In pursuit of an ‘interim administration’ in Sri Lanka's North and East: opportunity or ‘peace trap’?

Abstract

After 19 years of exhausting civil war between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a long‐term ceasefire was signed in February 2002. Government critics argue that this is a windfall for the war‐weary LTTE, allowing time for rearmament. Some LTTE supporters are suspicious that the ceasefire will impede their goal of political autonomy. This article reviews the topic from several perspectives. These include the initial, surprising speed of the peace process associated with the parliamentary victory of Ranil Wickremesinghe's United National Front in December 2001; the reaction of the Sinhala public and the presidency of Chandrika Kumaratunga to the government's subsequent negotiations for an interim administration in the sensitive LTTE‐controlled Northern and Eastern Provinces; LTTE strategy; the issue of the possible demobilization of the vastly expanded Lankan armed forces; and the consequences of the increased involvement of the international community (e.g., the successful Nordic Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission) in Sri Lanka's affairs. The conclusion argues that Sri Lanka's prospects are much brighter than at any time in two decades, but with a fierce, unabated power struggle between president and prime minister and the absence of a ‘national government’, and LTTE consolidation of de facto rule over a large terrain, what began as an opportunity for a genuine peace process may be compromised by historic and unresolved factors.