evident from these lectures that, in the subject of religious belief, Wittgenstein's prodigious capacity for puzzlement, in which Moore recognised the marks of genius, found full scope. But, at many points, it is not clear to me, at any rate, just how he is resolving – or would resolve – the puzzlement. So I am most certainly not setting myself up to explain ‘what Wittgenstein really meant’. However, like everything which we have from him, these lectures are fascinating, suggestive, provocative. And, at some hazard, I am going to offer a few observations on one or two of the points which he was, or appears to have been, making.

Cook on Wittgenstein's Account of Privacy

Cook on Wittgenstein's Account of Privacy