Abstract
This paper is about the putative theoretical virtue ofstrength, as it might be used in abductive arguments to the correct logic in the epistemology of logic. It argues for three theses. The first is that the well‐defined property oflogical strengthis neither a virtue nor a vice, so that logically weaker theories are not—all other things being equal—worse or better theories than logically stronger ones. The second thesis is that logical strength does not entail the looser characteristic ofscientific strength, and the third is that many modern logics are on a par—or can be made to be on a par—with respect to scientific strength.
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