Abstract
Abstract This chapter speculates on what the right replacement for standard epistemic norms will look like and points to potential future projects for epistemology. The chapter suggests a new type of epistemic goodness, which is had only by collections of beliefs—those constituting our overall picture of the world around us—and is worthy of respect. The norms governing these collections cannot be truth-oriented, and thus require jettisoning epistemic concepts such as knowledge, truth, accuracy, evidence, coherence, and reliability. In addition to this new notion of goodness, the chapter discusses important questions about norms governing interesting beliefs, and argues for the complete replacement of knowledge in our normative systems. Finally, the chapter discusses how epistemic norms might interact with practically or socially vindicated norms on belief.
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