Wresting the Initiative: Ridgway as Operational Commander in the Korean War, December 1950 to April 1951

Abstract

Abstract : This monograph examines the conduct of operations of the United States' Eigth Army under the command of General Matthew B. Ridgway in the Korean War. During the period of Ridgway's command, from late December of 1950 through April of 1951, the Eighth Army stopped an offensive campaign being conducted by Chinese Communist Forces. After completing a successful withdrawal and defense, Ridgway's Army mounted a series of offensive operations to regain lost territory and reestablish a defensive line along the 38th Parallel. thus, this case study examines the campaign of an operational commander who successfully wrested the initiative back from the enemy and illustrates the significance of the AirLand Battle tenet of initiative at the operational level of war. The monograph is divided into four major sections. After an introduction in Section I, Section II discusses the current doctrine concerning the tenet of initiative as described in Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Section III examines the theoretical foundations of the concept of initiative as expressed in the writings of Clausewitz. Section IV describes Ridgeway's conduct of withdrawal, defensive and offensive operations in early 1951. The concluding section evaluates Ridgeway's operational design using the key concepts found in FM 100-5 -- centers of gravity, lines of operation, and culminating points.