Experimentalist governance under hierarchy through leading small groups: a solution to power fragmentation?

Abstract

ABSTRACT Taking policy experimentation in several selected pilot sites as test beds prior to the implementation nationwide has emerged as a notable phenomenon amidst China’s reform trajectories. However, the country’s combined party-state authoritarian governance structure and relatively fragmented bureaucratic system have presented challenges to this experimentation process. This paper investigates the dynamic interplay between experimentalist governance and hierarchy in China by examining how hierarchical controls facilitate the implementation of experimentalist practice in the case of Wujin rural land reform. It reveals that the establishment of leading small groups (LSGs) at each administrative layer has aided in the materialization of local experimentation by enhancing the bargaining power of lower-level governmental entities and streamlining the vertical communication process across the lengthy administrative hierarchies. This mechanism also mitigates regulatory gaps among different branches of governmental departments responsible for land resources management. The political design of LSGs manifests the Chinese central government’s strategic commitment to promoting experimentalist governance while exerting careful control over the varied sub-national implementation practices, exemplifying the increasing feature of top-level design in China’s current policy experimentation and governance efforts.