Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Polities: A configurational analysis of the coalition formation and duration processes

Abstract

For too long, scholars have studied coalitions under presidential regimes as they did under parliamentarism: assuming that the executive needed to look for allies in only one chamber. However, symmetric bicameralism has made such assumption untenable. As a matter of fact, bicameralism, particularly symmetrical bicameralism, as it operates under presidential regimes, may entail significant constraints for policymaking and coalition duration. Indeed, controlling one of the two chambers may not be sufficient for the president to ensure policy approvals. This article focuses on the 28 coalition cabinets with a bicameral framework in Latin America since the return of democracy. I show that bicameralism dramatically affects the composition of the coalitions as the absence of a majority in both chambers engenders a post-electoral agreement round. Moreover, I show that when a coalition holds some kind of majority in both houses, the coalition agreement lasts longer.