Abstract

IntroductionThe United States and North Korea have a long history of troubled relations. From the Korean War through the twenty-first century's focus on post-9/11 inter - national terrorism, each country has been a major thorn the other's side. In general, there have been many more studies of overall U.S. foreign policy, including U.S.-North Korean relations as a sporadically important portion of that overarching policy, than there have been of overall North Korean foreign policy, including its preoccupation with the United States as a threat to its existence. That is understandable, given the relative roles of the United States and North Korea world a∂airs that warrant far more attention worldwide to the United States than to North That relative level of attention on the United States compared to North Korea is reinforced by the transparency of the U.S. government system versus North Korea's very evident opaque operating style. U.S.-North Korean relations are made still more convoluted by the dualistic dilemmas posed by the overall Korean context of U.S.- North Korean interactions that are significantly shaped by U.S.-South Korean alliance relationships, and by the U.S. goal of foreclosing North Korea's nuclear weapons option. This analysis shall focus on each of these issues turn, setting the stage for conclusions about how to cope with the problems posed by these dual dilemmas-dilemmas exacerbated by South Korea's election of President Roh MooHyun an atmosphere of heightened anti-Americanism, and by North Korea's increased willingness to utilize nuclear brinkmanship.Historical LegacyThese issues have intensified the debate within the United States about the appropriateness and e∂ectiveness of U.S. policy toward Korea's role U.S. foreign and defense policy has evolved an interesting manner over the years. For many Americans who are familiar with the United States' involvement Korea during the Cold War and its aftermath, it may seem natural that today's U.S. policymakers would be concerned about U.S. interests Before World War II, however, that was decidedly untrue. Even though the United States was the first Western power to take the lead and establish diplomatic relations with Korea i882, it was able to do so largely as a by-product of international circumstances which Chinese guidance of Korea led the Korean government under the Yi Dynasty to interact with the United States to o∂set other countries-especially Japan. This Chinese role was keeping with its traditional Sinocentric hierarchical ties with Even after the United States became more proactive the imperialist era, its interests Korea were significantly overshadowed by its interests China and Japan. A number of diplomatic arrangements with Tokyo (notably the Taft-Katsura memorandum of i905 and the Root-Takahira agreement of i908) involved the United States cutting geopolitical deals, partially at Korea's expense, that e∂ectively sanctioned Imperial Japan's incremental colonization of Compared to China or Russia, the United States did not express the kinds of interest Korea that Koreans considered appropriate. In short, Koreans deemed the United States to be inconsistent at best and opportunistic at worst.That began to change during World War II. The Cairo Declaration of i943, which the United States, Britain, and the Republic of China o∂ered the in due course commitment to Korea, was welcomed by Koreans (Department of State Bulletin, i943). Initial postwar events yielded a divided Korea and ambiguous U.S. interests South Korean reactions to U.S. ambiguity amid perceptions of other countries' stance toward Korea was reflected a post-World War II popular saying that counseled Koreans: Do not trust the United States; do not get deceived by the Soviet Union; Japan will rise again; be careful, Korea. Not until the Cold War developed and expanded to Korea-especially the form of the Korean War-did U. …

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