ABM Treaty Research Articles

Limit missile defense—or expand it?

Since 2002, when the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the international arms control regime has included no limits on missile defense. Washington wants to keep it that way, insisting that it “will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on US ballistic missile defenses.” Many experts believe that missile defense undermines strategic stability; but some argue that missile defense can play a role in denuclearization. Here, Wu Riqiang of China, Tatiana Anichkina of Russia (2015), and Oliver Thränert of Germany (2015) debate whether arms control arrangements should include limits on missile defense—or whether advances in missile defense should be encouraged because they might contribute to disarmament.

Limit missile defense—or expand it?

Since 2002, when the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the international arms control regime has included no limits on missile defense. Washington wants to keep it that way, insisting that it “will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on US ballistic missile defenses.” Many experts believe that missile defense undermines strategic stability; but some argue that missile defense can play a role in denuclearization. Here, Wu Riqiang of China (2015), Tatiana Anichkina of Russia, and Oliver Thränert of Germany (2015) debate whether arms control arrangements should include limits on missile defense—or whether advances in missile defense should be encouraged because they might contribute to disarmament.

Limit missile defense—or expand it?

Since 2002, when the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the international arms control regime has included no limits on missile defense. Washington wants to keep it that way, insisting that it “will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on US ballistic missile defenses.” Many experts believe that missile defense undermines strategic stability; but some argue that missile defense can play a role in denuclearization. Here, Wu Riqiang of China (2015), Tatiana Anichkina of Russia (2015), and Oliver Thränert of Germany debate whether arms control arrangements should include limits on missile defense—or whether advances in missile defense should be encouraged because they might contribute to disarmament.

TheEpistemic Communities as a Key to International Cooperation

This research tests hypothesis – The epistemic communities play an important (key) role for international cooperation. The main question driving this study is to what extent was essential influence exerted by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs on building interstate cooperation – between the USA and the USSR – in nuclear non-proliferation during the Сold War.The argument presented here is notwithstanding bipolar confrontation the USA-USSR cooperation in nuclear arms control issue thanks to the impact of the epistemic communities on politics of both countries was available. This research uses case study method to examine several significant steps in nuclear cooperation between states: 1. How did become possible to sign the 1972 ABM Treaty by the Soviet Union and the United States? 2. What contribution did the epistemic community make to development of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime? Putting together, conclusions of each of understudied cases let us to demonstrate the huge role played by communities in development international relations.The research concludes that in spite of the Cold War ideological frames deterred the USA-USSR cooperation, just with assistance of Pugwash scientific movement interstate collaboration in nuclear non-proliferation became available.

Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defence for America, China, and Russia

Consensus amongst great powers on ballistic missile defence (BMD) may be the only way to ensure it does not undermine international security. This article applies defensive realism to explain the destabilizing effect of America's unilateral deployment of BMD. Under defensive realism, states opting for offensive strategies are punished, cooperation and reconciliation becoming more logical strategic options. The reversal of previous American policy under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty created a new security dilemma with China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are not opposed to BMD in principle, though, and defensive realism provides a basis for improving relations, stressing joint deployment of BMD as the basis for a new paradigm of strategic relations. Defensive realism supports the conclusion that consensus amongst great powers on BMD is essential to strategic stability. It shows that the most likely alternative is worsening strategic action-reaction dynamics with unpredictable consequences. If BMD cooperation expands, however, domestic opposition will coalesce from groups with an interest in great power competition. Subsequent analysis should examine in more detail the role these groups play in influencing security policy and how they impede, or could facilitate, the emergence of BMD cooperation.

Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation

This piece follows on earlier work, Politics as Laws?: The ABM Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, which addressed the constitutional issues arising from the allocation of authority between the President and the federal courts concerning the interpretation of treaties. It addresses a response to Politics as Laws by Professor Michael Van Alstine, who argues that courts should have the primary role in interpreting certain types of treaties, specifically those that create domestic rights of action. He argues that treaties can delegate to the federal courts a law-making power to fill in gaps in treaties, and that the courts should interpret certain types of international agreements in harmony with the courts of other nations. Several significant problems pervade this approach to treaty interpretation. It transplants the most expansive theories of the federal judiciary's role in lawmaking into the treaty context without regard to the problems this creates for the separation of powers. Because treaties centrally involve foreign affairs, the text and structure of the Constitution are better read as vesting the authority to interpret treaties in the President. The separation of powers and federalism require a clear distinction between treaties and statutes, and there is no compelling reason, rooted in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution, for erasing that textual barrier. Giving courts the paramount role in interpreting treaties runs counter to the original understanding of the Constitution and modern jurisprudence concerning the scope and nature of the judicial power. Finally, theories about delegating interpretive authority to international or foreign courts are problematic due to the Constitution's vesting of federal power solely in the federal government.

Necessary Illusions: Misperception, Cooperation, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

A significant and growing body of literature related to security regimes focuses on the importance of either common knowledge or common norms to the success of efforts to limit military competition. This paper challenges this central pillar of the arms control literature. Security regimes, in particular arms control regimes, are not necessarily the product of common knowledge, norms, or shared identities. Rather, actors can and sometimes do cooperate because they do not fully understand one another and lack information. In these cases, examples of what I will refer to as “imagined intersubjectivity”—the mistaken belief that two actors share information, norms, and identities when in fact each has an idiosyncratic understanding—the lack of information is crucial for international cooperation. I analyze the record of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty negotiations. Through process-tracing, I will argue that three crucial moments in the negotiation process were premised on a misunderstanding of the position of the other party. The implications for cooperation without intersubjectivity are then explored.

China's Perspective on a Nuclear-Free World

A new wave of interest in the complete elimination of nuclear-weapons is washing over international security institutions. Although the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is as old as the nuclear...

Harnessing the Heavens: National Defense through Space (review)

Reviewed by: Harnessing the Heavens: National Defense through Space Donald R. Baucom Harnessing the Heavens: National Defense through Space. Edited by Paul G. Gillespie and Grant T. Weller. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2008. ISBN 978-1-879176-45-4. Notes. Index. Pp. xi, 235. $29.95. Harnessing the Heavens is a collection of fourteen papers delivered during the twenty-first military history symposium sponsored by the History Department of the U.S. Air Force Academy. The number of papers and the shortness of this review preclude specific comment on each paper. Therefore, I shall focus on a few of the major themes and issues that emerged from the symposium. Perhaps the most significant theme is the importance of space for the United States. Thus, in "Astropolitics and Astropolitik," Everett Dolman declared: "No nation relies on space more than the United States—none is even close—and its reliance grows daily. For both its civilian welfare and military security, a widespread loss of space capabilities would prove disastrous" (p. 111). This heavy reliance on space systems leads to a major dilemma in America's national space policy. The critical nature of American space assets would seem to justify an aggressive, if not pre-emptive, approach to defense. Since China and Russia have already demonstrated an anti-satellite capability, it may well be impossible to protect American satellites without having space weapons on station and using these weapons to exert at least some control over access to space by other nations. Yet, such a policy would almost surely lead to charges that America is weaponizing space and acting imperiously regarding the rights of other nations. The drawbacks of an aggressive American space policy notwithstanding, Dolman concluded that "it is past time for the United States to realize its responsibilities and to command space." Another challenge, one with which the United States has struggled for fifty years, is developing an organizational structure to ensure efficient development and effective employment of space-based systems. While this issue is touched upon in several papers, its most thorough treatment comes in David Spires's "Recurring Themes in U.S. Air Force Space History." A critical element in the quest for a better organizational structure has been the Air Force's efforts to balance its requirements for space and air forces. Both the Spires paper and the volume introduction by Paul Gillespie and Grant Weller find a parallel between the position of the Air Force's "star warriors" and the earlier struggle of Army aviators for independence from the Army. In the final paper of this volume, Alex Roland challenges one of the fundamental assumptions about the space program—that it is ultimately about man leaving the earth, a vision that dates back as far as the second century CE. In Roland's view, human space flight entails replacing computers with people trained to act like computers while at the same time increasing the weight and complexity of space systems. Yet, without the romantic vision of "human heroics," an expression used by Howard McCurdy in his paper (p. 36), continued popular support for expensive space programs is problematical. [End Page 328] In addition to its coverage of general themes, this volume provides a wealth of information about the programs and hardware of the major space powers. Asif Siddiqi covered Soviet military and space systems in his paper, while Dean Cheng discussed the development and evolution of major Chinese space systems. Finally, Rick Sturdevant traced the emergence and evolution of American communications satellites. While Harnessing the Heavens is a major contribution to military space history, as is always the case, one can find points to criticize. Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) served as interim manager of America's space program from February 1958 to October 1958 when the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics became the National Air and Space Administration. Yet, ARPA's role is essentially unnoted. Additionally, the ABM Treaty was not terminated in 2003 as stated on page fifteen. In December 2001, the Bush administration gave the six months notification of America's intent to withdraw from the treaty as required by the treaty itself. The formal ending of the treaty came in...

Review: Surrender is not an Option

SURRENDER IS NOT AN OPTION Defending America at United Nations and Abroad John Bolton New York: Threshold Editions, 2007. 496pp, US $27.00 cloth (ISBN 1416552847)Before we get onto what this reviewer thinks of John Bolton's memoir, it is worth pondering what Bolton would think of this reviewer. He might not be too positive, as represent a lot of things former American ambassador to United Nations doesn't like. Firstly, I'm British, and he's wary of intellectually snobbish Brits (210). I'm even the son of a British diplomat, an epithet he applies with particular disdain to one minor opponent (201). There are ideological as well as genealogical issues: am a qualified believer in international potential of European Union, which must make me one of EUroids (204), whose advocacy of international norms and multilateralism profoundly threatens to diminish American autonomy and self-government, notions that to spell 'sovereignty' (429). Worst of all, think that UN also has real value (if you require page references, you're missing point-we're talking about John Bolton).Unsurprisingly, Surrender is Not an Option is not aimed at likes of me. Bolton states that his audience is to be found in Middle America. He is concerned that many of his fellow nationals are too easily beguiled by multilateral institutions, and specifically UN. For them, the United Nations to this day remains UN of UNICEF trick-or-treating on Halloween, and of famine-relief efforts in natural disasters, or combating diseases in developing countries (197). A prominent critic of UN since 1980s and an unremittingly controversial ambassador in New York from mid-2005 to December 2006, author now sets out to disillusion who still think glowingly of UN as they had imagined it on Halloweens long ago (198). His volume may be a first in international relations literature-a book explicitly intended to sour childhood memories.To achieve this goal, he takes through his tenure at UN in extraordinary detail. Surrender is Not an Option is not entirely given over to Mr. Bolton's time in New York: first 40-odd pages canter through majority of his career, culminating in his involvement in 2000 Florida recount (although he says virtually nothing of that episode). There follows a longer description of his period as T, assistant secretary of state for arms control during George W. Bush's first administration that included American withdrawal from anti-ballistic missile treaty and a range of other agreements. It is in this part of book that we encounter author's preferred form of prose-highly involved descriptions of diplomatic negotiations enlivened by breaking of confidences, ad hominem attacks on most other participants, and a lot of jokes. This is style he maintains through main part of book, a prolonged account of his time at UN, which is followed by a much slighter set of thoughts on future challenges.Curiously, most interesting element of entire project may be jokes. We already know quite a lot about humour of Bush administration-Bob Woodward has revealed, for example, that president finds flatulence funny. Bolton, is more interested in verbal repartee, and from time to time he is genuinely witty. Describing a visit by George Clooney to New York to discuss Darfur before security council, he notes that actor was swarmed by female staffers, providing humility lessons, and therefore character-building, for rest of us (356). However, he is best at skewering those he dislikes with one-liners-and he knows it-returning to some victims repeatedly. Taken individually, his put-downs can be brutally effective (watching his British counterpart negotiate, he notes, I often wondered how Britain had acquired an empire, although he proved why they had lost America) but cumulative effect does get tedious (227). …

Vertical nuclear proliferation

All the nuclear-weapon states are working to develop new nuclear-weapon systems and upgrade their existing ones. Although the US Congress has recently blocked further development of small nuclear weapons and earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, the United States is planning a range of new warheads under the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme, and renewing its nuclear weapons infrastructure. The United Kingdom is spending £1 billion on updating the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, and about £20 billion on replacing its Vanguard submarines and maintaining its Trident warhead stockpile. The US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and plans to install missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic; Russia threatens to upgrade its nuclear counter-measures. The nuclear-weapon states should comply with their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as summarised in the 13-point plan agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and they should negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Internists, Epidemics, Outbreaks, and Bioterrorist Attacks

To the editor:—Lee’s otherwise comprehensive review of the role of Internists during epidemics, outbreaks, and bioterror attacks1 neglects to mention their role in preventing such events. Internists can minimize the effects of epidemics and outbreaks by vaccinating their patients according to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommendations, especially those who are immunosuppressed. Educating all staff members regarding universal precautions and how to respond to potential events should improve response while decreasing unwarranted fears. Activism for universal health care coverage (including access to a primary care provider), which would decrease the burden on emergency departments during events. Such coverage should include undocumented immigrants, who could represent a reservoir of infection and whose reluctance to visit providers could result in delays in identifying outbreaks. Laws that require health care providers and clinics to check the citizenship of patients should be vigorously opposed, and undocumented immigrants assured that their status will not be reported to governmental authorities, except in the unlikely event that the patient is suspected of being involved in a terrorist plot. Lee also fails to note how changes in US government policies could decrease the risk of terrorism and the role of physicians in preventing war, terrorist attacks, and major radiation events. Current administration policies that increase risk of an acute radiation event, both accidental and deliberate, include: Nuclear Posture Review (consideration of first strike nuclear weapons use); withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; failure to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; funding the development of “mini-nukes”; spending billions of dollars to support research and development of a so-called Missile Defense Shield, despite opposition from most reputable scientists and spectacular failures in highly structured tests; developing facilities to extract plutonium to create a new generation of nuclear weapons; and providing India with reactor technology that can be used to make nuclear weapons, in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All of these policies risk another nuclear arms race and send a message to foreign governments that they might consider developing and producing nuclear weapons. The US possesses the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, enough to destroy civilization many times over. We have spent little to upgrade and protect our aged, accident-prone nuclear power plants, and have failed to develop an environmentally sustainable, fiscally responsible energy policy. We plan to bury 100,000 tons of high-level nuclear waste on Native American land at Yucca Mountain, near an earthquake fault and major aquifer. Much of the transported waste will travel through major population centers, risking an accident or terrorist attack. Furthermore, we have allocated inadequate sums for disposal and safekeeping of nuclear weapons in former Soviet block countries and for halting nuclear materials trafficking. Prevention of terrorist attacks and radiation accidents should include efforts to reverse current US policies, as well as enhance medical education regarding: (1) the political, cultural, economic, and religious contributors to environmental destruction, war, and human suffering,2,3 factors that lead to disenfranchisement, discontent, desperation, and the kind of hopelessness that impels terrorists to consider the use of radiation weapons, such as dirty bombs; (2) the horrifying short- and long-term health consequences of nuclear explosions and accidents (South Pacific weapons testing, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Chernobyl); (3) the shameful involvement of physicians in the development, dissemination, and use of weapons of mass destruction (e.g., Nazi and Japanese scientists who conducted biological weapons “experiments” in World War II) and human rights abuses (e.g., Serbia’s Radovan Karadzic and Al Qaeda’s Ayman Al-Zawahri); (4) how medical students and physicians can create peace and justice in the world; and (5) medical organizations working for peace and justice (e.g., Physicians for Social Responsibility and Physicians for Human Rights). Regrettably, these subjects are almost entirely absent from medical school and residency curricula.4,5 Martin Donohoe, MD, FACP;Portland State University, 3718 Rivers Edge Drive, Lake Oswego, OR 97034, USA (email: martin.donohoe@verizon.net).

New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism

This article seeks to inform current debates on the changing architecture for global governance by cataloguing and suggesting evaluation criteria for alternative multilateral arrangements. Rather than describing a system in crisis, it focuses on the dynamics of change and flexibility in which established intergovernmental organizations are challenged to meet new demands and requirements while accommodating new mandates and members as well as nonstate actors with global reach. A proliferating and fluctuating set of intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder arrangements with more assertive and diverse actors best describes the international operating environment for collective decisionmaking and action across a range of global issues, raising fundamental questions of effectiveness, accountability, legitimacy, and sustainability and posing challenges to the authority of existing IGOs. KEYWORDS: global governance, multilateralism, intergovernmental organizations, global issues, collective action, and international public policy. ********** The world has changed dramatically since the end of World War II when the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, and a set of regional organizations were established to attend to matters of peace and security and economic cooperation. (1) What is now only too well known as accelerated globalization has radically multiplied the numbers of international transactions, actors, and modes of information sharing and communication that were previously dominated by established governments. In addition to the multiplication of countries seeking a voice in international forums, transnational movements of civil society, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations, and even wealthy individuals are influencing the ways in which international public policy is made and implemented. Through advocacy, lobbying, and direct service provision (and now global terrorism), these nonstate actors are changing perceptions and behavior in fields as diverse as international health, environmental management, peace and security, human rights, and trade. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are themselves under constant pressure to reform, and new hybrid and ad hoc interstate arrangements open avenues to extra-institutional responses, multiplex decisionmaking forums, and forum shopping. While much has been made of an alleged in multilateralism in the wake of the Security Council's failure to mediate the 2003 Iraq crisis and the US withdrawal from and abrogation of a number of treaties, such as the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol, collective action to address a range of global and transnational problems is in fact highly dynamic and adaptable. Without question, some multilateral institutions, notably the United Nations, face daunting challenges, as evident in Kofi Annan's dramatic invocation to member states to initiate a set of critical reforms: We have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded. We must now decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed when the United Nations was first set up, or whether radical changes are needed, to deal with threats ranging from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to the possibility that some States may act preemptively to respond to threats.... It is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the concerns that make some states feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is those concerns that drive them to take unilateral action. We must show that those concerns can, and will, be addressed effectively through collective action. (2) Efforts to meet this institutional reform challenge occur in a number of ways, ranging from debates about enlarging the Security Council to make it more representative and democratic to the proposed Assemblage of Democratic States or the expansion of the G8 or G-20 both in membership and mandate. …

The powers of war and peace: the Constitution and foreign affairs after 9/11

Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, the Bush administration has come under fire for its methods of combating terrorism. Waging war against al Qaeda has proven to be a legal quagmire, with critics claiming that the administration's response in Afghanistan and Iraq is unconstitutional. war on terror - and, in a larger sense, the administration's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and the Kyoto accords - has many wondering whether the constitutional framework for making foreign affairs decisions has been discarded by the present administration. John Yoo, formerly a lawyer in the Department of Justice, here makes the case for a completely new approach to understanding what the Constitution says about foreign affairs, particularly the powers of war and peace. Looking to American history, Yoo points out that from Truman and Korea to Clinton's intervention in Kosovo, American presidents have had to act decisively on the world stage without a declaration of war. They are able to do so, Yoo argues, because the Constitution grants the president, Congress, and the courts very different powers, requiring them to negotiate the country's foreign policy. Yoo roots his controversial analysis in a brilliant reconstruction of the original understanding of the foreign affairs power and supplements it with arguments based on constitutional text, structure, and history. Accessibly blending historical arguments with current policy debates, The Powers of War and Peace will no doubt be hotly debated. And while the questions it addresses are as old and fundamental as the Constitution itself, America's response to the September 11 attacks has renewed them with even greater force and urgency.

Deterrence Is Dead. Long Live Deterrence

Twenty years ago philosopher Anthony Kenny (1985, ix) could confidently assert that deterrence was “the key concept for the understanding of the strategy and diplomacy of the age.” Obviously, much has transpired since Kenny made his claim. In 1989 the Berlin Wall was dismantled. Two years later, the Soviet Union disintegrated. In short order democracy was introduced into Eastern Europe and NATO expanded into what was once part of the Soviet Empire. In 1991 Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, only to be pushed out by a coalition of nations led and organized by the United States. Later in the decade, Yugoslavia imploded. Concurrently, Pakistan joined the nuclear club. Then NATO went to war with Serbia over Kosovo. The United States unilaterally abrogated the ABM Treaty and began the deployment of a largely untested national missile defense system. And, of course, on September 11, 2001, terrorists brought down the Twin Towers in an act of inconceivable violence. Within weeks the United States drove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and, in 2003, invaded Iraq and overthrew its Baathist regime.

America: Escaping the legacy of the ABM Treaty

Throughout its duration, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty had to contend with critics who questioned its fundamental strategic rationale and the constraints it imposed on the full exercise o...

Canada: Doubting Hephaestus

On 13 June 2002, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty officially passed into history, removing the most significant legal obstacle to American development and eventual deployment of active ...

International Law as a Tool of Power Politics

The Limits of International Law. By Jack L. Goldsmith, Eric A. Posner. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 272 pp., $29.95 (ISBN: 0-1951-6839-9). Most critical analyses of US policy argue that certain actions—such as the invasion of Iraq, the designation of enemy combatants, the Patriot Act, the refusal to sign the Kyoto Treaty, and the withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty—are either direct violations of international law or proof that the United States actively disrespects the legal obligations that bind the international community. The normative assumption behind these claims—informed by international law and international relations scholars (including liberal institutionalists and constructivists) along with activists in transnational advocacy networks—is that international law is inherently benign and progressive and, as such, should alter the presumably dangerous and divisive self-interested pursuit of state goals. In The Limits of International Law , however, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner cogently argue that international law only reflects the interests of states. As a result, interstate power relations and states' formulations of their interests actually set the parameters for international law. Thus, compliance with and participation in the international law regime is actually endogenous to international politics and relations rather than being some sort of external, normative “brake” or pressure on state actions. The introductory chapter of The Limits of International Law —indicative of the well organized, cohesive, and accessible style of the entire book—conceptually unpacks the link between international law and international relations. It employs rational choice theory to model how states pursue their interests through international law. Rational choice theory assumes that all complex social phenomena can be explained in terms of an elementary, individualistic cost-benefit analysis aimed at making utility-maximizing choices in pursuit of state interests. These interests are defined as state preferences (actually the preferences of political leaders) regarding possible outcomes in various issue areas. In order to examine how states behave vis-a-vis each other when pursuing their interests, The Limits of International Law uses four …

Painful Partnership: The United States, the European Union, and Global Governance

With new worldwide threats, post-Iraq war tensions, and the United Nations under siege, democracies should take the lead in forming a new coalition united behind a common global security agenda?as hinted by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Chal lenges and Change (HLP) in its December 2004 report.1 The vital ques tion after President George W. Bush's reelection is whether there will be more of the same from Washington, or whether unilateralism will make room for collective responses to the challenges of the twenty-first century. The relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU) will be decisive in any global arrangement. Iraq, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and world poverty loom large, and ongo ing trans-Atlantic differences will not go away. Washington's policies have raised hackles in Europe over, inter alia, the Kyoto protocol on cli mate change; the landmine treaty; the approach to child-soldiers; the HIV/AIDS epidemic; the death penalty; biological weapons; global efforts to curb illicit sales of small arms and light weapons; the Compre hensive Test Ban Treaty; the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Amer ica's miserly percentage of overseas development assistance (ODA); and the International Criminal Court (ICC). As if these were not enough, U.S. attitudes toward the nuclear threats from Iran and North Korea, steel exports, farm and airline subsidies, alleged tax evasion, new definitions of torture and enemy combatants, and the new national security doctrine of preemptive strikes have also raised alarm. If we fast reverse, the June 2001 communiqu? from the EU-U.S. summit in G?teborg, Sweden, seems like ancient history:

The Strategic Defence Initiative: US Policy and the Soviet Union by Mira Duric (review)

542 SEER, 83, 3, 2005 the methods of the Soviet regime. This is an excellent piece of research in every sense. ChristChurch, Oxford CATHERINE ANDREYEV Duric, Mira. TheStrategic Defence Initiative: USPolicy andtheSoviet Union. Ashgate, Aldershotand Burlington,VT, 2003. vii + I90 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. C49.95. DURING the I980s thepotential (ordangers)of the StrategicDefence Initiative (SDI) became the most controversial issue in international politics. Indeed while working at the Royal United Services Institutein Whitehall, I recall a senior admiral observing that he did not know how defence commentators had managed without it. Mira Duric's monograph aims to assessthe place of the SDI in the process that culminated with the end of the Cold War. She brings a single-minded, no-nonsense approach to this complex process. She believes 'in reality' that SDI did not represent a threat but, in response to those inclined to boast that it brought the USSR to its knees in I989, she declaresboldly (andpersuasively)that 'one explanation alone is not sufficient to explain the end of the Cold War' (pp. I-2). Her book is designed to be a contributionto the historyofAmericanforeignpolicy, asshehasnot consulted Soviet documents. Duric has succeeded in fulfillingthe aimsshehas setherself.Her book offers a competent surveyof the issuesand, although occasionallyslightlyrepetitive, is clearand based on a thoroughstudyof an extensiveliteraturesupplemented by interviewswith the keyfiguresin the Reagan administration.Each chapter is concluded with a cogent synopsisof its arguments.These are advanced in short paragraphsaccompanied by numerous sub-headingsthat offer helpful signposts. Duric devotes some attention to the pre-SDI developments in ballistic missile defence, especially in the Soviet Union, that did a lot to undercut the provisionsof the Anti-BallisticMissile(ABM)Treatyof 1972. As she shrewdly points out, had the SDI technology a proven record of failurethen the Soviet Union would have encouraged the US to pour its resources into the effort. The main reasonwhy SDI became such a topical matterafter I98I had more to do with political issues and the personal enthusiasms of Ronald Reagan himself. He claimed SDI as 'his' idea, and it had the added convenience of serving as a counter-weight to the nuclear 'freeze' movement by presenting Reagan as a statesman genuinely looking for a solution to the intractable problemsof nuclearwarwhile maintainingAmerican strategicsuperiority. In her extended treatmentof the development of the rationalebehind SDI, Duric draws out a paradox. Despite Mikhail Gorbachev's claim that SDI would 'fomentmistrustand suspicion'between the Superpowers(p. 47), their relations were greatly improved by i988. In three summits, at Reykjavik (1986), Washington(i 987) and Moscow (1988), the 'atmosphere'in which the negotiationswere conducted was transformed.Reagan had a political motive for his summitry,especially in agreeing to the Reykjavikmeeting. He sought to out-flank his Democratic congressional critics, who had reduced the REVIEWS 543 funding for the programme and would continue to do so down to I988. Reagan, moreover, triedto give a bigger 'impulse'(pp. 68, 70) to the faltering arms reduction talksat Geneva. The summits, despite false starts,resultedin solid achievements. Probably the most importantwas the Soviet acceptance at the Washington summit of the 'zero option' and the removal of Russian intermediaterange nuclearforces (INF)from Europe. Reagan refusedto halt work on SDI because he genuinely believed that its defensive shield would eliminate nuclear weapons. Gorbachev (who believed that Reagan's offer to share SDI research, though sincere, would never be realized) gradually changed his tactics. He stopped frontal assaults on SDI, hoping that the concessions he made, especiallyover INF, would lead to an acceptance of the wisdom of the ABM Treaty. Arguably the existence of SDI hindered the signingof even more ambitioustreatiesto get rid of nuclearweapons, though its development also ensured the Soviet presence and an urgent readinessto reach such concordatsthat had previouslybeen lacking. Consequently, Duric concludes sensiblythat SDI contributedto the rapid dissolutionof the Soviet Union 'butit does not explain everything'(p. I28). It represented a technological and economic leap that served to expose as fraudulentthe Soviet Union's claimsto Superpowerstatus.Yetthe issue as Americanwealth and power continues to grow in relationto otherpowers has not been resolved. George W. Bush'scommitment to the national missile defence system(NMD) hasbeen obscuredby the attention and criticism devoted to his conduct of the 'waron terror'.Duric...