Abstract
The paper uses insights from comparative federalism to reflect upon the structure and functioning of the European Union. The first part of the paper will explore the extent to which the EU can be characterized as a federal system. After having shown that the EU corresponds rather closely to the model of cooperative federalism, the second part will analyze its structural deficiencies by drawing on the German federal experience. The comparison helps to understand why the EU has maneuvered itself into a double legitimacy trap where declining problem-solving capacity (output legitimacy) can no longer compensate for the lack of democratic participation and accountability (input legitimacy). The third part, finally, questions whether the Constitutional Treaty will be able to provide an escape route from the double legitimacy trap.
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