Pluralist Account Research Articles

The Privilege of Territory: Christian Wolff at the Origins of Statist International Thought

The modern state is often taken as the only legitimate claimant to the division of the globe. Political theorists offer many theories of territorial rights but tend to agree that the state remains the proper institutional bearer of such rights. This article examines how states became the exclusive bearers of territorial rights by returning to the international theory of the eighteenth-century Prussian jurist Christian Wolff (1679–1754), who wrote in a moment when sovereign states were not the heirs apparent to the globe but competed with other claimants to territorial rights. Despite proposing a radically pluralistic and anti-imperial account of land ownership, Wolff nonetheless paved the way for the state to become the sole bearer of territorial rights. Wolff’s international thought is an illustration of how building a state-centric international order was a double-edged sword: it criticized imperial overreach while also closing the international arena to nonstate forms of collective life. In this process, he offered two distinct ideas of political space: the territorial space of states, and the land ownership tracts of nonstate peoples, including pastoralists and nomads. To Wolff, only states were entitled to full and permanent territorial rights, while nonstate peoples were shut out of the international system, made both de facto and de jure stateless.

Working Memory Is as Working Memory Does: A Pluralist Take on the Center of the Mind.

Working memory is thought to be the psychological capacity that enables us to maintain or manipulate information no longer in our environment for goal-directed action. Recent work argues that working memory is not a so-called natural kind and in turn cannot explain the cognitive processes attributed to it. This paper first clarifies the scope of this earlier critique and argues for a pluralist account of working memory. Under this account, working memory is variously realized by many mechanisms that contribute to the maintenance and manipulation of information across tasks. This view in effect updates one of the earliest pluralist formulations of working memory. Juxtaposing this view against deflationary descriptions allows us to delineate two gradients that help us chart various accounts of working memory and identify their respective theoretical commitments. In turn, we can isolate those accounts that fail to accord with the evidence supporting a pluralist view, and we can begin to rehabilitate working memory as a pluralist, and ultimately more informative, construct.

Relational or Object-Oriented? A Dialogue between Two Contemporary Ontologies

Abstract Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) emphasizes the autonomy of objects, positing a withdrawn surplus of being that resists reduction to its parts or the sum of its parts. However, Harman’s framework faces conceptual tensions, including challenges in reconciling epistemological and ontological dimensions, explaining the formation of compound objects, and ascribing determinate features to experientially inaccessible objects. I argue that these issues arise mostly due to Harman’s over-commitment to a withdrawn substantial core of objects. To address these issues, I propose turning to Jean-Luc Nancy’s post-phenomenological materialism and Alain Badiou’s mathematical realism. Both Nancy and Badiou offer alternatives to Harman’s substantialist core, emphasizing a local, contextually bound identity of things, which describes a restricted domain from the endlessly broader horizon of relations and situations in which each thing is or can be involved. They thus account for the surplus of being in each thing and consequently their ontological autonomy without recourse to a substantive grounding. I argue such a relational-friendly account of pluralism avoids the conceptual issues Harman’s OOO runs into. Lastly, I emphasize the value of OOO as an advocate for ontological equality that seeks to avoid the emergence of privileged actors or centralized discourse. This dialogue between Harman, Nancy, and Badiou thus seeks to advance the possibility of pluralistic ontologies within relational frameworks, combining the perspectives of OOO with post-phenomenological theories to explore the complexities of relationality without recourse to non-relational substrata.

Remember me? First person thought, memory and explanations of IEM

ABSTRACT An important focus in discussions of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) is on what explains putative cases of it, and correspondingly, on what significance its presence should be taken to have. This focus is important for the literature: the interest of the phenomenon naturally depends on why it is supposed to be significant when it arises. This paper looks to the claimed IEM of memory-based judgments as a case study to advocate for a pluralist account of explanations of IEM. I argue that Evans was right that Shoemakerian q-memories fail to undermine the supposed IEM of memory-based first personal judgments, but that he was wrong about why. In fact, cases of q-memory reveal a surprising referential underdetermination in first person thought, which subvenes an underdetermination of the explanation of IEM for memory-based judgments. Given this plurality of explanations active in just a single case study, we should be cautious about claims to IEM having just one source of significance.

Teleosemantics, Structural Resemblance and Predictive Processing

AbstractWe propose a pluralist account of content for predictive processing systems. Our pluralism combines Millikan’s teleosemantics with existing structural resemblance accounts. The paper has two goals. First, we outline how a teleosemantic treatment of signal passing in predictive processing systems would work, and how it integrates with structural resemblance accounts. We show that the core explanatory motivations and conceptual machinery of teleosemantics and predictive processing mesh together well. Second, we argue this pluralist approach expands the range of empirical cases to which the predictive processing framework might be successfully applied. This is because our pluralism is practice-oriented. A range of different notions of content are used in the cognitive sciences to explain behaviour, and some of these cases look to employ teleosemantic notions. As a result, our pluralism gives predictive processing the scope to cover these cases.

Taking Dworkin’s Legal Monism Seriously

Abstract In this review essay, I analyse two philosophical positions presented by Cormac Mac Amhlaigh in New Constitutional Horizons – namely, a pluralistic analytic legal theory, which offers a criterion of ‘individuation’ of legal systems in the context of transnational laws (to explain the relationship between domestic and international law), and a pluralistic account of constitutionalism, which understands the concept of ‘constitution’ and related political concepts in the context of transnational legal relationships (treating them as ‘interpretive concepts’ in the sense of Ronald Dworkin). My main target is not Mac Amhlaigh’s account of constitutionalism, with which I agree, but, rather, his analytic legal theory. After a brief summary of the former, to make explicit the interpretive methodology of the book, I respond to the latter in two ways: first, I present Dworkin’s argument to defend Hans Kelsen’s international legal monism against H.L.A. Hart’s objections, and, second, I argue that the analytic ambition to provide a test to distinguish sharply between municipal law and international law, treating them as separate while simultaneously valid systems, is unachievable. I end with a claim that Dworkin’s thesis of the unity of value entails a distinctive version of legal monism, which is more plausible than Kelsen’s traditional legal monism because it is not committed to a ‘linear’ or ‘hierarchical’ theory of law.

Epistemic Authorities and Skilled Agents: A Pluralist Account of Moral Expertise

This paper explores the concept of moral expertise in the contemporary philosophical debate, with a focus on three accounts discussed across moral epistemology, bioethics, and virtue ethics: an epistemic authority account, a skilled agent account, and a hybrid model sharing key features of the two. It is argued that there are no convincing reasons to defend a monistic approach that reduces moral expertise to only one of these models. A pluralist view is outlined in the attempt to reorient the discussion about moral expertise.

Does harm or disrespect make discrimination wrong? An experimental approach

ABSTRACTWhile standard forms of discrimination are widely considered morally wrong, philosophers disagree about what makes them so. Two accounts have risen to prominence in this debate: One stressing how wrongful discrimination disrespects the discriminatee, the other how the harms involved make discrimination wrong. While these accounts are based on carefully constructed thought experiments, proponents of both sides see their positions as in line with and, in part, supported by the folk theory of the moral wrongness of discrimination. This article presents a vignette-based experiment to test empirically what, in the eyes of “folks”, makes discrimination wrong. Interestingly, we find that, according to folks, both disrespect and harm make discrimination wrong. Our findings offer some support for a pluralistic account of the wrongness of discrimination over both monist respect-based and monist harm-based accounts.

Towards a Pluralistic Account of Thought Experiments

Towards a Pluralistic Account of Thought Experiments

Does reflective equilibrium help us converge?

I address the worry that reflective equilibrium is too weak as an account of justification because it fails to let differing views converge. I take up informal aspects of convergence and operationalise them in a formal model of reflective equilibrium. This allows for exploration by the means of computer simulation. Findings show that the formal model does not yield unique outputs, but still boosts agreement. I conclude from this that reflective equilibrium is best seen as a pluralist account of justification that cannot be accused of resulting in an “anything goes” relativism.

A unified theory for intelligence analysis

ABSTRACT Causation has traditionally been an under-theorized topic. Until Hendrickson’s work, very little effort had been devoted to creating a compelling theory of causation in intelligence analysis. In line with the recent attempts to integrate intelligence theory with philosophy, this article is intended to contribute to the philosophy of intelligence by defining a dedicated account of causation for it. The Unified Theory for Intelligence Analysis, as this account of causation is named, is intended to integrate into a single account Betts’ Normal and Exceptional Theories as well as Hendrickson’s target challenges. It is then proved that a pluralistic account of causation that combines both counterfactual and probabilistic accounts of causation is the most successful option. Finally, it is shown that Bayesian tools are the natural manifestation of this Unified Theory, and that Subjective Logic can help refute criticism against Bayesianism in intelligence analysis.

Does Political Equality Require Equal Power? A Pluralist Account

AbstractIn this paper, I criticize two views on how political equality is related to equally distributed political power, and I offer a novel, pluralist account of political equality to address their shortcomings—in particular, concerning their implications for affirmative action in the political domain, political representation, and the situation of permanent minorities. The Equal Power View holds that political equality requires equally distributed political power. It considers affirmative action—e.g., racial or gender electoral quotas—, representation, and more-than-equal power to permanent minorities pro tanto objectionable. The Equal Status View, in contrast, holds that political equality concerns equal relations and status, and it is only contingently related to equally distributed power. I argue that while the Equal Status View is right that equal power can be insufficient for—or even objectionable from the viewpoint of—political equality, it is wrong to conclude that equal power has no independent significance in an account of political equality. My pluralist account shows that political equality entails not only status-based requirements but also independent egalitarian requirements to distribute political power equally. This account provides a finer-grained understanding of affirmative action in the political domain. It justifies affirmative action but holds that it should only be used to realize equal political status until thorough-going social reform allows us to maintain both equal political status and equally distributed political power at the same time. Similarly, representation should be amended with power-balancing institutions, and permanent minorities should enjoy equal status with minimal compromise to power equality.

A Holistic Double-Reference Explanatory Basis for a Unifying Pluralist Account of Truth

In reflective explorations of the nature of truth in the philosophical concern with truth (as conceived in people’s pre-theoretic understanding of truth), there are two seemingly opposed strategic directions of explaining the relationship between the two closely related but distinct basic semantic notions, truth (with sentential truth bearers) and reference (with referring terms at the subject position): by virtue of which to hook up to the world in the fundamental relationship between language, thought and the world; eventually which one is more fundamental in this connection, explaining truth by virtue of reference or explaining reference by virtue of truth. In this essay, through elaborating a holistic double-reference explanatory basis of truth, I explain how our pre-theoretic “way-things-are-capturing” understanding of truth fundamentally plays its normative-basis role for a unifying pluralist account of truth through the complementary interplay of its vertical “double-reference-based” dimension and horizontal “sentential-predication-based” dimension. For illustration and for a relatively complete understanding, in Appendix, I present a sample version of the suggested unifying pluralist account of truth which consists of the referentially enhanced base account, as explained in this essay, and sample accounts of some distinct types of perspective elaborations.

A Pluralist Hope: Or, Against Optimizing Neurochemistry on Some Moonlit Dream-Visited Planet

ABSTRACT In considering the hopeful rhetoric that pervades the “nothing but” psychopharmacological approaches to depression—a contemporary version of what William James calls medical materialism—this article argues that only a thorough-going pluralist account of hope is a hope worth wanting. Medical materialist hope is better conceptualized as a variation of optimism, which assumes a single universe that is already the best of all possible universes, and thereby only promotes optimization of the status quo, rather than encourage a wider undertaking of a variety of experiments in living. A pluralist hope, as opposed to optimism, cannot logically infer what the future will bring from a reigning scientific model of the brain. Rather, a pluralist hope is a passionate belief that a not-yet unimagined, and therefore indeterminate, future will meliorate current human ills should humans strenuously work toward achieving it.

Structure, essence and existence in chemistry

AbstractPhilosophers have often debated the truth of microstructural essentialism about chemical substances: whether or not the structure of a chemical substance at the molecular scale is what makes it the substance it is. Oddly they have tended to pursue this debate without identifying what a structure is, and with some confusion and about what a chemical substance is. In this paper I draw on chemistry to rectify those omissions, providing a pluralist account of structure, clarifying what (according to chemistry) a chemical substance is and defending microstructural essentialism, as I understand that position. I then give an account of the existence of composite substances and objects in chemistry, an issue that goes back to Aristotle.

Focused true–true counterfactuals

AbstractAny counterfactual with a true antecedent and a true consequent is invariably predicted to be true by the standard Stalnaker–Lewis semantics. But many such true–true counterfactuals appear false to ordinary speakers, which is considered by many authors as evidence that the standard semantics should be revised. However, Walters and Williams prove that allowing true–true counterfactuals to be false would unacceptably invalidate some very plausible logical principles. The objective of this paper is to provide a pragmatic account of seemingly false true–true counterfactuals, which explains why such counterfactuals seem false to ordinary speakers while being true semantically. In particular, a pluralistic pragmatic account is pursued: I argue that some true–trues seem false because they conversationally implicate some falsehood, and some others seem false because the focus (intonation stress) involved in them invokes some pragmatic re‐interpretation that affects speakers' truth‐value judgments.

Character Change in Mainstream Movies: Structures of Moral Development

Character change is an essential component of Hollywood storytelling, yet little has been written about how it is typically structured. This paper addresses that deficit. Through close formal analysis of a small but narratively diverse group of films—Casablanca (1942), The Apartment (1960), About a Boy (2002) and Wild (2014)—evidence is presented for the existence of a common schema, one that is used to organize the ethical development of morally-flawed protagonists. While this represents only one type of character change, specifying its structural dynamics productively extends our knowledge of commercial cinema's narrative norms as they have persisted in history. It also provides a basis for challenging the view, most fully developed by Carroll (1984), Smith (1995) and Plantinga (2018), that sympathy with or allegiance to characters is a matter of general moral assessment. I argue that because the schema requires a protagonist to repeatedly fall short of an ideal morality, one that is always clearly delineated in the narrative, then allegiance to them cannot be the result of moral approval or their ethical development would be meaningless. My solution is to propose a pluralist account of allegiance, one which emphasizes the role of viewer concern for flawed protagonists who, in all of my examples, suffer sustained emotional and psychological distress.

Honesty: Respect for the right not to be deceived

ABSTRACT In this paper, I explore the characteristic reason that motivates a virtuously honest person to perform honest actions. I critically examine previous accounts of honesty’s characteristic motivating reason, including Christian Miller’s pluralistic account, which allows various virtuous motivating reasons to count as honesty’s motivation. I then introduce the respect for the right not to be deceived as the moral ground that characteristically motivates a virtuously honest person’s honest action. After addressing possible objections, I conclude by discussing its educational implications on cultivating the virtue of honesty.

A little bit pregnant: towards a pluralist account of non-sexual reproduction

Fertility clinicians participate in non-sexual reproductive projects by providing assisted reproductive technology (ART) to those hoping to reproduce, in support of their reproductive goals. In most countries where ART is...

Shared Agency and Mutual Obligations: A Pluralist Account

Abstract Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do one's bit might provide our agency-pooling mechanism. When they do, we act together by virtue of satisfying them (degree 2). Conversely, some shared activities involve no obligation (degree 0). In the second part, I argue shared agency theory is best served by a non-moralistic conception of obligation, one on which co-participants’ obligations need be neither strict-performance obligations, nor directed ones. Overall, my arguments suggest that we can choose how to coordinate normatively our shared activities.