ABSTRACT This is the third and final special issue in this series that engages with the concept of nuclear disarmament irreversibility. The first special issue provided a comprehensive overview of irreversibility, establishing a conceptual foundation for this underexplored term. The second special issue focused on drawing insights from empirical case studies relevant to the concept of irreversibility by examining the cases of South Africa, Kazakhstan, North Korea and bilateral arms control agreements between US and Soviet Union/Russia. This third special issue explores the applications of irreversibility through addressing the following topic: nuclear safeguards and the role of the IAEA, regional perspectives from the Middle East and Latin America, how transparency can enhance disarmament irreversibility, lessons learnt from chemical disarmament and how irreversibility dynamics can help us understand multi-generation military procurement projects. With the publication of this special issue, The Journal of Peace and Nuclear Disarmament concludes a trilogy of special issues, totalling 20 articles, that examine irreversibility’s conceptual, empirical, and policy dimensions. At a time of renewed interest in advancing global discussions on irreversibility, these contributions aim to foster a nuanced and grounded conversation, and more broadly to support efforts to envision the foundations of a nuclear-weapons-free world.

ABSTRACT This article addresses challenges the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may face when conducting nuclear verification activities in former nuclear-armed States after the completion of their disarmament process. It does so by discussing the institutional, political and technological considerations that would present challenges and opportunities for the IAEA, building on discussions held in a workshop with an interactive simulation with eminent practitioners in the field of nuclear verification and scholars. First, the article briefly describes past discussions on the IAEA’s role in verifying former nuclear weapons possessors, and it assesses how nuclear safeguards could ensure irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in a disarmed environment. Second, it explores institutional, political, and technological challenges and opportunities for the IAEA verifying irreversibility. Institutional aspects include resource management, legal frameworks, and the adaptation of policymaking organs. Political aspects discussed are the potential for shifting the Agency’s organisational culture and mitigating financial constraints. Lastly, technological aspects include leveraging existing and new verification methods, dealing with new forms of classified materials, and assessing the completeness of nuclear material inventories.

ABSTRACT Applying the concept of “Irreversible Nuclear Disarmament” (IND) to the Middle East presents several challenges. Conceptually, the key frameworks for addressing the nuclear challenge in the region – namely the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (MEWMDFZ) – lacks a robust disarmament pillar to anchor IND. A further challenge is structural and relates to the markedly different nuclear context prevailing in the Middle East to that which governed the evolution of the IND concept. Although still at a nascent stage, the conceptual and political frameworks underpinning irreversibility at the global level have evolved within the relatively stable context of strategic interactions between the Nuclear Weapons States and a well-defined global discourse regarding nuclear arms control and disarmament. Attempting to transpose frameworks of irreversibility as they have developed in this relatively stable context to the more complex, unstable and fluid regional setting of the Middle East is fraught with difficulty. This paper presents a “first-cut” attempt to address these challenges. It argues that the most viable approach for applying IND to the Middle East is through a regional multilateral framework embedded in the MEWMDFZ. However, the zone framework as it has been formulated thus far, requires further development. Specifically, there is a need to incorporate a viable disarmament pillar, as well as provisions aimed at mitigating regional nuclear hedging and latency dynamics in order to provide for a more conducive regional nuclear environment to achieve high levels of irreversibility.

ABSTRACT The article draws on the concept of the “sunk cost fallacy” to understand how the state of irreversibility can occur in the context of large-scale, intergenerational military projects. Nuclear weapons are one example of irreversible military projects but there are others in the military domain that are susceptible to powerful vested interests, and where costs can spiral and be subject to the sunk cost fallacy. Nuclear-powered submarine building is the most complex military project that a state can undertake. Accordingly, the article analyses irreversibility through the case study of AUKUS, Australia’s second attempt to create a successor fleet to its retiring Collins-class and prevent a naval capabilities gap. In the AUKUS context, the anticipated state of irreversibility stems from a combination of factors, especially powerful bureaucratic forces being unleashed as Australia develops a nuclear industry from scratch and its prior failure at submarine building – with the imperative to make the shipbuilding a success at almost whatever cost. The article is also concerned with understanding why irreversibility can arise. Taking the analogy of the digger wasp from evolutionary biology, the article observes that for military projects spanning decades, decision-makers lack the full information to make cost-efficient evaluations. Although the sunk cost fallacy may lead to irreversible pathways, the outcome might not be as flawed as it first might appear. Ultimately there is a cost restraint on decisions taken for the long term, leading states to commit to complex project as a heuristic to manage future threats that can’t yet be known.

ABSTRACT This article examines the nuclear dimension of the war in Ukraine. It makes two arguments. First, our knowledge of the nuclear world is fundamentally limited and so any inferences we draw from the war in Ukraine should be tentative. Second, what we are observing in Ukraine appears at least consistent with basic and well-established theoretical insights about nuclear weapons: a) that nuclear weapons deter; b) that nuclear weapons enable; and c) that these political effects of nuclear weapons emerge from genuine nuclear risks. This article lays out these insights and demonstrates their consistency with existing empirical evidence from the war in Ukraine. Overall, therefore, it does not appear that the war in Ukraine should yet cause us to fundamentally rethink our understanding of nuclear weapons in major ways.

ABSTRACT In the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) context, irreversibility has been accepted as a critical principle of multilateral nuclear disarmament. Debates within the expert community and during the NPT Review Process, however, recognise the need to better understand the concept and its role in achieving and sustaining a world free of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the principle of irreversibility is still unclear, and the scope of its content is subject to competing interpretations. This paper deals with the concept of irreversibility in the context of nuclear disarmament from an interdisciplinary approach considering its technical, legal, and political aspects. It explicitly explores Latin American views of such a universal concept. The research relies on analyses of relevant information from Latin American experts and compares it with other sources. Focusing on a regional approach and its specificity could help identify ways that local perceptions can effectively feed into the global debate.

ABSTRACT This article presents the discussion and conclusions from a workshop hosted by the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) in February 2023. The workshop convened experts in IAEA safeguards and in nuclear disarmament to discuss the feasibility of applying lessons and tools from the current safeguards system to a future nuclear disarmament scenario. The aim was to probe certain aspects of safeguards which may be relevant in the context of “irreversibility” and evaluate these based on the participants’ knowledge and expertise. The discussion revolved around the following themes: the scope and purpose of verification; the starting point of verification; current verification processes and frameworks such as the State-Level Concept (SLC) and the 1997 Additional Protocol; and the consequences or lack thereof of non-compliance with a future disarmament treaty.

ABSTRACT In a speech on 2 June 2023, Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Adviser, expressed willingness to engage in nuclear arms control discussions with Russia “without preconditions”. Although the offer was rejected by Moscow, the White House initiative provides with a “textbook case” for the theory of negotiation. Through the use of the Harvard Negotiation Method, this paper sets out the theoretical interests of Russia and the United States in engaging in arms control discussion, in particular the explicit intention of both sides to prevent nuclear escalation and avoid an arms race. It then explains why, in reality, these interests diverge over the broader security landscape, including the US support for Ukraine. This contribution outlines US and Russia’s alternatives to negotiation, possible common ground in the area of “damage-limitation” efforts, as well as creative options for mutual gain. The authors ask why the US attempt to “compartmentalize” arms control, grounded on the Cold War tradition, has failed to convince Russia. They offer practical recommendations to facilitate constructive dialogue and progress in arms control discussions, building on lessons learned from the current “dialogue of the deaf”.

ABSTRACT The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) might inform a future verification regime for global nuclear disarmament that emphasizes irreversibility. This paper explores aspects of a verification mechanism for nuclear disarmament where the IAEA’s experience may be relevant: scope and purpose of verification; starting point and termination of safeguards; verification processes; conclusion-drawing; and compliance.

ABSTRACT The notion of deterrence by denial has been introduced in relation to biosecurity. The goal of deterrence by denial in biosecurity extends beyond dissuading attacks. It also encompasses the protection of citizens in the event of an attack. In this vein, it may be considered as including the elements of deterrence and safeguards in terms of the protection of complying states from the hazards of violations and evasions. In presenting a historical overview of nuclear safeguards and shedding light on the limitations of the safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, this paper delineates the distinction between safeguards and verification for deterrence. Subsequently, it examines the case of the Biological Weapons Convention in which verification is considered a crucial factor for deterrence and investigates the potential for deterrence by denial to serve as an alternative to verification in effective safeguards. It argues that the adoption of deterrence by denial in biosecurity could exert synergistic effects by rectifying the shortcomings of the verification system within the Biological Weapons Convention and providing effective safeguards without the need for coercive measures.