Account Of God Research Articles

Primary Causality, Providence, and Scripture

Abstract This paper brings together several issues in Aquinas’s thought on God’s primary causality, providence, and the reading of scripture. Herein I argue that God’s primary causality is to be understood in terms of His being the source of all actuality. From there I go on to integrate Aquinas’s account of providence with the account of God’s primacy. With God’s primary causality and providence in place, I then go on to address the theme pertinent to this special edition, and that is God’s response to sin in Aquinas’s reading of scripture.

Julian of Norwich's Grateful God

AbstractThe sixth “showing” that Julian of Norwich recounts in her Revelation of Love includes a vision of the saints receiving thanks from God. Julian echoes and refers back to this scene at several other points in her text, but she never acknowledges its oddity within the broadly Augustinian‐Platonist stream of theology within which she works. How can it make sense for the God who is Being, Goodness, and Truth—the creator and cause of all that is—to give thanks to a creature? I argue that Julian's image of a grateful God accords with (1) her account of God's aim in creation, including the defeat of sin and evil, and (2) her understanding of the place of giving and receiving in humans’ likeness to God.

Schelling and the problem of evil

Abstract This article contributes to discussions about the problem of evil and Schelling studies by analysing Schelling's conception of the problem in his 1809 Freiheitsschrift essay. I explicate Schelling's critical response to four classic solutions to the problem (embodiment, degree, dualism, and divine forms) and outline his positive solution. My thesis is that Schelling offers a unique theodicy by arguing for a dialectical conception of the infinite omnipotence of God. In contrast to traditional notions of the infinite as the opposite of the finite, Schelling claims that God is only truly infinite if also embodied in the finite, an embodiment enacted through the human freedom to do evil. To explore Schelling's project, I draw parallels between his account of God's omnipotence and Hegel's ‘good infinite’ and situate Schelling's thesis within Mackie's discussion of the problem of evil in ‘Evil and Omnipotence’.

What Does it Mean to call God Good?

Contemporary expositions of God's goodness commonly err either (1) by subjecting God to moral laws, which is to question His sovereignty, or (2) by failing to establish that God will always act in accordance with moral principles, which removes the theist's ability to appeal to God's goodness in response to problems of evil. Current attempts at intermediate positions which avoid these two problems fall short. In this paper, I aim to construct a better intermediate position and account of God's goodness. I do this by claiming that God's ability to create is best explained in terms of God's self‐love. Since God, as the greatest possible being, must be able to create, He must love Himself. I argue that this in turn entails that God loves all things, since by loving Himself, God loves the pre‐existent ideas of everything that will come to exist, and by extension the things themselves. This, I argue, allows us to have confidence that God will act in accordance with moral principles, but without subjecting Him to moral laws.

The Humility of the Eternal Son: Reformed Kenoticism and the Repair of Chalcedon by Bruce Lindley McCormack, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2021, pp. xi + 316, £29.99, hbk

The Humility of the Eternal Son: Reformed Kenoticism and the Repair of Chalcedon by Bruce Lindley McCormack, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2021, pp. xi + 316, £29.99, hbk

Is There a Principle of Continued Material Being?

Abstract What is the relation of an earlier being to a later such that given the earlier there is or will be a later? I call this the question of material continuation. To answer, I offer a review of several philosophers’ thoughts, including those of Zeno, Aristotle, Descartes, Bertrand Russell, Henri Bergson, and Alfred North Whitehead. While there is considerable variety among the ontological views of these philosophers, and indeed some direct opposition of both method and assertion, my review suggests that material continuation may be explained by reference to a principle of continual creation. This principle is reflected in Aristotle's unmoved mover, in Descartes's account of God's activity in persistence, in Bergson's concept of la durée, and in Whitehead's principle of creativity. It disappears from view in objective methodologies first emerging in pre-Socratic thought, made rigorous by the development of science by the modern philosophers such as Descartes, and realized in the scientist philosophy of Russell. I include some consideration of whether the creative principle might be ideal or divine.

Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra on God’s Knowledge of Particulars

The problem of God’s knowledge of particulars goes back to the beginnings of classical philosophy, and within the context of Islamic philosophy and theology, diverse schools have arisen which respond to this problem in different ways. The scope and depth of God’s knowledge of our world, which also includes knowledge of human will and human action, is the subject of Ibn Sina’s account of God’s knowledge of particulars, which I set out to discuss in this paper followed by Mula Sadra’s main criticisms of his premises and argumentation, finally providing my assessment of these two philosophers’ positions.

Является ли Бог Суинберна максимально простым?

In this commentary I examine Richard Swinburne’s account of God’s moral goodness. According to Swinburne, God’s moral goodness consists in His immunity to irrational motivation and in the maximal perfection of motivation. Such a God Swinburne calls a ‘best-acting’ God and argues that He is the simplest kind of personal God who could explain the existence of our universe. In my commentary, I first consider some implications of Swinburne’s account of God's moral goodness, which seem problematic to me; second, I offer my own account of the nature of God’s moral action, which could be an answer to these problems. Swinburne identifies two types of explanation of empirically observable reality, a personal explanation and an impersonal (scientific) explanation but reduces both to an explanation in terms of substances and their powers, suggesting that the decisive factor in choosing an explanation is its simplicity. The difficulty of recognizing Swinburne’s best-acting God as the best explanation for the existence of the universe is that what makes such a God morally good is the libertarian choice in accordance with reason, which implies the presence in Him of some potentiality which He should be able to actualize in this choice. But the potentiality means metaphysical complexity, therefore, Swinburne’s best-acting God would be the simplest possible substance explaining the existence of the universe only if a purely actual, i.e. devoid of any potentiality, substance is impossible. Relying on Aristotle’s idea that God is His activity, I try to show that the existence of such a substance, which I call God-Virtue, is possible. My argument assumes that every substance possesses its own principle of action, actualization of which leads to its flourishing. In the case of intelligent substances, the flourishing consists in the actualization of their virtue. Not every activity, however, involves change, so there is a distinction between changing substances and unchanging (divine) substance – for the former flourishing involves a transition from potential state into actual one, whereas the unchanging divine substance does not need such a transition. It follows that it is possible for there to be a substance whose action does not involve any potentiality, so that it does not actualize virtue existing independently of it but is identical with virtue itself. I conclude with brief responses to possible objections that might be raised against my account of God as virtue.

Моральная благость Бога

Philosophers have tried to demonstrate the nature of God – either by arguing that it is a priori necessary that there is a perfect being, and that perfection entails having a certain nature (Anselm); or by arguing that the existence and nature of the universe is such as to entail or make it probable that its creator God has a certain nature (Aquinas). In my probabilistic argument I pursue the second way, arguing that the existence and nature of the universe makes it probable that the universe was created and sustained by an essentially everlasting omnipotent person. An omnipotent person will be a “best-acting” God. He will therefore only allow bad states to exist if allowing them is logically necessary for the existence of some good state. I argue against Mark Murphy’s claim, that God is so different from ordinary humans that there is no reason to suppose that there is much in common between his obligations and those of humans. A morally perfect being would be not merely a best-acting God, but also a “best-feeling” God. He would allow himself to have the right feelings, which are feelings good in themselves, or right reactions to human actions and situations; or feelings which are logically necessary for a great good, such as the pain felt by Jesus on the cross. This account of God’s feelings is consistent with conciliar definitions that God is “impassible” in his divine nature.

The Frankfurt-style cases: extinguishing the flickers of freedom

ABSTRACT The Frankfurt-style Counterexamples (FSCs) to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) have been controversial. I sketch some of the major moves in the debates surrounding the FSCs, and I seek to provide an answer to a big challenge: the indeterministic horn of the ‘dilemma defense’. (Elsewhere I have addressed the deterministic horn.) Given indeterminism (at the relevant places), it is unclear how Black (the counterfactual intervener) can know with certainty what Jones will choose and do in the future; this leaves at least some open alternatives for Jones. I adopt the strategy of positing God in Black’s place (following others, such as David Hunt). The challenge now is to explain how God can have knowledge with certainty of future free human behavior in an indeterministic context, insofar as there is no entailing evidence in available in advance in such a situation. I present the Bootstrapping View of God’s knowledge to solve this problem. If we replace Black with God, we have an indeterministic case in which an agent acts freely, and yet cannot do otherwise. My account of God’s knowledge provides an interpretation of Luis de Molina’s notoriously obscure notion of Supercomprehension.

Space: A History ed. by Andrew Janiak

Reviewed by: Space: A History ed. by Andrew Janiak Marius Stan Andrew Janiak, editor. Space: A History. Oxford Philosophical Concepts. Series editor, Christia Mercer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xiii + 351. Paper, $24.95. This is a book with a purpose: it aims to chronicle the life of a concept (space) from its birth in ancient Greece to its growth into centrality for early modern metaphysics, and its end with Kant, after whom classical space got displaced to a marginal position. The volume is commendable for its good balance of broad scope, depth of insight, and careful exposition. Its chapters impressively combine analytic sharpness with sensitivity to historical context and philological nuance. Moreover, the gender balance among contributors is admirably even. [End Page 343] Barbara Sattler lucidly teaches us how the Greeks juggled a number of related ideas (roughly corresponding to our notions of place, region, position, and interval) yet without arriving at a concept of space qua global carrier of metric structure. Marije Martijn gives a novel account of Proclus's elusive notions, imagination and intelligible matter. That greatly helps us see his enormous influence on posterity. He anticipated strikingly key parts in the space doctrines of Descartes, Newton, and Kant; and his kinematic foundations for geometry overlap much with the analogous views of Hobbes and Kant, who also thought that geometric figures are generated by the motion of points and lines. Medieval doctrines of place and void span some twelve centuries, and presenting them usefully in one chapter would be hopeless. Edith Dudley Sylla wisely restricts her focus to Nicole Oresme and his milieu, but her account teaches a broader lesson. As they grappled with Aristotle's physics, fourteenth-century figures produced doctrines that anticipate visibly the early moderns' absolutism and relationism; strikingly, medieval distinctions and heuristics formed the background to debates about space and place well into the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. And yet, as Andrew Janiak points out in his chapter, from Plato to Suarez, the concept of space remained marginal; that began to change with Cartesian science. Experiments suggesting that vacua might exist; efforts to rethink the nature of geometry; and a new science of motion that (by the Law of Inertia) appealed to preferred directions in space—all these developments conspired to make space-concepts explanatorily fundamental, and central to theoretical philosophy: "thinkers such as Leibniz and Newton begin to treat space and its structure as worthy of philosophical analysis in a new way" (247). Before Einstein, cognitive access to space was by two channels: geometry and vision. The latter posed serious challenges. It required theorists to reconcile two things: a metaphysics of how material facts (about the size, shape, and distance of things) make cognitive contact with an immaterial mind; and an epistemology of the mysterious inferential processes whereby the mind passes from two-dimensional evidence (patterns on a screen-like retina) to knowledge of three-dimensional spatial relations. Many took these challenges on between Euclid and Berkeley; thus, explaining them well is far from easy. Gary Hatfield does it with admirable skill: he presents the very indispensable elements and key historical junctures in the long quest for a coherent theory of vision. Kant saw himself as the last early modern—the one who moved past difficult dilemmas by a third, better way. Michael Friedman's chapter vindicates that image. He gives a sharp reading of Kant's difficult thought that his doctrine of space fares better than Leibniz's or Newton's, and a quite novel account of God's relation to space (another early modern conundrum). Also difficult, though not for Friedman, was Kant's claim that space does not obtain for the things-in-themselves. This volume will make an excellent companion textbook to a number of courses, especially surveys of the major periods in the history of philosophy, and introductions to the philosophy of space and time. It has two other virtues beyond its pedagogical merits. First, by spanning two millennia of doctrines, it shows nicely how metaphysical reflection feeds off of sources as diverse as basic physics, natural theology, and the physiology of vision—which in turn gave epistemology a chance to reflect on how we reconcile such...

God, the Middle Term: Bonhoeffer, Kierkegaard, and Christ’s Mediation in Works of Love

In this article, I argue that in Works of Love Søren Kierkegaard stays true to his Lutheran roots in detailing an ethic of neighbor love that draws deeply on and unfolds the implications of the inseparable realities of justification and Christ’s mediation in the social sphere. The article unfolds in two parts. Since neither of these realities are explicit in Works of Love, the first part considers Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s account of Christ as mediator in order to provide a framework for thinking about and identifying their presence in Kierkegaard’s thought. Engaging with Bonhoeffer in this manner is particularly useful, not least because he was deeply influenced by Kierkegaard and also stood in the Lutheran tradition, but also because although he outlines the expansive nature of Christ’s mediatorial work to tantalizing effect, he never unfolds its concrete, ethical implications for the Christian life. With the key aspects of Bonhoeffer’s account in mind, the second part of this article demonstrates and argues for an overlooked theological dynamic in Works of Love: namely, that Kierkegaard’s account of God’s mediation not only shares these keys aspects, but also unfolds the ethical implications of Christ’s mediation for the Christian life.

Divine knowledge as direct awareness: a defence of Alston

AbstractIn his ‘Does God have beliefs?’, William Alston argues for an intuitive construal of the nature of Divine knowledge according to which God's knowledge consists in His direct awareness without any beliefs. Recently, Travis Dickinson has raised some objections to Alston's view and has developed an alternative account of God's knowledge as His acquaintance with a fact, a corresponding thought or belief, and a correspondence between these two. In this article, I respond to Dickinson's objections and show that there is no reason to favour his acquaintance construal of God's knowledge over Alston's intuitive view of the nature of God's knowledge.

Virtue and Law in Plato and Beyond by Julia Annas

Reviewed by: Virtue and Law in Plato and Beyond by Julia Annas Thornton C. Lockwood Julia Annas. Virtue and Law in Plato and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. vi + 234. $45.00. About Plato's Laws, Aristotle rather uninspiringly wrote, "Most of the Laws consists, in fact, of laws, and [Plato] has said little about the constitution. He wishes to make it more generally attainable [κοινοτέραν] by actual city-states, yet he gradually turns it back towards the Republic" (Politics 2.6, 1265a1–4). Julia Annas's new volume seeks to counter such dismissive interpretations of Plato's Laws. Rather than view the work as Plato's final written dialogue, written by a crabby, old, pessimistic author, she argues that "the Laws presents us with a remarkably fresh and original approach to social and political issues" (2–3), one grounded in views about law-abidingness and cosmic law which is novel in the Platonic corpus. Annas, the author of several landmark works in ancient Greek ethical and political thought, makes a very persuasive case for a rich interpretation of Plato's Laws, an interpretation that she further connects to Stoic natural law (in the works of Cicero) and Jewish divine law (in the works of Philo of Alexandria). Although Annas's book is divided into ten chapters, to my mind the book is composed of three parts. Following a first introductory chapter, chapters 2 and 3 probe the relationship between the Republic and the Laws with respect to Annas's target subject of law-abidingness. Therein, her thesis is that what most importantly distinguishes the Laws from the Republic is the former's concern with "the specific and explicit role of conscious commitment to strict and unquestioning obedience to the laws" (4). The second part of the book, chapters 4 through 6, shows how, in the Laws, Plato thinks that law-abidingness can be grounded in a peculiar mix of both Athenian and Spartan institutional arrangements. The third and final part of the book, chapters 7 and 8 (followed by a brief concluding chapter), explores the reception of the notion of law-abidingness in three post-Platonic traditions: in Aristotle, who largely omits such a notion in his Politics; in Cicero, who extends such a notion both universally (in Stoic natural law) and specifically for the Roman Republic (in his De legibus); and finally, in Philo of Alexandria, who also extends such a notion universally (as the laws of God) and specifically for the people of the Torah. The first part of the book aims to correct the (mistaken) notion that, whereas the Republic advocates the untrammeled ruling of philosopher kings, accountable only to themselves, the Laws advocates a "second best" constitutional rule of law. Annas provides ample evidence to show that the notion of law pervades much of the Republic and that more generally, the Republic and the Laws share the same goal, namely, that of discerning "how a city might best be run and individually how a person might best live their own life" (Laws 702a7–b1). Rather, the correct contrast to draw is that the Laws focuses on the political (rather than philosophical) education of its citizens, their legal institutions, and their religious framework (such as the account of god and public religion in book 10) that produce a mindset of strict obedience to the law. The second part of the book examines such aspects of Magnesia, the imaginary city described in the Laws, and argues that they are viewed as equally the result of superlative Athenian and Spartan institutions, while at the same time avoiding the deficiencies of both city-states (37). For instance, whereas justice is the central virtue of the Republic, moderation (σωφροσύνη) is the central virtue of the Laws, one which, [End Page 749] as we see in Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian Wars, is equally attributable to both Athenians (according to Pericles's funeral oration [II.39–40]) and Spartans (according to their Corinthian allies [I.68, 84]). The third and final part of Annas's book traces the development and reception of lawabidingness in the Stoic and Jewish traditions. She points out that, although Plato "rejects the idea of a...

Intrinsic value and love: three challenges for God's Own Ethics

AbstractI advance three challenges for the view Murphy advances in God's Own Ethics. The first two challenges target Murphy's claim that God does not have requiring reasons to prevent the suffering of rational creatures. I develop two arguments against that position, one based on the intrinsic value of human beings, the other based on the intrinsic badness of the suffering of rational creatures. My third challenge targets Murphy's account of God's contingent love for humanity. I seek to raise doubts about whether Murphy's picture is one in which it is true to say that God loves all human beings.

Jean-Luc Marion on the Divine and Taking the "Third Way"

In this article, I will investigate Jean-Luc Marion’s influential critique of metaphysical and natural theological approaches to the divine which he regards as “idolatrous”, and his own proposal of an “iconic” account of God’s revelation which he calls the “third way”. Marion’s idol-icon distinction, I maintain, developed in his early work “God without Being”, is the guiding thread of Marion’s philosophical project, and the key for an adequate understanding of his own account. While Marion’s account is compelling and has provided new perspectives and insights to the contemporary discussion in philosophy of religion, its uncompromising excessiveness and the outright rejection of all hermeneutics leaves it deeply problematic and makes it hard to see how to follow his “third way”.

Analogies between al-Māturīdī’s and Duns Scotus’s Ethical Perspectives

ABSTRACTAl-Māturīdī and Duns Scotus share an ethical paradigm that represents the middle ground between divine command and natural law theories in ethics. While al-Māturīdī’s theory can generally be located between Ashʿarite divine command and Muʿtazilite natural law theories in Islamic ethics, Scotus’s theory can be placed between William of Ockham’s divine command and Thomas Aquinas’s natural law theories in Christian ethics. Although the starting point of their ethical perspectives is fundamentally based on criticism of natural law theory, neither theologian can be labelled as a typical divine command theorist. This moderate theory may therefore be described as the theory of soft divine command. The main purpose of this article is to draw attention to some similarities between al-Māturīdī’s and Duns Scotus’s ethical perspectives: First, both theologians highlight the composite picture of human nature in terms of morality. In other words, they posit that humans have two opposite tendencies: ‘affection for justice’ and ‘affection for advantage’. Second, although both theologians grant reason an ontological authority in determining what is good and bad, this authority is not limitless. Finally, both theologians argue that, unless one takes account of God’s freedom and wisdom, the moral order in the world cannot be fully comprehended.

The Life of God in the Soul: The Integration of Love, Holiness and Happiness in the Thought of John Wesley

In this detailed and engaging examination of John Wesley's pastoral correspondence, sermons, hymns, and other work, David McEwan offers a lively defence of Christian holiness as an entirely relational as opposed to individual endeavour. And if relational, the anatomy of Wesleyan holiness that McEwan presents is based in claiming one's own participation in the love of God for creation and all of humanity, and then engaging in intentional formation by emulating this love for God, neighbour, and self. By his account Wesleyan holiness is deeply personal, yet never private: to love others and to love God is to conform the deepest desires of the heart to God's intention, and thus to be formed in a pattern of life Wesley recognized and each Christian may feel as ‘happiness’. Happiness, by this account, is the patterning of motive and action around an ethic of scriptural holiness lived out as faithful service in day-to-day work, health, discipleship, and relationships. As he corrects accounts of Christian holiness (and their correlative accounts of formation) that might over-emphasize the individual or private, McEwan notes that according to his understanding of Wesleyan theology, the question is ‘not really whether all this is wrong, but whether it is adequate’ (2).Based in Brisbane, Australia, the author is both the pastor of a Nazarene congregation and the Director of Research and Senior Lecturer in Theology, Pastoral Theology, and Practice at the Nazarene Theological College. Much of this work was developed on extended fellowships at the Manchester (United Kingdom) Wesley Research Centre, and it is international in its scholarly attention. In a well-organized, easily accessible progression of chapters McEwan gives an account of God's relationship with creation and humanity, and then considers both ‘challenges’ and ‘helps’ to the formation of the ‘life of God in the soul’. The first chapters offer a systematic treatment of Wesley's thought, and may be compared with other recent explicitly theological accounts of Wesleyan holiness. But this book becomes interesting to a much broader pastoral readership as it makes a methodological transition to applied theology, albeit entirely historical in focus. McEwan tells stories of pastoral conflict and contact to demonstrate the Wesleyan interplay of holiness and happiness across questions like suffering and its role in Christian formation, depression or ‘heaviness of spirit’, and the relation of bodily to spiritual health. At each stage, ample evidence from Wesley's letters and sermons is brought together to give a practical theology of spiritual formation for holy, happy, living. Sustained attention to his pastoral correspondences with particular individuals moves beyond simple thematic treatments of his pastoral approach to give a more holistic, complicated picture of Wesley the pastor. The project may have begun in work for the PhD, but this book develops Wesley's understanding of happiness and counsel toward obtaining it well beyond that base.As a work of theology and history, the book might have been stronger to integrate the systematic sections and the applied, and to distinguish sources from different eras of Wesley's life. McEwan might also have given consideration to present-day pastoral dilemmas in the conclusion: how might the link between holiness and happiness play out in an era of social media and virtual relationship, versus actual? Does the implication that love of the other be given without agenda preclude intentional evangelism? And how might the understanding of a fully relational, Wesleyan holiness aid the work of repentance from the historical sins of white-skin or male privilege, or the systemic inequities of global economics? These are some of the questions that this work provokes, and pastors (including McEwan) perhaps more usually work out each Sunday from the pulpit. This book will be an interesting and earthy read, amply resourcing Sunday-by-Sunday pastoral preachers and theologians alike.

Personally Speaking … Kierkegaardian Postmodernism and the Messiness of Religious Existence

In this essay I consider the possible impact of thinking phenomenologically about faith in a postmodern/post-secular age. Following Merold Westphal’s encouragement that philosophy of religion should be more ‘personal’, I offer a phenomenological reflection on my own experience of the difficulties and complexities that accompany being a postmodern phenomenologist and a Pentecostal Christian. Working through the possible conflicts that can arise when these two identities are brought together, I propose an account of Kierkegaardian postmodernism that resolves the conflict without, thereby, eliminating the existential and theological difficulties that accompany religious existence in a postmodern/post-secular world. Ultimately, then, I show that personal engagement with religious existence is not excluded by postmodern phenomenology, but is in fact crucial for an appropriately postmodern/post-secular approach to phenomenological philosophy of religion itself. I conclude by proposing a possible account of God that reflects both phenomenological rigor and existential awareness.

The Church’s Eucharistic Poverty in the Theologies of Jon Sobrino and Hans Urs von Balthasar

The article puts Jon Sobrino and Hans Urs von Balthasar into a mutually corrective dialogue regarding poverty and the church. Sobrino’s goals and outlook are laudable, but his proposal lacks an adequate metaphysical basis, which is seen most clearly in his account of God’s suffering. Balthasar’s theology gives an account of a church characterized by a eucharistic poverty, one of self-dispossession for the sake of others, but also upholds the divine immutability. At the same time, Sobrino’s attentiveness to concrete history serves to correct Balthasar’s problematic and romanticized views of poverty.