Abductive Argument Research Articles

Essence, Effluence, and Emanation

The subject of this essay is propria and their relation to essence. Propria, roughly characterized, are those real properties of a thing which are natural but nonessential to it, and which are said to “flow from” the thing’s essence, where this “flows from” relation is understood to designate a kind of explanatory relation. For example, it is said that Socrates’s risibility flows from his essential humanity; and it is said that salt’s solubility in water flows from the essential natures of both salt and water. The question I raise and attempt to answer in this essay is: In what sense do propria “flow from” essences? What kind of explanatory relation is this exactly? Some suggest that it is a relation of logical consequence (e.g., Kit Fine); others, of grounding (e.g., Michael Gorman); and still others, of formal causation (e.g., David Oderberg). In this essay, I reintroduce and defend a view suggested by the late scholastic Spanish philosopher and theologian Francisco Suárez, who in 1597 wrote that effluence is best understood as a very special kind of efficient causation, which we can call the relation of emanation. The thesis of this essay, then, is that propria emanate from essences. Along the way, this paper offers a new taxonomy of types of propria; it explains the significance of propria for the metaphysics and epistemology of essences; it discusses at length varieties of efficient causation (and emanation in particular); and then it offers an extensive abductive argument in favor of Suárez’s account, whereby the former accounts of effluence are critiqued, each in turn, and Suárez’s view is motivated and ultimately shown to be superior to its competitors.

“Well, in the case of my mom…”

Abstract This article is guided by the question: What are the argumentative functions of personal stories in public deliberations? Drawing on the analytical traditions of argumentation theory and discourse analysis, we analyzed three public forums on mental illness, where personal stories were used in a number of argumentative functions. Our analysis reveals that in a deliberative forum personal stories were used as negotiable arguments rather than as mere assertions of individual experience. Personal stories were primarily used as arguments by example to challenge the framing proposed by the moderator and to pitch problem definitions that participants considered most relevant. In this function, personal stories were alternatively engaged as inductive or abductive arguments by other forum participants. Additionally, personal stories were used to support solution proposals and to uphold social ideals.

Beliefs, knowledge and finite provinces of meaning: the case for science and the arts

Purpose This paper aims to build around an abductive argument: the epistemological value of the Arts-derived knowledge is equivalent and may be supplementary to that of science, contributing to the literature on the epistemological mistrust between both systems of knowledge. Design/methodology/approach This essay proposes a conceptual model – a tool, in Kuhn’s terms – grounded on the sociology of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Schütz, 1951), to frame the apprehension of reality from a social perspective, and the philosophical pragmatism (Peirce, 2012), considering the fixation of beliefs as the seminal concept that leads to the legitimation of knowledge in society. The proposed conceptual model guides analysis on the epistemological value of the knowledge derived from the Arts and supports reflection on the commonalities between both finite provinces of meaning. Findings Reproducibility, doxastic grounding, community/membership, intersubjectivity and evidence are criteria identified as commonalities between the Arts and Science. Acceptance and legitimation across finite provinces of meaning emerge to produce minimally acceptable objectivity, made possible by the mutual validation of impressions. Research limitations/implications The discussion on greater levels of aesthetic appreciation has been eclipsed by the authors’ intention to find specific epistemological properties of knowledge derived from the Arts. Practical implications As practitioners in applied social science, management researchers are supposed to have mastery over how to apply what they know. So, the findings suggest participation (becoming accepted, first of all) in communities of practice, learning from and contributing to distinct finite provinces of meaning. The role of organizations in the understanding of knowledge derived from the Arts and its application might be that of a protagonist, promoting creativity and innovation through openness to new perspectives on knowledge. Originality/value This essay rescues knowledge as not a justified true belief, but the result of fixed beliefs continuously and socially legitimated. This rescue escapes previous attempts that appeal to Gettier-type counterexamples. A conceptual model was proposed to frame knowledge from a philosophical and sociological perspective and represent a methodological contribution of this essay. The proposition of third-order interdisciplinarity, also represents a contribution, of conceptual nature.

What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?

Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the Quinean view that logical theories have no special epistemological status, in particular, they are not self-evident or justified a priori. Instead, logical theories are continuous with scientific theories, and knowledge about logic is as hard-earned as knowledge of physics, economics, and chemistry. Once we reject apriorism about logic, however, we need an alternative account of how logical theories are justified and revised. A number of authors have recently argued that logical theories are justified by abductive argument (e.g. Gillian Russell, Graham Priest, Timothy Williamson). This paper explores one crucial question about the abductive strategy: what counts as evidence for a logical theory? I develop three accounts of evidential confirmation that an anti-exceptionalist can accept: (1) intuitions about validity, (2) the Quine-Williamson account, and (3) indispensability arguments. I argue, against the received view, that none of the evidential sources support classical logic.

Discussion Note: Selim Berker’s Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief

In a recent paper, Selim Berker (Analytic Philosophy, 59, 427-470, 2018) develops an abductive argument against practical reasons for belief that exploits an alleged difference between epistemic and practical reasons. According to Berker, epistemic reasons for belief balance to suspension. If I have equally strong epistemic reasons to believe and disbelieve some proposition, I lack sufficient reason either to believe or disbelieve it. Rather, I have decisive reason to suspend judgment. In contrast, practical reasons balance to permission. If I have equally strong practical reasons to φ or ψ (and there are no other reasons on the scene), I have sufficient reason to do either. Given this difference, Berker argues that defenders of practical reasons for belief cannot offer a plausible explanation of how practical and epistemic reasons interact in order to yield all-things-considered normative verdicts. In this essay, I defend a non-interactionist “pure” form of pragmatism against Berker’s objection. I outline a pure pragmatist theory, recapitulate why Berker thinks it also falls prey to his objection, and explain why the objection fails to undermine pure pragmatism. Finally, I consider an additional reason Berker’s argument might seem persuasive and show that it depends on conflating Berker’s objection and a separate challenge to pure pragmatism. Once these distinct challenges are disambiguated, it is easier to see why Berker’s objection is not a significant concern for pure pragmatists.

In Pursuit of the Non-Trivial

AbstractThis paper is about the underlying logical principles of scientific theories. In particular, it concerns ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ) the principle that anything follows from a contradiction. ECQ is valid according to classical logic, but invalid according to paraconsistent logics. Some advocates of paraconsistency claim that there are ‘real’ inconsistent theories that do not erupt with completely indiscriminate, absurd commitments. They take this as evidence in favor of paraconsistency. Michael (2016) calls this the non-triviality strategy (NTS). He argues that this strategy fails in its purpose. I will show that Michael's criticism significantly over-reaches. The fundamental problem is that he places more of a burden on the advocate of paraconsistency than on the advocate of classical logic. The weaknesses in Michael's argument are symptomatic of this preferential treatment of one viewpoint in the debate over another. He does, however, make important observations that allow us to clarify some of the complexities involved in giving a logical reconstruction of a theory. I will argue that there are abductive arguments deserving of further consideration for the claim that paraconsistent logic offers the best explanation of the practice of inconsistent science. In this sense, the debate is still very much open.

Deontic modals and hyperintensionality

Abstract In this paper I argue that deontic modals are hyperintensional, i.e. logically equivalent contents cannot be substituted in their scope. I give two arguments, one deductive and the other abductive. First, I show that the contrary thesis (that deontic modals are not hyperintensional) leads to falsity; second, I argue that a hyperintensional theory of deontic modals fares better than its rivals in terms of elegance, theoretical simplicity and explanatory power (e.g. Ross’s paradox, the Gentle Murderer, The Good Samaritan, Free Choice Permission and the Miners’ Paradox disappear). I then propose a philosophical analysis of this thesis and outline some consequences. In Section 1 I introduce and define deontic modality and hyperintensionality. In Section 2 I give a reductio for the hyperintensionality of deontic modals. If the argument is sound, a useful corollary is that deontic modals are also non-intensional, and therefore possible-world semantics accounts are illfitted for them. I then show how the main result can be strengthened or weakened by varying the definition of logical validity. In Section 3 I give an abductive argument for the hyperintensionality of deontic modals, arguing that with a single move we are able to solve many paradoxes and puzzles traditionally troubling deontic logic. I present a version of a hyperintensional deontic logic in an appendix, which I prove is sound and complete with respect to a version of truthmaker semantics.

Estructura y dinámica de argumentos analógicos, abductivos y deductivos: un curso de geometría del espacio como contexto de reflexión

Se describen procesos de argumentación con énfasis en los argumentos analógicos, surgidos cuando un grupo de estudiantes aborda un problema que puede ser resuelto tanto en la geometría plana como en la del espacio. Para ello, en el marco de una metodología cualitativa basada en la realidad del aula, se emplea el modelo de Toulmin para tipificar los argumentos producidos y se realiza un análisis ontosemiótico para describir la actividad matemática asociada. Los resultados permiten legitimar el uso de argumentos abductivos o analógicos en procesos de resolución de problemas (particularmente, de geometría del espacio) precisando la forma en que estos articulan y dinamizan diversos objetos (conceptos, procedimientos, proposiciones) presentes en el proceso. Además, permiten detallar las fases de una argumentación por analogía mediante las configuraciones de los dominios que involucra.

The Self-Effacement Gambit

Philosophical arguments usually are and nearly always should be abductive. Across many areas, philosophers are starting to recognize that often the best we can do in theorizing some phenomena is put forward our best overall account of it, warts and all. This is especially true in areas like logic, aesthetics, mathematics, and morality where the data to be explained is often based in our stubborn intuitions. While this methodological shift is welcome, it's not without problems. Abductive arguments involve significant theoretical resources which themselves can be part of what's being disputed. This means that we will sometimes find otherwise good arguments suggesting their own grounds are problematic. In particular, sometimes revising our beliefs on the basis of an argument can undermine the very justification we used in that argument. This feature, which I'll call self-effacingness, occurs most dramatically in arguments against our standing views on the subject matters mentioned above: logic, mathematics, aesthetics, and morality. This is because these subject matters all play a role in how we reason abductively. This isn't an idle fact; we can resist some challenges to our standing beliefs about these subject matters exactly because the challenges are self-effacing. The self-effacing character of certain arguments is thus both a benefit and limitation of the abductive turn and deserves serious attention. I aim to give it the attention it deserves.

La justificación de la abducción en el contexto del debate sobre el realismo científico: una aproximación argumentativa

The new perspectives on the nature of justifying practices brought by the development of a non-formal and non-deductivistic argumentation theory offer us the opportunity to revisit some central issues for the Philosophy of Science and revise our analysis of the typical ways to give, ask for and critically receive reasons in the Sciences. The use of the notions and distinctions developed by this theoretical framework help us clarify the rational structure of the scientific agents’ evidentiary discourse, which includes closely interrelated both argumentative and explanatory acts. This determines the centrality of a meta-explanatory argumentative scheme such is abduction. However, there is a philosophical debate that goes beyond the identification and comprehension of these rational structures and even beyond their assessment conducted by the participants in scientific discussions. This is the debate among philosophers regarding the epistemic justification of abduction, closely related to the different stances regarding the justifying possibilities of scientific realism. This paper revises different viewpoints on the justification of abduction, exposing their argumentative import and the way they govern the comprehension of particular abductive arguments.

Strategic vs Definitory Rules: Their Role in Abductive Argumentation and their Relationship with Deductive Proof

This paper analyzes the role of abduction in proving process when students solve a geometrical problem. Solving a problem is like playing a game in which rules have to be defined. Two kinds of rules are considered: definitory rules that define the basic moves in the game and strategic rules that explain how to play the game. These two rules can be associated to two types of abductions that can be used to solve geometrical problems. The purpose of this paper is to compare these two abductions and to analyze their relationship with the deductive proof. In particular, the study reveals that abduction based on definitory rule can be an obstacle to the construction of the deductive proof, while abduction based on strategic rule seems to not be a challenge for students. In fact, this abduction is usually transformed into a deduction along the argumentation.

Deviance and Vice: Strength as a Theoretical Virtue in the Epistemology of Logic

This paper is about the putative theoretical virtue ofstrength, as it might be used in abductive arguments to the correct logic in the epistemology of logic. It argues for three theses. The first is that the well‐defined property oflogical strengthis neither a virtue nor a vice, so that logically weaker theories are not—all other things being equal—worse or better theories than logically stronger ones. The second thesis is that logical strength does not entail the looser characteristic ofscientific strength, and the third is that many modern logics are on a par—or can be made to be on a par—with respect to scientific strength.

Peirce Knew Why Abduction Isn\u2019t IBE\u2014A Scheme and Critical Questions for Abductive Argument

Whether abduction is treated as an argument or as an inference, the mainstream view presupposes a tight connection between abduction and inference to the best explanation (IBE). This paper critically evaluates this link and supports a narrower view on abduction. Our main thesis is that merely the hypothesis-generative aspect, but not the evaluative aspect, is properly abductive in the sense introduced by C. S. Peirce. We show why equating abduction with IBE (or understanding them as inseparable parts) unnecessarily complicates argument evaluation by levelling the status of abduction as a third reasoning mode (besides deduction and induction). We also propose a scheme for abductive argument along with critical questions, and suggest retaining abduction alongside IBE as related but distinct categories.

The political sacred and the holiness of life itself

ABSTRACTThis article reflects on Agamben’s formulation of the sacred within the political order of the West, contrasting this with the Durkheim/Bellah view of the sacred/profane opposition, and then presenting two arguments that reduction of the sacred to the political is insufficient, one a form of biological reductionism that seeks to locate the sacred within the common, biological nature of human life itself, the other an abductive argument for human transformation in terms of what Sloterdjik has called ‘vertical tension.’ This argument turns out to be one for locating holiness in the very notion of life itself that I wish to ground in the idea of social cognition.

Use-Trace Epistemology and the Logic of Inference

Use-trace analyses are regularly used to provide clues about artifact functionality and the use of materials that do not preserve and which are therefore not represented in the archaeological record. While all sciences strive for deductive certainty, they generally make use of inductive and abductive arguments. The same is true of use-trace studies. Here I examine the three main types of logical inference used in archaeological science and the extent to which each one is used in the interpretation of ancient use-traces. Each type of inference provides a different degree of certainty, and it is suggested that use-trace analysts should acknowledge this when presenting the interpretation of their results. Use-traces develop on tools through mechanical processes. They are then used to infer the most appropriate and likely anthropic activity to account for their formation. Despite the appeal to mechanical laws or regularities, the process of imputing anthropogenic activity to these use-traces is abductive and as such carries with it the same logical surety as all abductive inferences.

Composition as identity and plural Cantor's theorem

In this paper, I argue that the thesis of Composition as Identity blocks the plural version of Cantor’s Theorem, and that this in turn has implications for our use of Cantor’s theorem in metaphysics. As an example, I show how this result blocks a recent argument by Hawthorne and Uzquiano, and might be turned around to become an abductive argument for Composition as Identity

Informal Fallacies as Abductive Inferences

All who teach logic are familiar with informal fallacies such as ad ignorantium (appeal to ignorance) and ad populum (appeal to popularity). While it is easy to give clear examples of poor reasoning of this sort, instructors are also cognizant of what might be called “exceptions”: when it is legitimate to appeal to popularity or to an absence of evidence. The view I defend here is that appeals to popularity and ignorance (and some other fallacies) should best be viewed as instances of abductive reasoning, or inferences to the best explanation. Thus, determinations of whether these types of arguments are good ones will rest on the criteria that determine good reasoning for abductive arguments generally.

On a “most telling” argument for paraconsistent logic

Priest and others have presented their “most telling” argument for paraconsistent logic: that only paraconsistent logics allow non-trivial inconsistent theories. This is a very prevalent argument; occurring as it does in the work of many relevant and more generally paraconsistent logicians. However this argument can be shown to be unsuccessful. There is a crucial ambiguity in the notion of non-triviality. Disambiguated the most telling reason for paraconsistent logics is either question-begging or mistaken. This highlights an important confusion about the role of logic in our development of our theories of the world. Does logic chart good reasoning or our commitments? We also consider another abductive argument for paraconsistent logics which also is shown to fail.

Theorizing in Grounded Theory and creative abduction

This article aims to contribute to the analysis of the logical arguments in Grounded Theory (GT), both in the version of Glaser (Basics of Grounded Theory analysis: emergence versus forcing, 1992) and of Strauss and Corbin (Basics of qualitative research, 1990). The article will focus both on stages of the coding process—that could be considered the core of the overall process of theorizing in GT—both on logic of GT, analysing in particular whether GT makes use of abductive thinking. The article outlines the distinction between different modes of abductive reasoning, and focuses specifically on one of them: the “creative abduction” (Eco and Sebeok, The sign of three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce, 1983). The distinction between different forms of abductive argument appears especially useful to explore the logic of GT. By introducing this distinction, the article discuss how theorizing in GT makes use—both in Glaser and in Strauss and Corbin—of the same type of abductive reasoning: the creative abduction. According to this analysis, the differences between the two versions of GT turn out to be much less severe.

The Return of Radical Theology: A Critical Examination of Peterson and Zbaraschuk, eds., Resurrecting the Death of God

Abstract This review article critically examines the anthology Resurrecting the Death of God: The Origins, Influence, and Return of Radical Theology, edited by Daniel Peterson and G. Michael Zbaraschuk (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014). After making brief but largely appreciative summary comments on a number of essays, the article focuses attention on contributions by John Cobb on the theology of Altizer, John Roth on Levinas, and J. W. Robbins on the politics of de Tocqueville’s concept of God. Suggestions are provided for inclusion of a wider swath of theologies that might be considered "radical," and the argument is made for more dialectical exchange, including a revisitation of the basic rationale behind Tillich’s notion of the power of being and the provision of outlines of a cumulative or "global" abductive argument for the existence of cosmic mind that is informed by recent arguments of Thomas Nagel as well as historical forms of process natural theology, especially as propounded by Hartshorne.