The Theory of Non-provocative Defense: How Relevant for Korea?

Abstract

This paper examines the arguments for and against so-called non- provocative defense strategies which have gained considerable prominence in the strategic discourse on European strategy over the past five years. Proponents of non-provocative defense argue that offensive strategies tend to create or increase tensions, generate incentives for arms races, undermine crisis stability and hence increase the risks of inadvertent war. Critics, on the other hand, argue that it is militarily ineffective, that it concedes surprise and initiative to the enemy, that it cannot be used to win wars and that it offers a weak deterrent. The arguments for non-provocative defense strategies stress the utility of defensive force structures in reducing the risks of crisis instability and removing all incentives for preemptive strikes and preventive wars. Proponents of non-provocative defense argue that such strategies are highly appropriate in the European context because the existence of nuclear weapons has made aggression unthinkable. Deterrence is thus robust and the only risk of war arises from a crisis getting out of control. Non-provocative defense strategies are more appropriate for dealing with this type of strategic situation than are offensive strategies. The paper reviews the pros and cons of the debate over non- provocative defense strategies and examines their applicability to the rather different strategic circumstance of the Korean peninsula.