Abstract
Among others, the term “problem” plays a major role in the various attempts to characterize interdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity, as used synonymously in this paper. Interdisciplinarity (ID) is regarded as “problem solving among science, technology and society” and as “problem orientation beyond disciplinary constraints” (cf. Frodeman et al.: The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). The point of departure of this paper is that the discourse and practice of ID have problems with the “problem”. The objective here is to shed some light on the vague notion of “problem” in order to advocate a specific type of interdisciplinarity: problem-oriented interdisciplinarity. The outline is as follows: Taking an ex negativo approach, I will show what problem-oriented ID does not mean. Using references to well-established distinctions in philosophy of science, I will show three other types of ID that should not be placed under the umbrella term “problem-oriented ID”: object-oriented ID (“ontology”), theory-oriented ID (epistemology), and method-oriented ID (methodology). Different philosophical thought traditions can be related to these distinguishable meanings. I will then clarify the notion of “problem” by looking at three systematic elements: an undesired (initial) state, a desired (goal) state, and the barriers in getting from the one to the other. These three elements include three related kinds of knowledge: systems, target, and transformation knowledge. This paper elaborates further methodological and epistemological elements of problem-oriented ID. It concludes by stressing that problem-oriented ID is the most needed as well as the most challenging type of ID.
Highlights
Among others, the term ‘‘problem’’ plays a major role in the various attempts to characterize interdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity, as used synonymously in this paper
Doch die semantisch unbestimmte Redeweise von ‘‘Problem’’ ist alles andere als unproblematisch.—Der Ausgangspunkt dieses Papiers liegt in einer Defizitdiagnose, namlich dass Diskurs und Praxis interdisziplinarer Forschung Probleme mit den Problemen haben
If an actor does not have what he or she wishes to have or possess, and if he or she cannot obtain it, the actor has a problem: If we desire to live in a world without atomic weapons or would like to travel without carbon dioxide emissions but cannot do so, we are faced with problems
Summary
How do we know that X is a problem?19 Gereon Wolters defines a problem as the ‘‘incompatibility of some propositions (the ‘problems’) with the set of those propositions that are considered as true or evident’’ (Wolters 2004: 347). If an actor does not have what he or she wishes to have or possess, and if he or she cannot obtain it, the actor has a problem: If we desire to live in a world without atomic weapons or would like to travel without carbon dioxide emissions but cannot do so, we are faced with problems This notion of problem carries certain elements of action theories, including aspects of ‘‘inhibited effecting’’ (Wright 1991) and ‘‘thwarted realization of objectives and purposes’’ (Grunwald 2002). All these touch upon philosophical ethics, philosophy of science, 21 Cognate aspects can be found in the works on conceptual elements towards a theory of TA (technology assessment; cf Grunwald 2007). It can be considered as a major part of system thinking.
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