RMA to ONA: The Saga of an Effects-Based Operation

Abstract

Abstract : In the aftermath of the air campaign that began Operation Desert Storm, the US Air Force sought to measure US success in the military-technical and organizational innovation that occurred during the Gulf War and its impact on the future evolution of military art. From the perspective of the Air Force, the success of the war was based on planning and execution by the US air and naval strike forces during the initial aero-space operation, which set the stage for follow-on air-ground operations. These operations culminated in the defeat of Iraqi forces in theater and the liberation of Kuwait with few allied casualties. This success attracted considerable attention within the US Air Force and led to the reorganization of US Airpower for the Post-Cold War environment, which was characterized by local conflicts and Operations Other Than War. This success led the US Air Force to submit this concept as the centerpiece for its input to the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001. Air power theorists promoted this emerging concept as Effects-Based Operations (EBO). EBO emphasized that the goal of any conflict was to cause the adversary to act in accordance with US national interests, and that this could be achieved by the application of superior technology, against selected targets, to cause an effect. Though this was not a new concept, EBO was a new means to apply force in military operations. Over the past decade there has been confusion on what is EBO, its capabilities and necessity.