Abstract
This article proposes a new approach to the study of coalition formation in presidential regimes. Drawing on a dataset covering 33 Latin American governments, the article shows that coalition cabinets are, mostly, the product of pre-electoral agreements. I present a six-stage timing of coalition agreements, including four degrees of earliness. Then, I challenge this consideration with the most common – institutional – arguments from the literature about the survival of coalitions in presidential regimes. The findings are quite interesting since they point out that earlier agreements are relevant conditions for enduring coalitions. Moreover, and surprisingly, I show that the institutional argument seems to have been overrated by the literature.
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