Wittgenstein on sensation and ?seeing-as?

Abstract

Although Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind has given rise to a vast body of critical literature, his discussion of sensation has so far received only piecemeal treatjnent. In fact, the focus of commentators has been so much on the private-language argument that it may appear as if Wittgenstein had little else to say relevant to the topic of sensation. Although I shaU of course pay heed to that argument, my main concern is to sketch an overview of Wittgenstein's approach to sensation. One special virtue I should like to claim for it is that it provides some important thematic continuity between the two parts of the Philosophi cal Investigations.2 Another feature is that it avoids imputing to Wittgenstein various traditional philosophical doctrines which some of his critics, as well as some of his followers, claim to find in the later writings. I have just suggested that Wittgenstein's account of sensation is significantly different from what may be found in traditional philoso phical theories. Nevertheless, some writers have viewed Wittgenstein as adopting a behavioristic analysis of mental phenomena; others have credited him with preserving private, inner mental process, and intro ducing 'criteria' to bridge the gap between mind and behavior. If what I have to say in the first part of this essay is correct, it follows that both of these interpretations are fundamentally in error, and that both errors have a common source.