Abstract

The article uses insights from comparative federalism to reflect upon the structure and functioning of the European Union. The analysis shows that the EU corresponds rather closely to the model of cooperative federalism. The EU's structural deficiencies are revealed by comparison with German federal experience, which helps explain why the EU has manoeuvred itself into a double legitimacy trap in which declining problem-solving capacity (output legitimacy) can no longer compensate for the lack of democratic participation and accountability (input legitimacy). The article then assesses whether the Constitutional Treaty will be able to provide an escape route from the double legitimacy trap.

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