Trade Creation and Trade Diversion of ASEAN’s Preferential Trade Agreements

Co-Existence, Complementarity or Conflict? Interaction between Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties

The most remarkable evolution in the field of international investment law is undoubtedly the massive proliferation of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), either in the form of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) of Custom Unions (CUs). PTAs increasingly, as will be pointed out, contain provisions on the liberalization and/or protection of foreign investment, and may then be referred to as Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements (PTIAs). PTAs differ substantially in terms of the extent to which they cover investment. Agreements in the area of trade and investment either contain explicit provisions on the protection, and possibly the liberalization of foreign investment, or are aimed essentially at the regulation of trade in services and/or goods, in which case the provisions on investment are usually less extensive than in the former or even completely absent. BITs and modern PTAs which include investment protection (and liberalization) provisions, which may then be categorized as PTIAs, follow the first approach, and thus contain extensive provisions on both the liberalization and the protection of foreign investment (PTIAs), while the majority of the traditional PTAs follow the second approach, containing only a framework or framework provisions committing to further liberalization, protection and promotion of investment. This contribution aims to analyze the interrelationship between the network of bilateral investment treaties and PTIAs with respect to the protection of foreign investment. In doing so, this contribution will examine the differences in the content and rationale of PTIAs as compared to BITs, and in particular how substantive investment protection and investment dispute settlement are dealt with in PTIAs and BITs. Finally, this contribution will address whether conflicts between PTIAs and BITs are possible, and if so, how these conflicts may be addressed.

Trade Creation and Diversion Revisited: Accounting for Model Uncertainty and Natural Trading Partner Effects

In recent decades, there has been a dramatic proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between countries that, while legal, contradict the non-discrimination principle of the world trade system. This raises various issues, both theoretical and empirical, regarding the evolution of trade policy within the world trade system and the welfare implications for PTA members and non-members. The survey starts with the Kemp-Wan-Ohyama and Panagariya-Krishna analyses in the literature that theoretically show PTAs can always be constructed so that they (weakly) increase the welfare of members and non-members. Considerable attention is then devoted to recent developments on the interaction between PTAs and multilateral trade liberalization, focusing on two key incentives: an “exclusion incentive” of PTA members and a “free riding incentive” of PTA non-members. While the baseline presumption one should have in mind is that these incentives lead PTAs to inhibit the ultimate degree of global trade liberalization, this presumption can be overturned when dynamic considerations are taken into account or when countries can negotiate the degree of multilateral liberalization rather than facing a binary choice over global free trade. Promising areas for pushing this theoretical literature forward include the growing use of quantitative trade models, incorporating rules of origin and global value chains, modeling the issues surrounding “mega-regional” agreements, and modelling the possibility of exit from PTAs. Empirical evidence in the literature is mixed regarding whether PTAs lead to trade diversion or trade creation, whether PTAs have significant adverse effects on non-member terms-of-trade, whether PTAs lead members to lower external tariffs on non-members, and the role of PTAs in facilitating deep integration among members.

The subject‐matter of this article is the recently altered trade policy and practice of Australia and their consistency with the WTO multilateral trading policies and principles. Following its unhappy experience with the power and politics driven trading under GATT, Australia unequivocally supported the legalistic approach of the WTO trading system during the Uruguay Round. Its active participation in the WTO has given it a fair share of global free trade. The rule‐based trading framework of the WTO protects, more often than not, Australia from powerful trading states and blocs using their economic clout to gain unfair terms of trade. Australia has recently opted to pursue its multi‐track trading together with its commitments to WTO multilaterial trade liberalization. Since 2002, it has been negotiating a preferential bilateral free trade agreement with its preferred trading partners. The flurry of such negotiations has resulted in the conclusion of a preferential bilateral free trade agreement with Singapore in 2003. Negotiation towards a similar agreement with the U.S. is ongoing. A preferential trade agreement (PTA) is by nature discriminatory and as such inconsistent with the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rule under GATT Article I. Despite this apparent contradiction, GATT Article XXIV permits bilateral PTAs as an exception to the MFN rule under certain explicit conditions, which militate against discriminatory, differential and unequal trading deals among WTO members. This article examines the extent to which the existing and potential PTAs of Australia comply with the conditions of GATT Article XXIV. It concludes that these PTAs are not complementary, if not obstructive alternatives, to the WTO multilateral free trading system. They are not in the best long‐term trading interest of Australia either.

This study examines trade creation and trade diversion effects in the EUSAFTA using the standard gravity model of bilateral trade flows. The estimation of the gravity equation was carried out using the OLS analysis. In order to ascertain the overall trade creation and trade diversion effects explanatory variables such as GDP, distance and dummy variables were incorporated into the estimation equation to explain bilateral trade flows and exports respectively. The main focus was on the estimation of trade creation and trade diversion effects, resulting from participation in selected regional and preferential trade agreements like EU, COMESA, SACU and EUSAFTA. Additionally, the overall effects of regional and preferential trade agreements are positive and significant indicating that trade agreements, induce and generate huge trade volume among member countries. The trade creation effects of (SACU) were negative. This study demonstrates that participation in Regional and Preferential Trade Agreements stimulates trade between member countries. They also stimulate trade with non-member countries, perhaps as a result of an income effect.

Agricultural market distortions remain a major focus of contention in world trade negotiations. Estimates of the effects of liberalising current agricultural trade restrictions indicate an approximately $385 billion increase in global welfare, with the disproportionate share of the benefit being enjoyed by developing countries. In response to difficulties in adopting agricultural trade reforms, individual groups of countries have formed multiple bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements (PTA) to enhance trade among members. Few sectoral analyses exist of the effects on agricultural and food product trade of PTAs. This research uses a gravity model to isolate the effects of various PTAs on both intra‐ and extra‐bloc agricultural and food product trade for three time periods: 1995, 2000 and 2004. Findings strongly support PTA benefits in terms of increased intra‐bloc trade in both sectors. The findings also generally support trade creation in agricultural products. PTA membership was also associated with food trade creation in most cases, although diversion was observed for several associations composed primarily of developing countries.

This study investigates the effects of preferential trade agreements (PTA) on bilateral trade disputes. We construct a unique and comprehensive dataset on inter‐country trade disputes from 1995 to 2007. The dataset covers 110 countries and 1,162 bilateral country‐pair trade disputes. Using this dataset in a gravity‐type model of trade dispute analysis, we find that countries belonging to the same PTA tend to experience fewer trade conflicts among themselves than with non‐member countries. By studying various types of PTA with different dispute settlement mechanisms, we further find that the dispute‐reducing effect only comes from PTA with specific provisions on dispute settlement mechanisms. Moreover, the effect is stronger if those PTA explicitly stipulate that members can also resolve their disputes via the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. However, having PTA that do not address how members should resolve their disputes may lead to more dispute initiations than in cases without PTA.

The relevant of preferential trade agreement between diverse countries of the World can't be overemphasis, been a form of economic integration for equal member countries with non-discriminatory, sincerity to the terms of the agreement with essentiality in economic advancement, growth and poverty reduction between member countries who are involved in the trade. The PTAs examples includes EU, NAFTA ASEAN etc, more so, the trade exploded in the past years as the developed nations create large market as ASEAN, Mercosur etc. However, the result of trade creation to substitute high cost domestic production by low cost import from other countries, due to shift from less efficient to more efficient producer which increases country's welfare. While, on the other hand, trade diversion result to substitute of low cost imports from non- member country with high cost imports from member country. However, the research conclude by explaining the good ground of efficiency and welfare gain by members countries which burst trade creation, improve income through easy imports from countries involved and enhances comparative advantage through market liberalization, border elimination and global economic integration by outburst of welfare and efficiency increase of member countries. Keyword: Preferential trade Agreement, efficiency and welfare gain, trade creation, trade diversion.

The aim of this paper is (i) to assess the impact of regional agreements on members’ trade in SubSaharan Africa (intra-regional trade as well as trade with the rest of the world), controlling for the other traditional determinants, including geography and transport costs and (ii) to compare the respective effect of the preferential trade agreements and the monetary unions. Considering the period 1962-1996, we first assess the average impact of each regional agreement on their implementation period and second we show how these impacts have evolved. An “augmented” gravity model is designed, relying on a transport cost function, in which specific dummies allow trade creation and trade diversion effects to be separated. The model is estimated in panel with bilateral specific effects, to isolate the non-observable characteristics of each pair of countries, and according to the HausmanTaylor (1981) method, which takes into account a possible endogeneity of some explanatory variables. During their implementation, the African regional trade agreements have generated a significant increase in trade between members, although initially often through trade diversion. In the two agreements of the CFA franc zone, the currency unions have largely reinforced the positive effect of the corresponding preferential trade agreements on intra-regional trade, while dampening their trade diversion effect. Actually, currency unions rather had a trade creation effect (all the more important as the international monetary environment has been more unstable), whereas preferential trade agreements resulted in important trade diversion.

The EU is a major participant in the world sugar market, being one of the top producers, importers and exporters in the world. The reform of the EU sugar regime will affect not only the EU member states and candidates, but also countries that are associated with the EU through the preferential, regional and multilateral trade agreements. For several decades, the EU has supported and protected the EU sugar sector. Sugar from developing countries will not be able to enter the EU sugar market without preferential trade agreements. In the EU sugar regime, the unique features of the trade concessions are that sugar under preferential import quotas can enter the EU market duty-free and the price paid for sugar equals to the high EU price for sugar. This paper attempts to analyse the complex hierarchy of trade arrangements between the EU and specific groups of countries. It compares the different trade agreements – including those achieved under the WTO – and explores the impact of these upon both the EU and the other countries involved.

This study investigates the trade effects of the EU-SA and SADC preferential trade agreements of which South Africa is a member. Using a panel data estimation of the gravity model of bilateral trade and based on data from 1994 to 2008, the study finds the EU-SA preferential trade agreement to have a significant trade expansion effect. The study further reveals that an informative conclusion on trade effects of the SADC preferential trade agreement can only be reached once the agreement has been fully operational. The study also recommends that trade policy in South Africa should increasingly be geared towards broad-based multilateral liberalisation. In addition, South Africa should promote regional economic stability and development through supporting regional trade agreements initiatives. Keywords: Trade creation, trade diversion, preferential trade agreement, panel data estimation, gravity model of bilateral trade

The proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) has given rise to significant debate on the need to measure, understand and possibly regulate the impact these agreements have on the multilateral trading system under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This article will discuss the two Doha Transparency Mechanisms (legal transparency) regarding regional trade agreements, as they appear in two General Council decisions from 2006 and 2010. I will argue based on a closer look and a consistent interpretation of Paragraph 10 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration that there is another type of transparency that is relevant to the discussion on PTAs/RTAs, namely “internal transparency.” “Internal transparency stricto sensu” highlights the significance of trust in the WTO institutional processes, such as negotiations, decision-making, dispute settlement and trade monitoring that the representatives of developing member states should have in order for the WTO system to function productively. “Internal transparency lato sensu” is introduced in this article as an extension to include any decision-making deficits, exclusionary and asymmetrical outcomes specifically in the area of unchecked Preferential Trade Agreement proliferation. Instead of a conclusion, the article offers some proposals for more a meaningful progress in the WTO with respect to PTAs/RTAs The proposals aim at raising the profile of both legal and internal of transparency and posit that raising the profile of one will inevitably lead in improvements in the other.

Would improvements in port performance increase trade in countries on the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans?Previous studies attempted to answer this question using ad hoc measures of port efficiency that do not control for the actual use of port assets or measures that can be very noisy.To avoid these problems, this paper builds a measure of economic efficiency based on the use of port inputs to deliver port output.Using data envelop analysis, it ranks countries on the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans in terms of their port efficiency, and assesses the effect of increased efficiency.It finds that becoming as efficient as the country with the most efficient port sector would reduce their average maritime transport costs by up to 14 percent and increase their exports by up to 2.2 percent.

Estimates of the trade diversion (TD) effect of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) tend to be much smaller than that of the trade creation (TC) effect. This paper examines two sources of estimation bias of the TD effect. The first bias arises from the failure to recognise that the concept of TD is inapplicable for a substantial proportion of PTAs, and thus, previous studies wrongly count cases where trade cannot be diverted as cases where trade is not diverted. The second bias arises from the difficulty in controlling for multilateral resistance and other unobserved time‐varying country heterogeneity when estimating both TC and TD effects simultaneously due to perfect multicollinearity. This paper corrects these two biases using a new measure of TD which provides a better mapping between the concept and data characteristics. Removing the two sources of bias leads to a multifold increase in the estimate of the TD effect. It is found that the total TD effect is comparable to the TC effect in dollar terms.