Abstract
Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention has been paid recently to the view, known as anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), that the subject matter and epistemology of logic may not be so different from that of the recognised sciences. One of the most prevalent claims made by advocates of AEL is that theory choice within logic is significantly similar to that within the sciences. This connection with scientific methodology highlights a considerable challenge for the anti-exceptionalist, as two uncontentious claims about scientific theories are that they attempt to explain a target phenomenon and (at least partially) prove their worth through successful predictions. Thus, if this methodological AEL is to be viable, the anti-exceptionalist will need a reasonable account of what phenomena logics are attempting to explain, how they can explain, and in what sense they can be said to issue predictions. This paper makes sense of the anti-exceptionalist proposal with a new account of logical theory choice, logical predictivism, according to which logics are engaged in both a process of prediction and explanation.
Highlights
Anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL) is the thesis that the subject matter and epistemology of logic is, contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, similar in significant regards to the recognised sciences [25]
It seems either we must admit that the proposed data is unreliable, or we need to preidentify certain agents as reliable judges of which propositions follow from others in particular arguments. We highlight this problem here not because we have a ready solution to it, but because it is a challenge that will eventually need to be met—what justifies the presumption that the proposed data is reliable, when we have good reasons from empirical findings to believe it isn’t? In what follows, we only aim to show what sense can be made of a logical methodology that treats such judgements as reliable, and further that logical practice does suggest that logicians rely upon such data
Upshot 2: Re-evaluating Anti-Exceptionalism The current proposal takes seriously the idea that logical theory choice is akin to that within the sciences, with both scientific and logical theories engaged in a process of providing explanations for a given phenomenon, and demonstrating their worth through successful predictions
Summary
Anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL) is the thesis that the subject matter and epistemology of logic is, contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, similar in significant regards to the recognised sciences [25]. For the anti-exceptionalist’s proposal, it just happens that these theoretical virtues have a strong resemblance to those theoretical virtues often discussed in connection with the empirical sciences [32, 39] This account will have the benefit of substantiating the antiexceptionalist’s claim that logical methodology is similar to scientific methodology, for we take it that the role of explanation and prediction within science are uncontroversial claims about scientific methodology, but allow the anti-exceptionalist to stop speaking in the unhelpfully vague terms of logics “capturing” or “accommodating” data.
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