Korean Reunification

Abstract

Abstract A review of German reunification in 1990 shows that a peaceful reunification can be explained as the result of an interaction between the centrifugal forces in international dimension in favour of the status quo and the centripetal forces in internal dimension towards reunification. Similarly, a peaceful reunification of Korea is assumed to occur when international forces against reunification can be minimized, while internal (inter-Korean) forces for reunification are maximized. On the one hand, the geostrategic concerns of Korea’s four neighbouring states (the United States, China, Japan, and Russia) about the uncertain future of reunified Korea have been the important source of strong centrifugal forces. Four states view the issue of Korean reunification from the perspective of their strategic games with others. Three major factors—the lack of multilateral security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia, hostile US–North Korea relations, and China’s concern on losing strategic buffer zone—have strengthened centrifugal forces. On the other hand, South Korean governments’ political efforts to improve inter-Korean relations, and thereby strengthen centripetal forces, could not bear fruit. Two major factors—the lack of bipartisan consensus on North Korea policy between the liberal and conservative political camps in South Korea and top leaders’ fear of regime instability and nuclear development in North Korea—weakened centripetal forces. Whether and how effectively the Koreans will be able to influence the operation of these five factors will probably affect the likelihood of peaceful reunification significantly in the future.