The Tamil Militants-Before the Accord and After

Abstract

AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE ACCORD between India and Sri Lanka on 29 July 1987, the euphoria lasted exactly two and a half months. It was hoped that the accord would put an end to the five-year-old civil war between Sinhalese and Tamils in the north and east that was threatening to tear the island apart. The accord seemed to fulfil all the Tamils' demands: extensive autonomy in their home areas, equal status their language with Sinhala, and a provisional merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces subject to a referendum. On top of that, it offered India greater influence in the shaping of Sri Lanka's foreign policy. On 28 September these hopes were dashed. The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), the strongest and most influential of the guerilla groups, rejected candidates the post of chief administrative officer of the merged Northern and Eastern Province. The LTTE deputy leader Mahatiya expressed the LTTE's side of this impasse in an interview with The Hindu: of the three names submitted to the Indian high commissioner, J.N. Dixit, as the LTTE's list of proposed candidates the post of chief administrative officer (CAO) of the Interim Administrative Council (IAC), they preferred Pathmanathan, an LTTE sympathiser arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and released under the general amnesty militants. His name was substituted Thillainathan, the third name on the list besides Sivananam and Sivagnanasundaram. In talks with Dixit, the LTTE agreed to accept Sivananam, a one-time municipal councillor in Jaffna, though they preferred Pathmanathan. Sivananam, however, declined later for personal reasons, and the LTTE then demanded the appointment of Pathmanathan who comes from the east. This demand was rejected, which was one of the factors that led to the fatal hunger strike by LTTE commander Amirthalingam Tilipan (Yogi).' A few days later,