The Temporal Difference and Timelessness in Kant and Heidegger

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Abstract I spell out two theses, one shared by Kant and Heidegger, the other Kant’s alone: (1) there is a difference between “within-time-ness” (Innerzeitigkeit) and original or pure time (the temporal difference); (2) the temporal difference is articulated by a self-conscious act not bound by time. While each agrees that the “time-less” original or pure time has limits within which particular temporal determinations have their significance, Kant goes further in asserting that the pure ‘I’ must cognize the determinate boundaries of original or pure time if objective cognition is to be possible. The ‘I’ thus rejects time as a horizon of its own significance. An understanding of this argument suggests why Kant’s position is not as obviously susceptible to Heidegger’s criticism: not only does Kant positively argue that the ‘I’ is atemporal, but the content of this argument tells us why it is impossible for the ‘I’ to be ‘extant’ or a superadded representation in need of unification with temporality. Finally, it suggests that the dispute between Kant’s and Heidegger’s philosophical orientations rests not on whether temporality has been understood, but on how the ultimate conditions of intelligibility relate to their limits.