The End of Epistemology As We Know It

Abstract

Abstract The epistemic norms should matter. The ones philosophers typically focus on do not matter enough. They should be replaced. This book discusses a range of views of why and how epistemic norms could matter and shows how epistemic norms as standardly understood fall short on each. No matter how the importance of the epistemic is to be explained, it does not matter at all what we believe about most topics or why we believe it. When what we believe does matter, it is often not particularly important that our beliefs are true, but rather that they are good enough for our purposes, and thus no truth-connected epistemic notion such as reliability, evidence, coherence, accuracy, or knowledge is really relevant. Finally, even when truth is genuinely important, standard epistemic norms do not properly aim at the truth, because they do not allow us to sacrifice one true belief for the sake of others. In light of all of this, epistemic norms as standardly conceived are not really concerned with what matters. We can and should do better. The epistemic norms that genuinely matter will replace truth-based epistemic notions with conceptions of success, reasons, and justification aimed at the “good enough.” They will require us to form some seemingly bad beliefs—beliefs that violate all standard norms by going against our evidence, being incoherent, or even being clearly false—in order to improve other beliefs. In fact, they will sometimes allow our beliefs to be bad for no reason whatsoever.