A unified theory for intelligence analysis

Abstract

ABSTRACT Causation has traditionally been an under-theorized topic. Until Hendrickson’s work, very little effort had been devoted to creating a compelling theory of causation in intelligence analysis. In line with the recent attempts to integrate intelligence theory with philosophy, this article is intended to contribute to the philosophy of intelligence by defining a dedicated account of causation for it. The Unified Theory for Intelligence Analysis, as this account of causation is named, is intended to integrate into a single account Betts’ Normal and Exceptional Theories as well as Hendrickson’s target challenges. It is then proved that a pluralistic account of causation that combines both counterfactual and probabilistic accounts of causation is the most successful option. Finally, it is shown that Bayesian tools are the natural manifestation of this Unified Theory, and that Subjective Logic can help refute criticism against Bayesianism in intelligence analysis.