Upward and downward accountability in local government: the decentralisation of agricultural extension services in Tanzania

Wilfred U Lameck,Rudie Hulst

doi:10.5130/cjlg.vi25.6472

Abstract

A key assumption behind decentralisation in developing countries is that it enhances the accountability of local government and results in policies that reflect the preferences of the local community. However, previous research shows that local politicians and administrators in many developing countries to a large extent behave as if they were primarily accountable to central government, not local communities. The literature suggests various explanatory factors but does not provide insight into their relative weight and into how different factors interact. This paper combines comparative case-study research with in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with local government politicians and officials involved in the delivery of agricultural extension services in Tanzania. It shows that limited administrative and political decentralisation and centralistic human resources management restrict downward accountability to the community. Downward accountability is also constrained by the social rules that local politicians and administrators observe. For downward accountability to materialise, formal systems of public administration need to introduce incentives to that effect.

Highlights

This paper reports research concerning accountability in the delivery of agricultural extension services in Morogoro Municipality in eastern Tanzania, and Hai District in the north
What could be done to achieve a better balance in the Tanzanian context? The present research suggests that it would not do to increase the degree of local autonomy: that is, reduce central guidelines and make local government less dependent on conditional grants
As long as the career of local councillors and staff depends on their loyalty to the leadership of the ruling party and central government, incentives for upward accountability will remain strong and there is no reason to believe that the two social rules identified above will be substituted by others

Summary

Introduction

This paper reports research concerning accountability in the delivery of agricultural extension services in Morogoro Municipality in eastern Tanzania, and Hai District in the north. Many developing countries have engaged in the transfer of responsibilities for various aspects of policy-making and public service delivery from central to regional and local government One of the main motives for decentralisation was that the centralised planning and administration of the 1970s and 1980s had failed to produce economic growth and deliver public services at a satisfactory level. A second motive has been that, from the early 1990s, international agencies such as the World Bank and the International Development Bank have pressured countries to transfer responsibilities to lower levels of government. The common assumption was that decentralisation would create proximity between citizens and government, and would increase the accountability of local government and result in policies and services that reflected the preferences of local communities The common assumption was that decentralisation would create proximity between citizens and government, and would increase the accountability of local government and result in policies and services that reflected the preferences of local communities (Jutting et al 2004, pp. 8– 9)

Findings

Discussion

Conclusion