Thin Rule of Law or Un-Rule of Law in Myanmar?

Abstract

T he government of Myanmar has responded to worldwide dismay over the May 2009 criminal trial of democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for allegedly violating the terms of her house arrest by characterizing it as a simple and unavoidable matter of law. State-run media outlets have rebutted arguments that the charges are baseless, erroneous and politically motivated. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to criticism from the United Nations Security Council by saying that the case would “not have any political impact” and that it was being “considered and carried out as the task [sic] relating to the rule of law.” The government’s recourse to the rule of law in justifying the case, which is aimed at keeping the party leader under lock and key ahead of a planned general election in 2010, is not surprising. Like coup-makers around the world, the army in Myanmar predicated its 1988 takeover on maintenance of the rule of law. One general after the next has stressed the rule of law as a prerequisite for Myanmar becoming modern and developed. The regime has joined the nine other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in signing a regional charter that includes among its purposes and principles the enhancement of and adherence to the rule of law. Myanmar’s offi cialdom acknowledges the rhetorical force of the rule of law at least as much as its counterparts elsewhere, and like others, uses it for a variety of ulterior purposes. International lawyer Hilary Charlesworth has remarked that the rule of law has “a worthy resonance that no one can plausibly reject and yet it is malleable enough to accommodate many types of legal system.” This worthy resonance is problematic, because it encourages authoritarian regimes of