Abstract
ABSTRACT In a speech on 2 June 2023, Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Adviser, expressed willingness to engage in nuclear arms control discussions with Russia “without preconditions”. Although the offer was rejected by Moscow, the White House initiative provides with a “textbook case” for the theory of negotiation. Through the use of the Harvard Negotiation Method, this paper sets out the theoretical interests of Russia and the United States in engaging in arms control discussion, in particular the explicit intention of both sides to prevent nuclear escalation and avoid an arms race. It then explains why, in reality, these interests diverge over the broader security landscape, including the US support for Ukraine. This contribution outlines US and Russia’s alternatives to negotiation, possible common ground in the area of “damage-limitation” efforts, as well as creative options for mutual gain. The authors ask why the US attempt to “compartmentalize” arms control, grounded on the Cold War tradition, has failed to convince Russia. They offer practical recommendations to facilitate constructive dialogue and progress in arms control discussions, building on lessons learned from the current “dialogue of the deaf”.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.