Was the 600-ship navy a chimera? Budgets, force structure, and the political realities behind Reagan-era naval strategy

Abstract

ABSTRACT In 2018, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman admitted that the daring Ocean Venture operation of 1981 – when U.S. and Royal Navy ships as part of a wider NATO exercise proceeded north of the Arctic Circle and penetrated within bombing range of Soviet naval bases – was in fact a ‘bluff’ because various technologies necessary for U.S. naval forces to operate deep in Soviet waters were not yet ready. They eventually were, but what about the fleet that would use them? The Reagan Administration championed the construction of a 600-Ship Navy with fifteen aircraft carrier battlegroups as central to its defense buildup, but Lehman recognized that the fleet was only viable if he implemented reforms to limit rising weapons costs. The planners responsible for long-term analysis of the Navy’s budget countered that Lehman’s plans were unrealistic and pressed him to ask Congress for more money. This was impossible because it would have run contrary to the Reagan Administration’s wider defense policies, which focused on the defense of Central Europe, and upset the delicate budgetary truce between the U.S. military services. Ultimately, political and budgetary realities were as important as strategic imperatives in shaping the size and composition of the U.S. Navy during its 1980s ‘renaissance’.