Mass Mobilization, Elite Competition, and Diversionary Use of Sanctions

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Abstract How does the domestic environment affect a government's incentives to use coercion against another country? Traditional diversionary literature indicates that governments facing internal pressures will initiate military actions overseas to improve popularity. I argue that struggling governments are more inclined to employ economic sanctions over military force because of lower cost and political risk. I further posit that when governments encounter nonviolent protests and strong competition in the legislature, they have more incentives to initiate sanctions. Foreign sanctions are used to project sanctioning leaders’ competence and increase national cohesion. I test the empirical implication of the argument on a sample of 137 countries from 1975 to 2005. The multinomial logit results show that diversionary use of sanctions is more likely when incumbents face maximalist nonviolent mobilization and higher legislative opposition, but these domestic challenges do not prompt military actions. This study presents a domestic explanation for sanctions initiation; it also casts doubt on the conventional predictions that beleaguered governments will resort to the use of force.