Why do national skill systems vary? The state’s role in skill system institutions for maintaining growth models

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article combines the comparative political economy of skill formation literature with the one on growth models to analyse the state's role in skill systems of late industrialising countries. It focuses on Mexico and Turkey, which constitute crucial cases for a most similar case analysis. The article shows that Mexico and Turkey followed different growth models after their economic liberalisation, which led to distinct state roles in two key skill system institutions, namely the minimum wage and the vocational education and training (VET) system. In Mexico, the state aligned these institutions with the ‘dependent-downgrading' growth model, which was reliant on external demand and investments with low industrial upgrading and sometimes downgrading, and minimal working-class cohesion. Minimising labour costs was prioritised to attract foreign investment and to reduce the prices of exports, leading to extremely low wages and a liberal VET system in Mexico. In Turkey, the growth model was ‘domestic-upgrading’ with higher role of domestic investments and demand, and some improvements in industrial upgrading and working-class social cohesion. Ensuring high minimum wage and comprehensive VET system constituted key strategies for the state to maintain this growth model in Turkey, leading to relatively higher minimum wage and a statist VET system.