Abstract
Abstract There may be putative vindications of epistemic norms not discussed in previous chapters. This chapter presents a “master challenge,” building on the ideas in the rest of the book, that can be used to show that any such vindication does not vindicate standard epistemic norms. The challenge is illustrated by applying it to a virtue-based vindication of the epistemic norms. The chapter also discusses and rejects the idea that standard epistemic norms are constitutive of belief (that having beliefs requires a commitment to standard epistemic norms). And the chapter discusses and rejects the idea that we do not need to explain why epistemic norms matter.
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