The Syrian and Egyptian Campaigns

Abstract

The October war, although it came as a surprise to the world, was inevitable as a result of failures to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict by peaceful means. The occupation by Israel of Arab territories after the June 1967 war had not brought about the political concessions from the Arab side that Israel desired. Rather than enter direct negotiations at a time when Israel was expressing expansionist territorial demands, the Arab countries attempted to secure an Israeli withdrawal by various military initiatives (the War of Attrition, 1969-1970) and diplomatic means. The latter centred on attempts to persuade the international community, and in particular the United States, to enforce the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 upon Israel. But neither the Arab attempts, nor the means of pressure that were intended to support them repeated threats of a war that might embroil the great powers, or cutbacks of Arab oil-were taken seriously enough. On the contrary, during this period the United States claimed to be unable to exert pressure on Israel, while supplying it at the same time with large numbers of advanced and sophisticated weapons, such as Phantom fighterbombers, smart bombs, self-propelled artillery, electronic counter-measure (ECM) equipment and tanks. With the Israelis apparently determined to transform military occupation into a permanent status quo, the only alternative left to the Arabs was to initiate a war-which proved far more successful than had been anticipated.