Abstract
ABSTRACT An important focus in discussions of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) is on what explains putative cases of it, and correspondingly, on what significance its presence should be taken to have. This focus is important for the literature: the interest of the phenomenon naturally depends on why it is supposed to be significant when it arises. This paper looks to the claimed IEM of memory-based judgments as a case study to advocate for a pluralist account of explanations of IEM. I argue that Evans was right that Shoemakerian q-memories fail to undermine the supposed IEM of memory-based first personal judgments, but that he was wrong about why. In fact, cases of q-memory reveal a surprising referential underdetermination in first person thought, which subvenes an underdetermination of the explanation of IEM for memory-based judgments. Given this plurality of explanations active in just a single case study, we should be cautious about claims to IEM having just one source of significance.
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