Written directives and ministerial tenure in China: a novel gauge for political performance?

Abstract

ABSTRACT While prior research on Chinese political elites has predominantly centred on local officials, assessing the performance of ministers may pose significant challenges. This paper uses written directives (WDs), a pivotal form of elite communication, as a metric for evaluating ministers’ political performance. We posit that a higher frequency of WDs received by ministers from top leaders signifies increased attention and enhanced political success, potentially bolstering their longevity in office and career advancement. To test this hypothesis, we analyse ministerial tenure in China from 1949 to 1976, a period characterized by the unparalleled influence of Chairman Mao Zedong, which facilitated the measurement of WDs. Our findings indicate that ministers who received a greater number of WDs, on average, enjoyed longer tenures, while those with a shared historical background with Mao did not. These results align with previous historical analyses demonstrating Mao’s adept consolidation of power within political elites. Moreover, the recent release of historical Chinese materials has unveiled a wealth of political communication among Chinese political elites, with WDs offering a novel avenue for gauging political performance. This research contributes empirical insights from China to the global literature on ministerial tenure, enriching the landscape of contemporary Chinese bureaucratic studies.