Abstract
ABSTRACT Introduction: Hallucinations research is increasingly incorporating philosophy or the work of philosophically trained individuals. We present three different ways in which this is successfully implemented to the enhancement of knowledge and understanding of hallucinations and related phenomena. Method: We review contributions from phenomenology, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of science and psychiatry. Results: We demonstrate that these areas of philosophy make significant contributions to hallucinations research. Phenomenology gives us a sophisticated and critical understanding of the lived experience of hallucinations. Philosophy of cognitive science enables big-picture theorising and synthesis of ideas, as well as a critical engagement with new paradigms. Philosophy of science and psychiatry raises valuable and theoretically informed questions about diagnosis and categorisation. Conclusions: These contributions reflect both the methodological variety within philosophy and its relevance to the hallucinations researcher.
Highlights
Hallucinations research is increasingly incorporating philosophy or the work of philosophically trained individuals
We offer some examples of how Phenomenology has informed hallucinations research in the past – with regards to schizophrenia – and provide a brief survey of contemporary research
Consider the historic distinction between hallucinations that do and do not have a sense of “objective reality”. This was once regarded as an important way to demarcate “hallucinations” – thought to be associated with psychosis and neurological illness – from “pseudo-hallucinations”, experiences that are phenomenologically similar to hallucinations but involved “intact reality testing”, and have an association instead with personality and conversion disorders
Summary
Hallucinations are typically taken to refer to perceptual experiences that lack a sensory stimulus (e.g., David, 2004). One of us (Wilkinson) has argued that predictive processing offers a new kind of description of a range of phenomena, that is helpful for some purposes, rather than a complete explanatory account of why they occur (Wilkinson, 2014) These kinds of trade-offs will be familiar to researchers with training in philosophy of science, given that the virtues of each approach differ in quite contrasting ways (e.g., breadth, depth, parsimony, etc.), and serve to limit their explanatory appeal. Consider the historic distinction between hallucinations that do and do not have a sense of “objective reality” This was once regarded as an important way to demarcate “hallucinations” – thought to be associated with psychosis and neurological illness – from “pseudo-hallucinations”, experiences that are phenomenologically similar to hallucinations but involved “intact reality testing”, and have an association instead with personality and conversion disorders (van der Zwaard & Polak, 2001). Such research should aim to be inclusive of as broad a range of people as possible; extending to research scientists and clinicians, and service users and other stakeholders
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