Reasonable Account Research Articles

Accommodating Embodied Thinkers

AbstractThe principle of divine accommodation posits that revelation is accommodated to human cognitive capacities. It is regularly cited throughout the history of theology as an exegetical tool, as a doctrinal rationale, or as a condition for theological knowledge in general. This article proposes that divine accommodation invites an engagement with cognitive science, since findings in cognitive science illuminate the human cognitive capacities to which theological knowledge is accommodated. This article aims to demonstrate the fruitfulness of such an engagement by considering how theological concepts might be accommodated to accounts of human conceptualisation emerging from cognitive science. In particular, a case study considers the ‘conceptualisation hypothesis’ from ‘embodied cognition’, an emerging paradigm in cognitive science. This hypothesis suggests that human concepts are ‘grounded’ in sensorimotor states. If this scientifically‐motivated theory applies to all human concepts, it poses a potential theological dilemma: namely, if God‐concepts are grounded in sensorimotor states they prima facie risk being idolatrous, whereas if they are not so grounded, they may be un‐conceptualisable by humans. I suggest that one way to address this dilemma is to draw upon Athanasius’ insight that the incarnation plays a crucial role in accommodating human understanding. By examining the incarnation as an accommodation to human capacities uncovered by cognitive scientists, we gain a more comprehensive account of the epistemological reason for the incarnation. This account offers new lines of thinking about debates on the doctrine of the incarnation, such as the possibility of multiple incarnations.

Naturalizing the contributory

This paper has two aims. First, I critically discuss Daniel Whiting’s (Philos Stud 195(9):2191–2208, 2018) recent proposal that a reason to ϕ is evidence of a respect in which it is right to ϕ. I raise two objections against this view: (i) it is subject to a modified version of Eva Schmidt’s (Ethics 127(3):708–718, 2018) counterexample against the influential account of reasons in terms of evidence and ‘ought’, and—setting aside judgments about specific cases—, (ii) it is also in an important sense uninformative. Interestingly, it turns out that this last objection cannot be helpfully understood in terms of circularity. This leads to a more general question about the criteria of adequacy for reductive accounts of reasons: In what sense, if any, should such accounts be informative? The second aim of this paper is to clarify one such sense, which is suggested by reflection on Whiting’s proposal. In particular, I argue that successful reductive accounts naturalize the contributory—by which I mean, roughly, that they explain the specifically contributory nature of reasons in fully non-normative terms. Moreover, I explain how views that fail this criterion are unable to meet certain key explanatory desiderata for reductive accounts of reasons. After broaching some of the wider implications for the project of understanding the notion of a reason in other terms, I conclude that the notion of naturalizing the contributory is a helpful notion for structuring the debate over reductive accounts of reasons.

Hume on Nonhuman Animals, Causal Reasoning, and General Thoughts

AbstractIn both the Treatise and the Enquiry, as a naturalist philosopher Hume is committed to recognizing continuity between humans’ and other animals’ cognitive capacities. In particular, Hume maintains that humans share with other intelligent animals the basic psychological mechanism that underlies their capacities for causal reasoning. In this article, I will address the question whether Hume’s philosophical system can coherently attribute to animals the ability to engage in causal reasoning as he intends. First, I formulate an apparent problem for Hume that his views on causal reasoning and general thinking may seem to yield the following inconsistent triad: (1) causal reasoning requires general thinking; (2) general thinking requires language; (3) nonhuman animals lack language but can engage in causal reasoning. Then, I will develop a Humean solution to the problem by distinguishing two kinds of general thinking, which I call “level‐1” and “level‐2” general thinking, respectively. Level‐1 general thinking does not require language and must play the foundational role in Hume’s account of causal reasoning, as well as his account of language acquisition. Level‐2 general thinking, on the other hand, requires language, and it presupposes the capacity for level‐1 general thinking in several important ways.

Fair allocation of cryopreserved donor oocytes: towards an accountable process.

A growing number of people desire ART with cryopreserved donor oocytes. The allocation of these oocytes to couples and mothers to be is a 2-fold process. The first step is to select a pool of recipients. The second step is to decide who should be treated first. Prioritizing recipients is critical in settings where demand outstrips supply. So far, the issue of how to fairly allocate cryopreserved donor oocytes has been poorly addressed. Our ethical analysis aims to support clinics involved in allocation decisions by formulating criteria for recipient selection irrespective of supply (Part I) and recipient prioritization in case supply is limited (Part II). Relevant criteria for recipient selection are: a need for treatment to experience parenthood; a reasonable chance for successful treatment; the ability to safely undergo an oocyte donation pregnancy; and the ability to establish a stable and loving relationship with the child. Recipients eligible for priority include those who: have limited time left for treatment; have not yet experienced parenthood; did not undergo previous treatment with cryopreserved donor oocytes; and contributed to the supply of donor oocytes by bringing a donor to the bank. While selection criteria function as a threshold principle, we argue that the different prioritization criteria should be carefully balanced. Since specifying and balancing the allocation criteria undoubtedly raises a moral dispute, a fair and legitimate allocation process is warranted (Part III). We argue that allocation decisions should be made by a multidisciplinary committee, staffed by relevant experts with a variety of perspectives. Furthermore, the committees' reasoning behind decisions should be transparent and accessible to those affected: clinicians, donors, recipients and children born from treatment. Insight into the reasons that underpin allocation decisions allows these stakeholders to understand, review and challenge decisions, which is also known as accountability for reasonableness.

Political Realism and Political Reasons

Some people, we may call them realists, endorse the priority thesis. This thesis says political reasons (distinct from moral, prudential, aesthetic, economic, and other kinds of reason) have normative priority whenever we assess political situations. Any putative political reasons, I argue, must satisfy an autonomy condition and an identity condition. I argue that no realist account of political reasons shows such reasons are distinct and autonomous as of yet. One account, the practice-based account, may have the wherewithal to show political reasons are distinct. I also say some things about the relations between identity, autonomy, and priority.

MacIntyre on Practical Reasoning

Patrick Byrne argues that MacIntyre’s account of practical reasoning is inadequate because it is based upon a notion of flourishing that places too much emphasis on impersonal facts, likewise because it is excessively focused on means without considering the role of desire for ends, and because it is does not account for the role of feelings in explaining how knowledge of ends is attained. In this essay, I argue that MacIntyre’s account provides adequate responses to each of these concerns. But more broadly, I argue that Byrne is right to suggest that a Lonerganian perspective offers important insights that can extend MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian practical philosophy. Specifically, Lonergan’s account of the generalized empirical method may inform MacIntyre’s theory of rival, and potentially incommensurable traditions, explaining how standards of argument are both transcultural and historically articulated.

Problems and Solutions of Accounting Work in Enterprises

With the continuous development of economy, the importance of accounting work in enterprises has been gradually highlighted. Reasonable and effective enterprise accounting can not only provide impetus for the economic development of enterprises, but also ensure that the accounting system of Chinese enterprises becomes more perfect. Therefore, in the actual operation process, enterprises need to make a reasonable analysis of various problems existing in the current accounting work, to work out a feasible solution plan, and constantly innovate. In addition, the solutions will be truly implemented in the work, so as to ensure that the enterprise’s accounting work can be carried out more reasonably and effectively, and provide certain support for the enterprise to achieve better development.

'An Expansionist Model of Legal Reasoning'

In this paper, I engage with J.J. Moreso’s account of legal reasoning. First, I reconstruct Moreso’s conception of legal deliberation, which I regard as taking a distinctive stance within the contemporary debate in jurisprudence, since it innovatively expands on some of the most sophisticated models of practical reasoning and legal reasoning that have been defended in the literature. Building on this interpretation of Moreso’s theory of legal reasoning, I will go on presenting some reflections on the idea of practical rationality that undergirds the practice of reasoning in law, when this practice is conceived in Moreso’s terms. In this context, I account for two central features of the conception of practical rationality that underlines, and best fits with, Moreso’s explanation of legal reasoning. Since Moreso has yet to systematically explore the idea of practical rationality associated with his theory of legal argument, the claims I advance in this part of the paper are merely tentative. Whilst I try to make a rigorous attempt to develop Moreso’s jurisprudence from a theoretical perspective that is sympathetic to his overall project, nothing in the discussion I carry out here should be taken to suggest that Moreso is conceptually committed to the views about practical rationality I associate his theory of legal reasoning with.

OP230 How Legitimate Is The Process Of Updating the Benefits Package In Israel? A 20 Year Overview

IntroductionThe National Health Insurance Law enacted in 1995 stipulates a minimum list of health services (benefits package) that the four health plans in Israel have to provide to their members. The recommendations on which new technologies or new indications for existing ones should be added every year to the benefits package, subject to a predetermined budget, are made by a public committee that evaluates and prioritizes candidate technologies according to their clinical merit, economic (mainly budget impact), social, ethical and other aspects. We assessed the legitimacy of this coverage decision process over the past 20 years.MethodsThe legitimacy of the process was assessed by adherence to the conditions outlined in the accountability for reasonableness (A4R) framework. A4R defines four conditions for legitimate and fair healthcare coverage decision processes: relevance, publicity, appeals/reversibility, and enforcement. We reviewed the changes made in the coverage decision process over the past 20 years and examined whether these changes have changed its legitimacy.ResultsOur analysis suggests that despite several changes made over the years in the process for updating the benefits package, for example, increase in transparency, introducing a structured appeal process, it only partially fulfills the four A4R conditions. In order to accomplish these goals more fully, several widely used considerations such as cost-effectiveness analysis and incorporating views from patients should be included. Additionally, this decision-making process should become even more transparent than it currently is.ConclusionsThe annual process of updating the benefits package in Israel where hundreds of technologies are “competing” with each other for coverage under a pre-defined budget is unique and not without merit. This process has been operating in the same pattern with only minor changes made since 1999. The main barriers for fulfilling all A4R conditions may relate in part to the large number of technologies assessed each year within a short time frame. Several changes in the process including the assessment of societal values, involvement of diverse stakeholders including patient advocate groups should be made to improve its legitimacy.

Isobaric analog state energy in deformed nuclei: A toy model

A formula to evaluate the effects of a general deformation on the Coulomb direct contribution to the energy of the Isobaric Analog State (IAS) is presented and studied via a simple yet physical model. The toy model gives a reasonable account of microscopic deformed Hartree-Fock-Bogolyubov (HFB) calculations in a test case, and provides a guidance when predicting unknown IAS energies. Thus, deformed HFB calculations, to predict the IAS energies, are performed for several neutron-deficient medium-mass and heavy nuclei which are now planned to be studied experimentally.

A puzzle about fickleness

AbstractIn this paper, I motivate a puzzle about epistemic rationality. On the one hand, there seems to be something problematic about frequently changing your mind. On the other hand, changing your mind once is often permissible. Why do one‐off changes of mind seem rationally permissible, even admirable, while constant changes seem quintessentially irrational? The puzzle of fickleness is to explain this asymmetry. To solve the puzzle, I propose and defend the Ratifiable Reasoning Account. According to this solution, as agents redeliberate, they gain two types of evidence. First, they gain inductive evidence that they will not stably settle their belief. Second, this inductive evidence affords higher‐order evidence that they are unreliable at assessing the matter at hand. The fact that fickle agents gain this higher‐order evidence explains why fickleness can be epistemically—not just practically—irrational. In addition to solving the puzzle, my account captures a wide range of contextual factors that are relevant for our judgments.

Editor's Introduction

Editor's Introduction

Utility and Science

Utilitarian philosophy, from its very beginning, has been inspired by the success of scientific practice, as can be seen in J. Bentham’s attempt to model law or ethics more generally on the methodology of the physical sciences, and in J.S. Mill’s account of mathematical objects and reasoning. Similarly, in some cases scientific research has been guided by the utilitarian approach, for example in restricting animal experimentation on the basis of the principle of equity, emphasised by P. Singe...

Network recall among older adults with cognitive impairments

Although it is widely accepted that personal networks influence health and illness, network recall remains a major concern. This concern is heightened when studying a population that is vulnerable to cognitive decline. Given these issues, we use data from the Social Network in Alzheimer Disease project to explore similarities and discrepancies between the network perceptions of focal participants and study partners. By leveraging data on a sample of older adults with normal cognition, mild cognitive impairment, and early stage dementia, we explore how cognitive impairment influences older adults’ perceptions of their personal networks. We find that the average individual is more likely to omit weaker, peripheral ties from their self-reported networks than stronger, central ties. Despite observing only moderate levels of focal-partner corroboration across our sample, we find minimal evidence of perceptual differences across diagnostic groups. We offer two broad conclusions. First, self-reported network data, though imperfect, offer a reasonable account of the core people in one’s life. Second, our findings assuage concerns that cognitively impaired older adults have skewed perceptions of their personal networks.

Parallel Phrases and Interaction in Greek and Latin Magical Texts.

Magical texts represent an inexhaustible source for the phenomena of an ancient language for special purposes. The scope of this paper is limited to the different kinds of word-borrowings in the Pannonian set of curse tablets. One-language, well written and easily readable magical texts can be difficult to understand while explicit and unambiguous wording is expected in such practical genre like curses which level at definite persons. Harmful curse tablets and protective amulets, however, can be obscure. This study aims to give a comprehensive account of the possible reasons why these texts have a cloudy style, with special outlook of parallel phrases in Greek pieces of evidence.

Public reason as a social basis of self‐respect

AbstractThe idea of public reason was traditionally explained in terms of the need to justify the exercise of coercive power to reasonable people who do not agree on the truth of any particular conception of the good. In this paper, I show why this traditional, coercion‐based, view is problematic, and offer a different account of public reason: the “self‐respect account.” In addition, I argue that this account is capable of informing recent, nontraditional, accounts of public reason. The conclusion is that public reason can be conceptualized as a social basis of self‐respect.

The Value of Autoethnography in Leadership Studies, and its Pitfalls

The field of leadership studies frequently focuses on defining leadership traits in abstraction from the context in which leadership operates. The first aim of this article is to provide a brief overview of reasons why this might be the case. Reasons include: leadership studies being dominated by the perspectives of leaders; the lack of definition and visibility of followership studies; the status and limitations of much qualitative research; and a predominant focus on good leadership. Consequently, many people who experience the effects of leadership, and particularly those of bad leadership, do not recognise their experiences in the literature. However, recognising that followers who experience bad leadership personally increasingly engage in autoethnographic studies, my second aim is to draw out some examples of bad leadership from the autoethnographic literature, as well as their effects. In spite of its negative effects, bad leadership frequently remains unchallenged. My third aim is to explain why this might be the case, where I argue that this stems partly from the pitfalls of autoethnographic studies. I also sketch how these pitfalls might be overcome and how doing so and adopting the principle of ‘accountability for reasonableness’ might help to tackle bad leadership.

Logical Predictivism

Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention has been paid recently to the view, known as anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), that the subject matter and epistemology of logic may not be so different from that of the recognised sciences. One of the most prevalent claims made by advocates of AEL is that theory choice within logic is significantly similar to that within the sciences. This connection with scientific methodology highlights a considerable challenge for the anti-exceptionalist, as two uncontentious claims about scientific theories are that they attempt to explain a target phenomenon and (at least partially) prove their worth through successful predictions. Thus, if this methodological AEL is to be viable, the anti-exceptionalist will need a reasonable account of what phenomena logics are attempting to explain, how they can explain, and in what sense they can be said to issue predictions. This paper makes sense of the anti-exceptionalist proposal with a new account of logical theory choice, logical predictivism, according to which logics are engaged in both a process of prediction and explanation.

Theory‐of‐mind during childhood: Investigating syntactic and executive contributions

AbstractBoth syntax and Executive Functions (EF) are involved in Theory‐of‐Mind (ToM) but their contributory roles have mainly been studied separately. Moreover, researchers have mostly administered False Belief (FB) tasks while they may not be representative of all ToM abilities. Studies of adults give valuable information regarding whether syntax and EF are useful for ToM reasoning (i.e., Reasoning account), however, only the study of children brings direct evidence in favor of ToM emergence (i.e., Emergence account). Also, because the ToM tasks used often entail verbal and executive demands, the links observed could mostly result from such confounds (i.e., Expression account). We evaluated ToM, syntactic and EF abilities in 126 children (3‐11 y.o.) using a set of ToM tasks with minimal verbal and executive demands. Our goals were to assess (1) the hierarchical contribution of syntax and EF to ToM, (2) whether results previously obtained for FB tasks are representative of ToM in general, (3) whether the ToM‐syntax and ToM‐EF links are constant (i.e., Reasoning account) or decrease during development (i.e., Emergence accounts). Results of stepwise regression analyses showed a predominant role of syntax over EF to predict ToM abilities. The comparison of results for ToM and FB tasks showed that FB is not always representative of ToM. Finally, there was no moderating effect of age on the syntax‐ToM or EF‐ToM relations, thus suggestive of the Reasoning account rather than the Emergence account.

Interplay of reactive interference and crowding effects in the diffusion-influenced reaction kinetics.

We investigate the interplay of reactive interference and crowding effects in the irreversible diffusion-influenced bimolecular reactions of the type A+B→P+B by using the Brownian dynamics simulation method. It is known that the presence of nonreactive crowding agents retards the reaction rate when the volume fraction of the crowding agents is large enough. On the other hand, a high concentration of B is known to increase the reaction rate more than expected from the mass action law, although the B's may also act as crowders. Therefore, it would be interesting to see which effect dominates when the number density of B as well as the number density of the crowders increases. We will present an approximate theory that provides a reasonable account for the Brownian dynamics simulation results.