Threat Consensus and Rapprochement Failure: Revisiting the Collapse of US–North Korea Relations, 1994–2002

This article examines the intricate dynamics of US‐China and US–North Korea relations, focusing on the strategic competition between the United States and China. Drawing upon the realist theories of Kissinger and Mearsheimer, the study delves into how various intensities of US‐China conflict might influence North Korea's strategic value and the prospects for improved US–North Korea relations. The research underscores that escalating US‐China competition could reshape the geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia, paving the way for new strategic alignments and partnerships. Four distinct scenarios are presented, each reflecting a different intensity of US‐China conflict and the ensuing reactions from both North Korea and the USA. The analysis suggests that the most probable scenario entails an intensifying US‐China rivalry, which correspondingly elevates North Korea's strategic significance. Such a turn of events would necessitate a shift in US strategy – from isolating North Korea to forging more favorable geopolitical conditions. Potential strategies might include reducing North Korea's reliance on China, disrupting the alignment between China, Russia, and North Korea, or even contemplating the integration of Pyongyang into the US security framework. These strategic adjustments could reshape the power dynamics and address regional challenges in Northeast Asia, promoting peace and stability and safeguarding the nation's core interests.

A review of German reunification in 1990 shows that a peaceful reunification can be explained as the result of an interaction between the centrifugal forces in international dimension in favour of the status quo and the centripetal forces in internal dimension towards reunification. Similarly, a peaceful reunification of Korea is assumed to occur when international forces against reunification can be minimized, while internal (inter-Korean) forces for reunification are maximized. On the one hand, the geostrategic concerns of Korea’s four neighbouring states (the United States, China, Japan, and Russia) about the uncertain future of reunified Korea have been the important source of strong centrifugal forces. Four states view the issue of Korean reunification from the perspective of their strategic games with others. Three major factors—the lack of multilateral security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia, hostile US–North Korea relations, and China’s concern on losing strategic buffer zone—have strengthened centrifugal forces. On the other hand, South Korean governments’ political efforts to improve inter-Korean relations, and thereby strengthen centripetal forces, could not bear fruit. Two major factors—the lack of bipartisan consensus on North Korea policy between the liberal and conservative political camps in South Korea and top leaders’ fear of regime instability and nuclear development in North Korea—weakened centripetal forces. Whether and how effectively the Koreans will be able to influence the operation of these five factors will probably affect the likelihood of peaceful reunification significantly in the future.

North Korea's missile and nuclear tests conducted unilaterally have put China's North Korea policy under intense internal and external pressures. The dramatic developments since 2018 like the détente of the two Koreas and the unprecedented US–North Korea summits are not to be seen as signs that China has played an effective role through its North Korea policy. Why does North Korea always seem to have the upper hand in its relationship with China despite its obvious unilateral economic dependence on China? How did Sino–North Korean relations evolve into their current contradictory state? What is the nature of their relationship? This article considers these questions by analysing China's North Korea policy over the past three decades, since the end of the Cold War. Current research mainly focuses on analyses of specific periods and the interpretation of specific events. By systemically investigating the policy evolution in the past 30 years, this article argues that the US-centric mentality is the primary variable for informing China's perception and policy towards North Korea after the Cold War.

The United States and Cuba moved to end five decades of hostility and agreed to revive diplomatic relations in December 2014 while US President Barack Obama finally made an official visit to Cuba on 20 March 2016 as the first sitting president to do so in 88 years. In contrast with the Cuban case, US–North Korea relations are only getting worse due to the North Korean nuclear program. The United States adopted new legislation for strong economic sanctions against North Korea after the country's fourth nuclear test was carried out on 6 January 2016 and its launching of a long-range missile on 6 February 2016. This study aims to find an answer as to why Cuba and North Korea are walking different paths in their relationships with the United States even though they have been subject to similar sanctions from the US. Recent analysis shows that factors in security, international and economic surroundings, geostrategic factors and domestic politics contribute to notable divergence between Cuba and North Korea in regards to their relationships with the United States.

Purpose—The purpose of the article is to analyze the U.S.’s foreign policy framework toward North Korea in the post–Cold War era. Design, Methodology, Approach—We employ process-tracing technique and comparative sequential method across successive administrations and find that the U.S.’s foreign policy toward North Korea is one of a self-amplifying process. Findings—We argue that the U.S.’s foreign policy toward North Korea has remained remarkably consistent over the course of three decades. Furthermore, the policy has both hardened and narrowed in its focus on denuclearization. Practical Implications—As the U.S. deepens its pursuit for denuclearization as an end, the misalignment of goals between Washington and Pyongyang persists and even grows. Originality, Value—Through our analysis, we contribute to existing work that identifies North Korea’s liability for the engagement failures and add texture to the understanding of the current deadlock in negotiations.

Introduction: Japan, the great powers, and the coordination of North Korea policy Linus Hagstrom and Marie Soderberg 1. Japan and the recurrent nuclear crisis Tsuneo Akaha 2. The rationales behind North Korean foreign policy Han S. Park 3. Seoul's policy toward Pyongyang: Strategic culture and the negligibility of Japan Balbina Y. Hwang 4. US North Korea policy: The 'Japan factor' Yoichiro Sato 5. Chinese North Korea policy: A secondary role for Japan Quansheng Zhao 6. Russian North Korea policy: Old conflicts obstacle for Russo-Japanese cooperation Alexander Zhebin 7. The EU's North Korea policy: No trace of Japanese influence Rudiger Frank 8. Japan and multilateralism in the North Korean nuclear crisis: Road map or dead end? Christopher W. Hughes

The Trump–Kim Summit in Singapore can be regarded as a meaningful first step in a long journey towards complete denuclearisation of North Korea. At the Singapore summit, President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un agreed that North Korea would denuclearise completely and that the United States would in return provide North Korea with security guarantees. However, due to political complexity of the North Korean nuclear issue and technical difficulties of nuclear dismantlement, the process towards complete denuclearisation of North Korea is expected to be protracted and difficult. The prospects for future US–North Korea nuclear negotiations will largely depend on how both countries can work out together the concrete steps, phases and timelines for the implementation of denuclearisation.

Conceptual mappings in political cartoons: A comparative study of the case of nuclear crises in US–North Korean relations

THE EASING OF tensions in East Asia since the 197I visit of Richard Nixon to Peking and Japan's diplomatic normalization with China in I972 has brought significant changes in North Korea's relations with Japan.* Though they are not yet normalized, the impact of detente has been great enough to raise hopes of eventual normalization. Such a development could significantly affect such crucial issues as the status of two Koreas, South Korea-Japan relations, and North Korean policies toward China and the Soviet Union. The coming of detente presented a dilemma for Japan because of the conflicting interests involved in dealing with North Korea. On the one hand, the Japanese government has to reckon with the increasing pressure from North Korea and from Japan's opposition parties for early normalization. It must also consider the attitudes of China and the Soviet Union, with which Japan has been endeavoring to improve her relations, for a persistent hostile or intransigent attitude on the part of Japan toward North Korea could be viewed by both China and the Soviet Union as a revival of Japanese militarism and colonialism. On the other hand, considering Japan's economic interests in South Korea (with a total investment of $2.012 million, some $6.2 billion of surplus resulting from Japan's trade with South Korea over the past ten years)1 and her national security ties with South Korea, she can not disregard South Korea's strong disapproval of Japan's flexible policy toward North Korea. Japan's basic policy of seikei bunri (separation of politics from trade),2 which has been intended to maximize her interest in and involvement with both Koreas, has not been satisfactory to either North or South Korea. Both have charged that such a policy could perpetuate Korea's division and aid one against the other. In essence,

Science can serve as an attractive mode for trust building and cooperative engagement between countries where formal political or diplomatic relations have been strained or are nonexistent. In this article we discuss some conditions and constraints for bilateral academic science engagement and suggest how such engagement might help to build trust between the United States and North Korea. We analyze longitudinal data on North Korea's diplomatic ties and international academic collaboration as well as US public opinion data to provide context for US–North Korea science engagement. We argue that bilateral academic science engagement should be attractive to the United States and North Korea and suggest a set of policy measures that might facilitate such engagement.

Significance The resolution was a Democratic attempt at damage control after comments by a newly elected caucus member that were perceived as anti-Semitic: the party fears being tagged as ‘anti-Israel’ before 2020’s elections. This resolution is the latest move in a brewing congressional battle over the Boycott-Divest-Sanction movement, which brings together several US anti-Israel groups. The rallying cry for this issue is the proposed Israel Anti-Boycott Act, which has 292 co-sponsors in the House and 58 in the Senate. Impacts The White House will resist congressional efforts to limit the president’s foreign policy powers. The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement will be agreed but could be delayed for final changes. Congress will seek a greater role on US North Korea, Saudi Arabia and Iran policy. US-Russia policy will be a sticking point between the Democrats and Trump White House.

For all their efforts to avoid a nuclear North Korea, the Clinton and Bush administrations failed to achieve this goal, the most important policy objective of the United States in its relations with North Korea for decades, mainly because of inconsistencies in U.S. policy. This dissertation seeks to explain why both administrations ultimately failed to prevent North Korea from going nuclear. It finds the origins of this failure in the implementation of different U.S. policy options toward North Korea during the Clinton and Bush administrations. To explain the lack of policy consistency, the dissertation investigates how the relations between the executive and the legislative branches and, more specifically, different government types—unified government and divided government—have affected U.S. policy toward North Korea. It particularly emphasizes the role of Congress and partisan politics in the making of U.S. policy toward North Korea. This study finds that divided government played a pivotal role. Partisan politics are also central to the explanation: politics did not stop at the water’s edge. A divided U.S. government produced more status quo policies toward North Korea than a unified U.S. government, while a unified government produced more active policies than a divided government. Moreover, a unified government with a Republican President produced more aggressive policies toward North Korea, whereas a unified government with a Democratic President produced more conciliatory policies. This study concludes that the different government types and intensified partisan politics were the main causes of the inconsistencies in the United States’ North Korea policy that led to a nuclear North Korea.

OverviewThe tension on the Korean Peninsula decreased immediately following the dramatic reconciliation, in June 2000, between Kim Il-Sung, former leader of North Korea, and Kim Dae-jung, president of South Korea. President Kim Dae-jung adopted a policy of engagement toward North Korea called the Policy. Subsequent to President Kim Dae-jung's five-year rule, President Ro Moo Hyun inherited the engagement policy from his predecessor. Under the Sunshine Policy, South Korea provided North Korea with generous economic aid on an annual basis from 1998 to 2007.At the beginning of 2008, South Korea switched from a one-way engagement policy to a policy of give-and-take. South Korea's new president, Lee Myung Bak, inaugurated in February 2008, initiated this policy shift. President Lee came to believe that South Korea's engagement policy had failed. In February 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th president of the U.S.Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. attempted to settle disputes through direct dialogue with North Korea. It is reasonable to assume therefore that under the Obama regime, more of a direct dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. may be pursued to resolve pending issues, including North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction and support of rogue terrorist states.North Korea has been excessively provocative in recent years. On October 9, 2006, North Korea test-launched a nuclear missile. Neighboring countries immediately expressed serious concern, and the U.S. nuclear envoy, Christopher Hill, doubled his efforts to ensure that North Korea fulfill its agreements on denuclearization through the Six-Party Talks countries; namely, South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. North Korea agreed to disable the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and to dismantle nuclear facilities in the interest of nonproliferation. The international community is watching closely to determine whether North Korea will fulfill its obligations under these agreements. Kim Jong-il has to decide whether he will take further steps to put North Korea in the nuclear power club-which would be likely to invite furious resistance from the Western world-or opt instead to abandon the nuclear program to improve international relations.The purpose of this paper is to envisage President Obama's North Korea policy by applying game theory. In game theory, players try to adopt the best strategy, given their objective function. There have been six major players so far in the Korean Peninsula's nuclear conflict. We point out that interstate differences in the objectives between the national leaders and the party/military leaders have undermined the Six-Party Talks.This paper focuses on the game play between North Korea and the U.S. Although Kim Jong-il can effectively control his military advisers at present, there are potential divergences in their respective viewpoints, which may become more evident in the future.The Game Play in Economic Cooperation between South Korea and North KoreaIn June 2000, Kim Dae-jung of South Korea and Kim Jong-il of North Korea met for the first time to ease the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Since this meeting, the two Koreas have expanded the scope of reconciliation and economic cooperation. The two countries agreed on the reunion of separated families, the establishment of an industrial complex in Kaesong, and the joint exploration of Kumgang Mountain as a means of promoting tourism. This honeymoon abruptly ended when North Korea fired two nuclear missiles on October 9, 2006. During the period 2000-06, President Kim Dae-jung and his successor President Roh Moo-hyun implemented the engagement policy of reconciliation toward North Korea. With generous economic aid from South Korea, North Korea was able to overcome severe food and energy shortages. In return, North Korea opened Kumgang Mountain to South Koreans, and allowed South Korean businesses to hire lower-wage workers in the Kaesong industrial complex. …

Background The central model of Japan’s North Korea policy has been maintained consistently despite repeated changes in the government from the Liberal Democratic Party to the Democratic Party and back again.Purpose: This paper summarizes Japan’s policy concerning North Korea after the Cold War, examines the structure of this policy, and, based on this structure, analyzes Japan’s current policy regarding North Korea. The analysis then turns to the future.Main Argument: Normalizing relations between Japan and North Korea may be the primary goal of Japan’s policy, but the following four motives can also be identified. First, for Japan, the normalization of relations with North Korea is significant as a remaining postwar process. The second motive involves responses to security issues. Third, there is the issue of the safety of Japanese lives. Fourth, Japan’s economic opportunities in North Korea must be considered. Japan has sought ties with North Korea with these four motives, which will remain unchanged in the future. However, Japan does not aim to normalize relations with North Korea without restrictions, and Japan’s policy concerning North Korea is bound by the following three factors. The first factor is the international environment. Second, Japan–North Korea relations are constrained by the attitude of South Korea. Third, Japan’s domestic politics also determine Japan’s North Korea policy.Conclusion: While the four motives will remain the same for Japan, these three factors determine Japan’s attitude toward North Korea, all three of which are pushing for Japan to negotiate with North Korea. He central model of Japan’s North Korea policy has been maintained consistently despite repeated changes in the government from the Liberal Democratic Party to the Democratic Party and back again. This paper summarizes Japan’s policy concerning North Korea after the Cold War, examines the structure of this policy, and, based on this structure, analyzes Japan’s current policy regarding North Korea. The analysis then turns to the future. Normalizing relations between Japan and North Korea may be the primary goal of Japan’s policy, but the following four motives can also be identified. First, for Japan, the normalization of relations with North Korea is significant as a remaining postwar process. The second motive involves responses to security issues. Third, there is the issue of the safety of Japanese lives. Fourth, Japan’s economic opportunities in North Korea must be considered. Japan has sought ties with North Korea with these four motives, which will remain unchanged in the future. However, Japan does not aim to normalize relations with North Korea without restrictions, and Japan’s policy concerning North Korea is bound by the following three factors. The first factor is the international environment. Second, Japan–North Korea relations are constrained by the attitude of South Korea. Third, Japan’s domestic politics also determine Japan’s North Korea policy. While the four motives will remain the same for Japan, these three factors determine Japan’s attitude toward North Korea, all three of which are pushing for Japan to negotiate with North Korea.

Significance That evening, the first components of the THAAD missile defence system, including two launchers, arrived at Osan airbase in South Korea, prompting renewed protests and further reported sanctions by China. Meanwhile, in Seoul, the Constitutional Court’s verdict on President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment is expected imminently. Protesters for and against the president are facing off, raising the spectre of civil disorder. Extremists have threatened violence. Impacts Washington's review of US North Korea policy is a wildcard, with all options (including military) said to be under discussion. The murder of Kim Jong-un’s half-brother and subsequent diplomatic row make outreach to Pyongyang harder to argue for. South Korea’s likely next president's commitment to engaging with Pyongyang will create friction with Tokyo and probably Washington too. With neither Beijing nor Seoul minded to back down, the THAAD row will further damage business and political ties.