USAF Relevance in the 21st Century. A First Quarter Team in a Four Quarter Game

Abstract

THE RISE IN TERRORISM perpetrated by non-state actors is a primary threat to U.S. national security. It also challenges relevance of air and space power. Although United States has repeatedly demonstrated ability to achieve decisive effects using air and space power in conventional war, it has not mastered use of these tools against terrorists and guerrillas. (1) Without ability to perform decisively in all areas of conflict spectrum, U.S. Air Force (USAF) is like a football team that comes out scoring touchdowns in first quarter only to lose its tremendous lead by fourth. To become a four-quarter team, USAF must address some fundamental challenges to way it prefers to (2) When Americans think of war, they envision great battles and campaigns such as Gettysburg, Normandy, and Desert Storm. Yet, as retired General Anthony Zinni puts it, the purpose of war is not battle at all. It is a more perfect peace. (3) Destroying enemy's army in battle is only a means to an end. (4) In some cases, phase following major combat operations is decisive, not combat itself. According to Washington Post's reporter Dana Priest, in Iraq and Afghanistan [w]e are now seeing that hardest, longest, and most important work comes after bombing stops, when rebuilding replaces destroying and consensus-building replaces precision strikes. (5) This is not a revelation. majority of conflicts United States has fought in its 200-plus-year history required more years of peaceful engagement post-hostilities than years of force application during hostilities. But because low-level conflicts or reconstruction operations are often characterized by a low threat to national survival and/or a smaller force commitment, military institutions often dismiss them as second-rate activities. current culture throughout Department of Defense is still overly focused on war. As military analyst Carl Builder has argued, The dominant concepts of war held by military institutions have a significant effect upon kinds of forces they acquire and train and, therefore, upon kinds of wars they are prepared to fight. (6) Today's U.S. military has been designed for, and prefers to focus on, big interstate conflicts. From World War II through Operation Desert Storm, America built and refined a force to counter a peer or near-peer competitor. In 1990s, despite being involved in numerous non-combat operations, U.S. Armed Forces continued to improve their warfighting capability by focusing on destroying forces and/or leadership of enemy nation-states. This mindset meshed with Caspar Weinberger/Colin Powell doctrine, which held that wars should be fought only for vital national interests, and then only with overwhelming force and clearly articulated objectives and exit strategies. Thus, armed forces have tended to resist operations not related to combat. (7) Icarus Syndrome USAF has been at least as culpable as other services, perhaps even more so, in resisting change from pure combat operations to nation-building operations. Traditionally, USAF holds flying and fighting as its reason for being, and its is based largely on its organizational and conceptual history and primacy of technology over warfighting theory. These lead to a culture in which small, often technology-based, subcultures flourish. (8) In this environment, bomber pilots (and later fighter pilots) became senior leaders of USAF. Under their control, Builder notes, USAF has identified itself with air weapon, and rooted itself in a commitment to technological superiority. dark side of this commitment is that it becomes transformed into an end in itself when aircraft or systems, rather than missions, become primary focus. In fact, one's identity in Air Force is usually associated +with a specific airplane rather than institution or military art, with a resulting weaker sense of community than other services. …