Voting for Corruption: How Poverty and Inequality Undermine Democratic Accountability in Latin America

Abstract

OF THE DISSERTATION Voting for Corruption: How Poverty and Inequality Undermine Democratic Accountability in Latin America by Peter C. Casey Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science Washington University in St. Louis, May 2014 Professor Guillermo Rosas, Chair Why do citizens fail to hold their elected officials democratically accountable for corruption? In this dissertation, I argue that poverty and inequality undermine democratic accountability for corruption by creating opportunities for elected officials to mobilize political support through targeted, personal exchange. I focus on two such types of exchange, clientelism and crony capitalism, and explain how corruption reinforces these two strategies of political mobilization. I argue that the costs of corruption are very high for the poor, who often lose access to government resources they rely on to meet their basic needs. Because the cost of failing to meet their basic needs is so high, poor citizens are likely to rely on political patrons for access to resources in corrupt countries, making them especially susceptible to clientelism; the exchange of material benefits for political support. Clientelism thereby undermines democratic accountability for corruption, especially in countries with poor populations.