Institutional Dynamics of Governance and Corruption in Developing World: the Case of Pakistan

Abstract

The primary concern of this research is to enhance the understanding regarding inverse relation of governance and corruption in transitional societies of the developing world, while exploring the possibilities to seize the upward surge of corruption and concomitant downward slide of governance, through institutional restructuring with a special focus on Pakistan. Hoping, en route to the above stated destination, to unravel the riddle of the ‘cultural embeddedness of corruption’, this research demonstrate that: institutional restructuring can be instrumental in controlling corruption; and the institutional culture, rather than the culture of transitional societies, is responsible for the rampant corruption and decaying governance in transitional societies and developing states. This research builds it genesis in the rational choice neo institutional theory of political science and the agency theory of economics, and maintains that agents are rational actors and are predisposed to optimization of possible benefits, while making decisions; further, agents are inclined to be malleable with the changes in the institutional structures. This research takes corruption as an indicator of the level of governance and maintains that structured institutions, developed on the lines of Weberian bureaucratic model, are bound to be more efficient and comparably less prone to corruption. During the course of this research these assertions have been analyzed in the context of civil bureaucracy of Pakistan, where defying the rules of conduct is a normal behavior among the public servants; concurrently within the Motorway Police agents are collectively inclined to abide by the rules, despite functioning in the same socio-economic setting of a traditional society and a developing state. The results show that structured institutional settings help agents to follow the rules irrespective of their socio-cultural background, past experiences and habits. Apart from being the first exhaustive study of Pakistan, the seminal feature of this research is the employment of real stakeholders’ perceptions for investigating the causes of bureaucratic corruption and the measures assisting in controlling this malady. These questions have been empirically explored with the help of qualitative and quantitative data, obtained from both primary and secondary sources. Major source of primary data was a survey, conducted by the author, in which 250 civil servants of 32 different departments of Government of Pakistan, including the Motorway Police, were surveyed. Results of this research divulge that the agent’s perception, regarding corruption in bureaucracy, corresponds with the perceptions of general public. This study also establishes the authenticity of perceptions as a reasonably good indicator of corruption. Results of this research reveal that agents’ perception regarding prevalence of corruption in bureaucracy and Pakistan is in congruence with the perceptions of the local public as well as the international experts of the region. Data analysis shows a significant negative correlation between the age and experience of the respondents and his perception of corruption in the country. Moreover, variables like gender, marital status, number of dependents, or the geographical origin do not have any significant impact on the agents’ perception of corruption in the country. Agents rated Police, Land Revenue and Income Tax as three most corrupt institutions, while the Motorway Police was rated as the least corrupt institution in the country. Result shows that in agents’ view insufficient financial remunerations is the primary most cause of widespread corruption, along with lack of accountability, greater opportunities, weaker system of check & balances, corrupt leadership, and discretionary powers. Further analysis of MP establishes that reasonable salaries, good leadership, effective accountability, and strong checks & balances are the three most effective tools in enhancing efficiency and reducing corruption in any institution. Results of this research also reveal that strict accountability and reward for honesty are considered, as the major indigenous tools, while, social disapproval and institutional restructuring are viewed, as primary exogenous tools for controlling corruption. After analyzing the functionalist and the moralist approach, this study concludes that both of these approaches suffer from inherent deficiencies. This study also investigates the evolution of corruption in South Asia with a focus on Pakistan. The study concludes with practical recommendations for the policy makers of the developing world, emphasizing on the need for inculcating the idea of social responsibility among the masses; giving due attention to petty corruption; limiting the perception of corruption in the society; prioritising efforts according to the potential cost of corruption; and efficient utilization of honest human resource.