U.S. Coercive Diplomacy toward Pyongyang: Obama vs. Trump

Abstract

Since the first nuclear crisis of the early 1990s, the United States has engaged in coercive diplomacy toward North Korea for its denuclearization. From Clinton to Trump, it has consumed four U.S. administrations without much success so far. Meanwhile, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests and tested intercontinental ballistic missiles, each of which created serious tensions on the Korean Peninsula, with potential military actions. After a war of words with military threats in much of 2017, Kim Jong Un and President Trump had their first historic meeting in Singapore in June 2018 followed by two more in Hanoi and Panmunjom in 2019. Although no one is sure about their final negotiation outcome, the U.S. nuclear negotiation with North Korea presents an interesting case of coercive diplomacy spanning over a quarter century. The puzzle is, despite its willingness to engage North Korea from early on, the Obama administration did not have meaningful success in nuclear diplomacy while the Trump administration did have at least a first-ever summit with the North Korean leader. Why, then, has Obama’s diplomatic efforts failed to achieve major nuclear agreement with Pyongyang? Can the Trump administration’s coercive diplomacy finally succeed in getting Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons? What are the conditions for the effective use of pressure? Are appropriate rewards needed alongside pressure? Using the works of Alexander George and Bruce Jentleson on coercive diplomacy theory, this paper draws on analyses and lessons from U.S. efforts to persuade North Korea to denuclearize its weapons program by the Obama and the Trump administrations.