Outer space is a commanding height for major countries strategic competition, and the formulation of international rules is equally a strategic high ground. The significance of the game over international outer space rules is self-evident. Whether in the realm of peaceful uses of outer space or in outer space arms control, the rules game has entered an unprecedentedly white-hot phase. Accurately identifying the historical development principles and characteristics of this game is crucial for states to plan ahead and seize the initiative in future. For the international community, it is the key to jointly promoting the positive development of outer space global governance and the rule of law in outer space. The evolution of the international outer space rules game can be broadly divided into three stages: preliminary establishment and the formulation of basic rules (Stage 1.0, 1959-2007); the rise of comprehensive rules focusing on the peaceful uses of outer space (Stage 2.0, 2008-2020), and the formulation of comprehensive rules with an emphasis on outer space arms control (Stage 3.0, 2021-). Since entering Stage 2.0, the overall trend has been manifested in “eight characteristics”: fragmentation, integration, conceptualization, the hardening of soft law, mirroring/politicization, common interest orientation, complexification and deepening, and universalization. In the long run, outer space global governance and the rule of law in outer space will inevitably move toward the convergence, systematization, and integration of international outer space rules, completing the transformation from an “obligation-based” to a “rights-based” paradigm.

People-to-people connectivity is the foundation of China’s exchanges with other countries, with social distance reduction serving as the pathway. As an essential component of Chinese social governance, work organizations play a significant role in fostering social proximity between Chinese and foreign residents. Examining the bidirectional social distances between these groups and analyzing data from the Chinese General Social Survey and the Survey of Foreign Residents in China reveals two main findings: first, work organizations help reduce social distance through resource sheltering and expanded interaction; second, large organizations, by leveraging advantages in resource sheltering, can exert a stronger influence on social distance reduction between Chinese and foreign residents. The common roles and distinctive characteristics of work organizations in reducing social distance between Chinese and foreign residents underscore their positive institutional potential in promoting cultural exchanges, societal integration in the new era, and reconstructing the cultural subjectivity of the Chinese nation.

Moral bioenhancement is an initiative aimed at enhancing human morality through biomedical interventions, and its main proponents believe that moral enhancement can be achieved by biologically enhancing people’s capacity for compassion or empathy. Although altruism and morality can both be viewed as having evolutionary origins, they serve fundamentally different functions in human life, which complicates the nature of human moral experience and causes moral content to shift with environmental conditions and the nature of social interactions. Such proposed initiatives not only lack sufficient feasibility but could, if implemented on a large scale, fundamentally alter the very shape of human life, potentially depriving individuals of their grasp of life’s value and meaning.

The construction of ecological civilization is a core issue within the rural revitalization strategy. There is a pressing need to optimize the spatial structure of the rural ecological rule of law. It is essential to achieve synergetic optimization through the following strategic path selections: in the legal space, priorities include reconstructing environmental legislation for urban-rural balance and using codification to optimize rural environmental norms. In the administrative space, devolving powers and responsibilities, institutionalizing inter- agency coordination, and refining incentive mechanisms can lower governance costs and strengthen primary-level performance. In the judicial space, functional reconfiguration should recalibrate the division of labor between judicial and administrative authorities and guide the legalization of informal rules.

China’s city-level social governance guided by the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) Party building emphasizes the alignment of governing actors with clearly delineated responsibilities, signaling a shift from a governance logic centered on the exercise of political authority to one grounded in organizational techniques. Drawing on grounded analysis of pilot cities advancing the modernization of city-level social governance, this study finds that local governments have developed a range of innovative Party-building models, such as grid-based, consortium-based, service-oriented, and downward-embedded Party building, which have enhanced the leadership capacity, organizational strength, social cohesion, and responsiveness of primary-level Party organizations. From the theoretical perspective, the essence of city-level social governance guided by Party building lies in a multidimensional empowerment framework that integrates political, organizational, and technological capacities. Through this framework, three core governance bottlenecks are addressed with precision: the difficulty of forging shared strategic direction, weak coordination of motivational forces among multiple actors, and efficiency losses resulting from information barrier. From the standpoint of practical experience, the Party-building-guided approach emerges from the coupling of party logic with governance logic and has generated a set of profound structural transformations. The organizational system has evolved from fragmented, department-and-region segmentation into an integrated and multidimensional Party-building architecture; primary-level organizations have shifted from merely securing social recognition to establishing institutional authority; mechanisms of dispute resolution have moved from end-stage, reactive handling toward source-oriented governance; and the underlying driving forces have undergone a fundamental transition from administrative compulsion to value-based motivation.

Under the impact of the global crisis of the 17th century, both China and Europe experienced large-scale state collapse and initiated new rounds of state-building, shaped by their respective political logic. During the Qing dynasty, China achieved multi-ethnic and large-scale national unification by reconstructing the concept of “Da-yi-tong” (great unity). In Europe, the state theory of the Natural Law School emerged, laying the political theoretical foundation for the Westphalian system. China, as the dominant country in East Asia during the Qing dynasty, refrained from pursuing the kind of hegemonic supremacy typical of traditional Western empires. Instead, it effectively maintained long-lasting peace throughout East Asia. In contrast, the European multinational system, which aimed at achieving a power equilibrium and enduring peace, remained burdened by the pressures of war arising from inter-state competition for survival. These pressures fueled both the “military revolution” and the “scientific revolution.” To judge whether China’s national evolution from the Ming to Qing dynasties was progressive solely through the lens of state theory derived from the European experience is inevitably a one-sided perspective rooted in “Eurocentrism.”

Do industrial chain risk shocks merely impede Chinese enterprises’ technological progress, or do they compel breakthroughs in indigenous innovation? This question is investigated within the context of technological blockades with a focus on effects and underlying mechanisms. The findings reveal that industrial chain risk shocks have pushed Chinese upstream enterprises to enhance their capacity for indigenous innovation. Key mechanisms include incentives to fill domestic market gaps, pressure-driven innovation, and government support policies, with upstream indigenous innovation also generating spillover effects that benefit downstream enterprises. Amid the intensifying technological rivalry, it is imperative to promote self-reliance and self-strengthening in key sectors, refine policies for supporting domestic enterprises to achieve technological innovation, and foster international cooperation in industrial and supply chains, thereby accelerating the formation of an open innovation ecosystem.

China has long adhered to the principle of excluding administrative rules when assessing contract validity. However, explicitly recognizing the mandatory provisions of these rules as part of the legal basis for determining contract validity is a more appropriate approach. Such recognition is an inevitable outcome of the coordinated governance of complex societal relations under the Civil Code of the PRC and other legal sources. Current Chinese legal provisions on the basis for contract validity reveal inherent contradictions: permitting the application of customs—an informal source of law—while rejecting administrative regulations—a formal source—contravenes the hierarchical principles of the source of law system. Similarly, applying the general provisions of public order and good morals while dismissing specific provisions of administrative regulations violates the fundamental interpretive principle of “forbidding the escape into general clauses.” A more prudent reform is to not only expand the applicability of administrative rules in contract validity determinations but also extend the legal basis for contract validity to the full scope of “laws” as defined by the Legislation Law of the PRC.